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Abstract
In this dissertation I develop a pluralist theory of actual causation. I argue that we
need to distinguish between total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation.
The pluralist theory accounts for a set of example cases that have raised problems
for extant unified theories and it is supported by considerations about the various
functions of causal concepts. The dissertation also analyses the context-sensitivity
of actual causation. I show that principled accounts of causal reasoning in legal
inquiry face limitations and I argue that the context-sensitivity of actual causation
is best represented by a distinction between default and deviant states in causal
models.
The dissertation has three parts. Part I provides the theoretical background for
my pluralist account. First, two central problems for theories of actual causation
are introduced: the problem of redundancy and the problem of selection (Chapter
2). Then I review extant accounts that address these problems by employing the
framework of causal models. A central assumption of these accounts is that there
is a single unified concept of actual causation (Chapter 3).
Part II presents my pluralist account. I argue from an interventionist perspective
that we need to distinguish between total, path-changing, and contributing actual
causation. Moreover, I present a novel distinction between two senses in which
concepts of actual causation are context sensitive. Context-sensitivity1 concerns
the normality or typicality of an individual event, independently of other events
iii
that occur. Context-sensitivity2 concerns our willingness to consider an event’s
occurrence given that certain other events also occur (Chapter 4). Next, I argue
that we also need to be pluralist with regard to the function of concepts of actual
causation. I show that interventionist approaches to the function of causal concepts
face limitations. In order to make sense of certain claims of actual causation we
need to assume that their function is to indicate responsibility for some outcome
(Chapter 5).
Part III explores consequences of the pluralist account with particular regard to
the context-sensitivity of actual causation. First, I employ the distinction between
two kinds of context-sensitivity, in order to show that principled approaches to
causal inquiry in the law face difficulties. While principled approaches may circum-
vent context-sensitivity1, it is unlikely that they will overcome context-sensitivity2
(Chapter 6). Finally, I present a new argument for incorporating a distinction be-
tween default and deviant states into the formal framework of causal models. Some-
times agents agree about the causal structure but disagree about the appropriate
causal judgments. In this kind of situations causal models with defaults can facil-
itate clarification by enabling a distinction between epistemic disagreement about
causal structure and normative disagreement about relevant possibilities (Chapter
7).




In dieser Dissertation entwickle ich eine pluralistische Theorie der Verursachung.
Ich argumentiere für eine Unterscheidung zwischen totaler, pfad-verändernder und
beitragender Verursachung. Die pluralistische Theorie löst Beispielfälle, die für ex-
istierende vereinheitlichende Theorien der Verursachung Schwierigkeiten hervor-
rufen. Außerdem wird die Theorie durch Überlegungen zu den vielseitigen Funk-
tionen kausaler Begriffe untermauert. Ferner analysiert die Dissertation die Kon-
textabhängigkeit von Verursachung. Ich weise Grenzen für prinzipienbasierte An-
sätze zur rechtlichen Ursachenanalyse auf und ich lege ein neues Argument dafür
vor, dass kausale Modelle kontextabhängige Überlegungen am besten mit Hilfe
einer Unterscheidung zwischen Standardzuständen und abweichenden Zuständen
repräsentieren.
Die Dissertation hat drei Teile. Teil I legt den theoretischen Hintergrund für
meinen pluralistischen Ansatz dar. Zwei zentrale Probleme für Theorien der Verur-
sachung werden eingeführt: das Problem der Redundanz und das Problem der
Auswahl (Kapitel 2). Anschließend gebe ich einen Überblick über existierende
Ansätze, die diese Probleme mit Hilfe kausaler Modelle zu lösen versuchen. Eine
zentrale Annahme dieser Ansätze ist, dass es einen einzigen vereinheitlichten Be-
griff von Verursachung gibt (Kapitel 3).
Teil II präsentiert meinen pluralistischen Ansatz. Aus einer interventionistischen
Perspektive argumentiere ich dafür, dass wir zwischen totaler, pfad-verändernder
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und beitragender Verursachung unterscheiden müssen. Ich führe außerdem eine
neue Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Arten von Kontextabhängigkeit von Verur-
sachung ein. Kontextabhängigkeit1 betrifft die Normalität oder Typikalität eines
individuellen Ereignisses, unabhängig von anderen Ereignissen. Kontextabhängig-
keit2 betrifft unsere Bereitschaft, das Eintreten eines bestimmten Ereig-nisses zu
erwägen, gegeben, dass bestimmte andere Ereignisse eintreten (Kapitel 4). Danach
argumentiere ich dafür, dass wir auch eine pluralistische Theorie für die Funktion
von Verursachungsbegriffen brauchen. Ich zeige, dass interventionistische Ansätze
zur Funktion von Verursachungsbegriffen eine begrenzte Erklärungskraft haben.
Um bestimmte Aussagen über Verursachung richtig einzuordnen, müssen wir an-
nehmen, dass sie die Funktion haben, auf Verantwortungsträger hinzuweisen.
Teil III lotet die Konsequenzen meines pluralistischen Ansatzes aus und widmet
sich der Kontextabhängigkeit von Verursachung. Zuerst verwende ich die Unter-
scheidung zwischen zwei Arten von Kontextabhängigkeit, um zu zeigen, dass prin-
zipienbasierte Ansätze zur rechtlichen Ursachenanalyse mit Problemen konfrontiert
sind. Während prinzipienbasierte Ansätze möglicherweise Kontextsensitivität1
umgehen können, ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass sie Kontextabhängigket2 verhin-
dern können (Kapitel 6). Schließlich präsentiere ich ein neues Argument für eine
Unterscheidung zwischen Standardzuständen und abweichenden Zuständen in
kausalen Modellen. Manchmal sind sich Akteure über die kausale Struktur einig,
während sie sich uneinig über die angemessenen Kausalurteile sind. In diesen Situ-
ationen können kausale Modelle, die Standardzustände und abweichende Zustände
unterscheiden, Klarheit verschaffen. Sie ermöglichen eine Unterscheidung zwis-
chen epistemischer Uneinigkeit über die kausale Struktur von normativer Un-
einigkeit über relevante Möglichkeiten.
Schlagwörter: Kausale Modelle, kausaler Pluralismus, interventionistische Theo-
rien der Kausalität, Verantwortung, Kontextabhängigkeit.
vi
Acknowledgments
First of all, I would like to thank Mathias Frisch and Hasok Chang for giving me
the opportunity to conduct this project under their supervision. Thank you very
much for your feedback, advice, and support.
I am particularly grateful to Christopher Hitchcock for acting as external referee
for the thesis. As the following pages show, his work has had an enormous influence
on my thinking about actual causation.
My intellectual home during the past years has been the DFG Graduiertenkol-
leg 2073 "Integrating Ethics and Epistemology of Scientific Research." One of the
great advantages of the Graduiertenkolleg has been the opportunity to benefit from
a large group of members of faculty both at the University of Hanover and the
University of Bielefeld. I would like to thank all principle investigators for useful
comments on my presentations at the GRK colloquia and many helpful conversa-
tions. In particular, I would like to thank Uljana Feest and Marie Kaiser for detailed
comments on drafts of chapters of the thesis and for helpful advice during tutorials.
Life as a PhD student would surely have been much poorer had it not been
for the wonderful community of fellow PhD students and Postdocs within the
GRK. I am grateful for joint enjoyment of the culinary highlights provided by
the Contine, long evenings of table tennis at the theory workshops, and an open
ear for my philosophical concerns even after the 1000th iteration of the notorious
thought experiments involving Billy and Suzy. Many thanks especially to the
vii
Hanover-based part of the group, including Markus Ahlers, Stefano Canali, Philipp
Eichenberger, David Hopf, Daria Jadreškić, Anna Leuschner, Jonas Lipski, Leon
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1. Introduction
The topic of this thesis is the concept of actual causation. The term ’actual’ suggests
that this concept refers to a particular kind of cause—a kind of cause that is naturally
contrasted with potential causes. A potential cause is something that can bring about
a certain effect. An actual cause then is something that does bring about a certain
effect.
The distinction between actual and potential causes is relevant in situations where
we want to know why a certain event occurred or a certain state of affairs came
about. Often we are able to identify a number of conditions that could explain
the outcome but we need to know what actually did bring it about. Consider, for
example, a legal inquiry that concerns a particular person’s death. Common sense
suggests a wide range of potential causes. For example, given the circumstantial
evidence it may be hypothesized that the person’s death was caused by poisoning.
In order to verify the hypothesis, we need to know not only that poisoning is one
way in which a person can die. We need to know whether the person’s death was
actually caused by poison.
Here is another example—one that suggests that actual causation is relevant in
contexts of intervention as well. Suppose you have serious back pain and visit your
doctor. The doctor knows about a wide range of potential causes of back pain: poor
posture, little exercise, or more serious conditions such as a prolapsed disk or a
broken bone in the spine. In order to prescribe the optimal medical intervention,
1
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the doctor will need to know which of these factors actually causes your back pain.
Actual causes matter in the sciences as well. In the 1960s Arno Penzias and
Robert Woodrow Wilson, two radio astronomers at Bell labs, measured an excess
signal of 2.7 K when they directed their horn antenna at the sky (Penzias and
Wilson (1965)). They had a range of hypotheses about potential causes of the
deviation, including human-made radiation from New York City, ionized particles
in the atmosphere resulting from high altitude atomic bomb tests, and pigeon’s
droppings in the antenna (Wilson (1978)). However, they wanted to know what
did cause the deviation. Eventually they concluded that the antenna was picking
up fossil radiation from an early stage of the universe, today known as the Cosmic
Microwave Background Radiation.
What distinguishes actual causes from merely potential causes? Actual causes
do occur. The prolapsed disk is an actual cause of your back pain only if it is in fact
prolapsed. Likewise, the poisoning is an actual cause of the victim’s death only if
the person was really poisoned and the Microwave Background is an actual cause
only if it is true that there is background radiation of this type.
But mere realization of the respective events or states of affairs is not sufficient.
The cause also has to bring about the effect. A natural way to spell out what this
means is to say that the effect depends on the cause. If the cause had not occurred,
then the effect would not have occurred either. However, this criterion is known
to fail in instances where more than one factor could have brought about the effect.
Consider, for example, the following case of preemption. An assassin in training
shoots the victim. On his mission he is accompanied by a supervising assassin who
would have shot the victim if he had lost his nerves. This is a situation where the
effect (the victim’s death) does not depend on its cause (the trainee’s pulling the
trigger of his gun) because there is a backup process (the supervisor) that would
have sustained the effect if the primary process had failed (Hitchcock, 2001).
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One approach to cases like these, going back to Judea Pearl (2000), is that coun-
terfactual dependence as a criterion for causation can be retained if we require
dependence under certain contingencies. Under the contingency that the supervising
assassin does not intervene, the victim’s death depends on the trainee’s behaviour,
therefore the trainee is an actual cause. The crucial challenge for an account like
this is to find general criteria that delineate permissible from impermissible contin-
gencies. There is now a wide range of accounts that suggest different criteria for the
delineation. Most accounts of this kind spell out the criteria with the help of causal
models. A causal model consists of a set of variables and a set of structural equa-
tions. The variables represent possible events or states of affairs in the target system
and the structural equations describe the causal relations between the variables.
Joseph Halpern’s book Actual Causality (2016) is exemplary for the current state of
art in the causal-model based literature on actual causation. Surveying a plethora of
example cases Halpern offers three competing basic definitions of actual causation
and discusses several ways of combining these definitions with additional criteria
that restrict contingencies in terms of "normality." At the same time, Halpern is
convinced that there is one unified concept of actual causation that captures the
causal intuitions in the wealth of example cases.
In this thesis I will propose a new account of actual causation that is explicitly
pluralist. According to my account, there is a range of concepts of actual causa-
tion that need to be distinguished. More specifically, I shall propose a distinction
between three notions of actual causation. In order to provide a preliminary un-
derstanding of the distinction let me give a brief and rough characterization of the
concepts—exact definitions will be provided in Chapter 4. First, an event c is a total
actual cause of another event e if and only if e depends on c. This means that if c




Second, an event c is a path-changing actual cause1 of another event e if and only
if e depends on c, given that certain other consequences of intervening on c do not
occur. The key difference to total actual causation is that in order to prevent the
effect of a path-changing actual cause we need to apply (at least) two interventions.
If c is a path-changing actual cause of e, then a primary intervention that prevents
c needs to be combined with a secondary intervention on adverse consequences
of the intervention on c. For example, an intervention on the assassin in training
would lead to an attack on the victim by the supervising assassin. In order to save
the victim the primary intervention on the assassin in training has to be combined
with a secondary intervention on the supervising assassin.
Third, an event c is a contributing actual cause2 of another event e if and only if
e depends on c, given that certain other events c′ that are independent of c do not
occur. This means that if c is a contributing actual cause of e (but not a path-changing
or total actual cause), then an intervention that prevents c has to be combined with
an intervention that prevents c′ in order to prevent e. Contributing actual causation
is found in examples of symmetrical overdetermination. Each one of two fires that
approach a house from different sides is a contributing actual cause of the house
being destroyed. Like in path-changing actual causation the goal (e.g. saving the
house) is achieved only if more than one intervention is applied. The difference is
that the additional intervention targets a causal process that is independent of the
process targeted by the first intervention and was active in the first place.3 This is
relevant because such active causal processes are often much easier to track than
processes that are only activated through the attempt of preventing the effect.
1The definition of path-changing actual cause that I will propose in Chapter 4 will be similar to (and
is inspired by) definitions of actual cause provided by Pearl (2000), Hitchcock (2001), and Halpern
(2015).
2The definition of contributing actual cause that I will propose in Chapter 4 will be similar to (and
is inspired by) Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) preliminary definition of actual cause.
3More precisely, this is true for instances of contributing actual causation that are not instances of
path-changing actual causation.
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Causal pluralism is typically motivated through failures to capture the diversity
of causal reasoning within one unified account of causation. Nancy Cartwright
(2007), for example, argues that there is a range of opposing approaches to causation
which solve certain paradigmatic problem cases but fail with respect to others. This
observation is taken to support the pessimistic inference that no account will ever
achieve unification. My pluralist theory is not based on such an assumption.
Instead, I propose, we need to distinguish a plurality of causal concepts in order to
facilitate the functions of causal reasoning most effectively. In particular, I argue that
the differences between total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation are
important from the perspective of an intervening agent. If we suppose that actual
causation has the function to indicate intervention targets that are most suited for
achieving our goals (as argued, for example, by Christopher Hitchcock and Joshua
Knobe (2009)), then the concept should at least tell us whether a single intervention is
sufficient for achieving the goal or whether that intervention needs to be combined
with another intervention.
Thus, the pluralism is positively motivated through considerations regarding
the purpose that concepts of actual causation fulfil for an agent who uses these
concepts. Thus, I aim to provide a functional account of actual causation. The most
prominent functional account of causation has been provided by James Woodward
(2014). According to Woodward, a functional account "takes as its point of departure
the idea that causal information and reasoning are sometimes useful or functional
in the sense of serving various goals and purposes that we have" (693). The focus of
Woodward’s interventionist theory is one particular kind of purpose: manipulation.
Woodward argues that a functional account "then proceeds by trying to understand
and evaluate various forms of causal cognition in terms of how well they conduce
to the achievement of these purposes. Causal cognition is thus seen as a kind of
epistemic technology—as a tool—and, like other technologies judged in terms of
5
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how well it serves our goals and purposes" (693f).
Woodward’s functional approach has both descriptive and evaluative elements. It
has descriptive elements because it is based on assumptions about how we actually
use causal concepts. It has evaluative elements because it involves an assessment
of whether causal concepts facilitate our goals. Moreover, the metaphor of causal
cognition as a technology suggests that we can also improve that technology. In
that sense a functional account can be understood as pursuing a kind of conceptual
engineering (Cappelen, 2018).
One way to employ a functional account is to aim at explaining the distinction
between causal and non-causal relations. Such an account has been put forward,
for example, by Cartwright (1979) who argues that we need to distinguish causal
relations from mere correlations in order to identify effective strategies. For exam-
ple, it may well be the case that holding a college teachers’ life insurance policy
correlates with longer lifetimes. However, purchasing a life insurance policy is not
an effective strategy for lengthening one’s life because it is not a cause of a longer
lifetime.
I take my functional account to make a contribution to the more recent project
of establishing useful distinctions among causes. Many have argued implicitly
(e.g. Woodward (2003)) or explicitly (e.g. Hitchcock (2003, 2007b)) that such useful
distinctions can be drawn. Woodward, for example, distinguishes a range of causal
notions, including direct, total, contributing, and actual causation. Pace Woodward,
however, I will argue that it is a mistake to list actual causation as one notion among
the other notions. Instead, I argue that we need to distinguish between total, path-
changing, and contributing actual causation as detailed above.
Another important difference to existing functional accounts is that I do not take
our intuitions associated with actual causation to be explained solely by the func-
tion it plays in contexts of intervention. In the law the function of this concept is
6
to indicate responsibility for some harm. Most interventionists seem to be aware
of this function—yet they spell out the role that the concept plays in our cognitive
architecture by referring to interventions. Thus, there seems to be an underlying
assumption that intervention and responsibility are in some sense closely related.
Hitchcock and Knobe’s (2009) account makes this assumption explicit and iden-
tifies the ascription of responsibility as one kind of intervention. I will address
this assumption more specifically and highlight cases of causal reasoning where
intervention and responsibility come apart. I take these cases to indicate potential
limitations of a purely interventionist functional account of actual causation.
The second central theme of this thesis (along with pluralism about actual causa-
tion) is the context-sensitivity of concepts of actual causation. Context-sensitivity
means that if a factor is an actual cause of an event in some context, then there may
be other contexts where this is not the case. There are two ways in which context-
sensitivity has featured in debates about actual causation. First, actual causation
has been related to considerations of normality. The idea is, roughly, that we typ-
ically identify only those factors as actual causes that are abnormal. For example,
we typically identify a short-circuit as an actual cause of a fire but not the presence
of oxygen. This is related to the fact that normally we inhabit places where oxygen
is present and short-circuits do not occur. But of course there are contexts where
the situation is reversed. If the fire occurs in a scientific experiment that involves
a short-circuit in an evacuated chamber, then the presence of oxygen is abnormal
and, thus, will be identified as actual cause.
Second, most definitions of actual causation that will be discussed here make
explicit reference to an underlying causal model. These definitions typically require
that the underlying causal model be an appropriate representation of the target
system. However, there are no hard and fast criteria of what an apt causal model
is. Moreover, what counts as an appropriate causal model in one context may
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not be acceptable in another context. In particular this concerns whether a causal
model represents all the causal structure that is relevant for evaluating a situation
and whether it involves scenarios that are not to be taken seriously because they
are too far fetched. A causal model that describes the death of the flowers in the
municipal gardens as depending on whether the Queen of England waters them
may be rejected on these grounds: the scenario that the Queen waters the flowers is
just too unlikely to be included in an apt representation of the situation. It should be
clear, however, that there may be contexts where the Queen’s watering the flower
is a relevant scenario.
In accordance with the idea of a pluralism about actual causation I will distinguish
two kinds of context-sensitivity. Context-sensitivity1 concerns our willingness to
entertain counterfactuals involving the occurrence of certain individual events.
Our willingness to accept oxygen as an actual cause of fire, for example, depends
upon whether we take the absence of oxygen to be a salient scenario. This kind
of consideration can also be understood as related to the feasibility of particular
interventions: oxygen is usually taken to be a background condition—and legiti-
mately so—because there are many other strategies for preventing fire that are more
feasible than preventing the presence of oxygen.
Context-sensitivity2, by contrast, concerns our willingness to consider the occur-
rence of certain events, given that certain other events occur or do not occur. Our
identifying the assassin in training as an actual cause of the victim’s death, for ex-
ample, depends on considerations of this kind. He is an actual cause because in a
situation where he does not pull the trigger of his gun it is still a serious possibility
that the supervisor fails to intervene and that the victim survives as a result. This
kind of consideration can also be understood as related to the feasibility of combina-
tions of interventions. Do we think there is a possible combination of interventions
that would save the victim? Context-sensitivity2 is important, for example, in cases
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of preemptive prevention. In preemptive prevention an event c prevents another
event e that would have been prevented by another event d that would have oc-
curred in the absence of c. In these cases our identifying c as actual cause depends
on how willing we are to take seriously the scenario that d fails to occur in the
absence of c.
The relevance of norms in the debate on actual causation may come as a surprise
from the perspective of law, where the notion of actual causation has its origin.
Here actual causation is traditionally construed as a notion that is not context-
sensitive. I will argue that my disambiguation between context-sensitivity1 and
context-sensitivity2 will shed new light on the feasibility of such a norm-free notion
of actual causation. More specifically, context-sensitivity1 may to a certain degree
be eliminated from the legal inquiry regarding causes. Richard Wright (1985) argues
that legal inquiry is concerned with the question whether a particular instance of
tortious behaviour stands in a causal relation to the harm. But whether a particular
behaviour is tortious (that is, abnormal according to some legal norm) is not part of
the causal inquiry. This argument, however, does not extend to context-sensitivity2.
Whether, for example, we take the non-use of a defective brake to be an actual cause
of an accident depends on whether we are willing to construe the case as an instance
of preemptive prevention and this, in turn, depends on whether we take seriously
the possibility of certain combinations of events.
Another question concerns how we should account for norm-related considera-
tions in the framework of causal models. One way that has been popular among a
wide range of contributors is to invoke a distinction between default and deviant
values. The idea is that variables normally (in one or a mixture of its many possible
senses) take on their default values whereas the deviant values represent abnormal-
ities. Thomas Blanchard and Jonathan Schaffer (2017) have advanced a powerful
argument against defaults. They argue that standard cases that suggest a need
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for incorporating the default/deviant distinction result from problematic assump-
tions about the underlying causal models. Rather than extending the formalism of
causal models by the default/deviant distinction, we should provide more careful
models that do not represent far-fetched scenarios in the first place. I largely agree
with Blanchard and Schaffer’s argument as a response to standard arguments for
defaults. However, I will argue that there are situations where Blanchard and Schaf-
fer’s argument has problematic consequences. Norms affect our causal judgements.
Thus, when agents disagree about norms they may subscribe to conflicting judge-
ments of actual causation. In such cases it is better to represent the disagreement
as a disagreement about default and deviant values rather than as a disagreement
about appropriate model decisions. The reason is that if disagreement is confined
to defaults, the agents may still agree on an underlying causal model. This is par-
ticularly relevant in situations with complex causal structure where disagreement
may also arise for epistemic reasons.
The remainder of the Introduction is structured as follows. In section 1.1 I will
specify what I take actual causation to be. In section 1.2 I will clarify the relation
of actual causation to other causal concepts that have been proposed within the
framework of interventionist causal models. In section 1.3 I will relate my own
contribution to existing strands in the literature on causation. In section 1.4 I will
provide a brief overview of the chapters of this thesis.
1.1. What is Actual Causation?
I will argue that there is a plurality of concepts of actual causation. Nevertheless, we
need to say why the concepts fall into the category of actual causation—as opposed
to causation simpliciter. The examples provided earlier suggest that there are three
important features of actual causation.
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First, actual causation entails that a certain cause event and a certain effect event
occur. When we ask for the actual cause of this particular person’s death, we ask
for information about the circumstances under which this particular person died.
An answer to this question will (at least implicitly) refer to certain general causal
claims—such as the fact that, generally, persons with the bodily constitution of the
victim die if they ingest a certain amount of poisonous substance. But the point
is that the claim of actual causation is not exhausted by such claims: we need to
know whether this particular person did in fact ingest a sufficient amount of the
poisonous substance.
Second, a claim of actual causation entails that the effect event is in fact brought
about by the cause event. There is no consensus on what ’bringing about’ means.
Nevertheless, it is safe to say that whether one event brought about another event
in a particular situation depends on the specifics of that situation. For example,
it is a feature of the particular situation that the assassin in training preempts the
supervising assassin. In other contexts it may well be the case that the supervisor
kills the victim and the trainee is preempted, or both kill the victim at the same
time.4
Third, actual causation typically involves privileging the cause as particularly
salient. We identify the assassin’s pulling the trigger of the gun as actual cause
of the victim’s death but not the absence of a potential gust of wind that could
have deflected the bullet. Backgrounding the potential gust of wind is a contextual
matter. There may well be instances of assassination where the absence of wind is
a salient detail.
Many authors identify actual causation with singular causation.5 Singular cau-
4We will see that this kind of information is often even programmed into the causal models. A causal
model in which the value of the supervisor variable depends on the value of the trainee value, for
example, reflects the the fact that the supervisor waits as a backup in this particular situation.
5Often the claim of identity is made implicitly as in Woodward (2003) who examines "the relationship
between [type-causal claims] and claims involving actual-, singular-, or token-causal claims" (75),
for further examples see Baumgartner and Fenton-Glynn (2013); Baumgartner (2013); Kutach
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sation is taken to be a relation between token events as in ’the fire in the Grenfell
Tower, London on 14 June 2017 was caused by a malfunctioning fridge’ and it is
contrasted with causal laws that relate types of events as in ’malfunctioning fridges
cause fires.’
It is true that considerations of actual causation most naturally arise with regard to
token events. Actual causation depends on which token events occur in a particular
situation. For example, the prolapsed disk being an actual cause of a particular
person’s back pain depends on whether this particular person has a prolapsed
disk. However, it is not true that actual causation essentially concerns token events,
which means that actual causation is not to be equated with singular causation. The
reason is that we can make generalized claims about which kinds of events occur in
which kinds of ways. Let me explain. Looking at a population of back pain patients,
for example, we can make generalized claims about how many of these patients’
back pain has actually been caused by prolapsed disks. Such claims are not token
claims. For they concern not a token instance of back pain.6 But neither are they
simply claims of potential causation. For they concern not merely what could be
the cause of these patients’ back pain but what actually did cause it.
We can also make generalized claims about the way in which events occur. Sup-
pose the assassin in training and his supervisor follow certain general instructions
for assassin education, according to which a trainee is to be accompanied by a su-
pervisor who waits as a backup. This particular sequence of token events can then
be understood as an instance of a general scheme in which the trainee preempts
the supervisor. There are also more mundane cases of generalized preemption.
(2013); Halpern and Hitchcock (2015); Halpern (2016); Blanchard and Schaffer (2017); Fenton-
Glynn (2015); Menzies and Beebee (2019).
6Is the fact that three patients have back pain because of three prolapsed disks not itself an instance
of token causation? From the interventionist perspective that will be central to this the following
discussion, such a coarse individuation scheme seems to be difficult to motivate. What matters
from the perspective of the doctor is that there are three different patients and, therefore, three
medical interventions have to be performed.
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Consider the relation between constituents of complex electric circuits. Under cir-
cumstances of normal operation, for example, standard electricity supply preempts
emergency power supply.
A key advantage of allowing generalized actual causation is that it explains why
we are interested in actual causation from the perspective of intervention. From the
perspective of an intervening agent strictly singular causal relations are (or should
be) of limited interest, especially when they concern events in the past, because
we cannot change the past. Generalized claims of actual causation, by contrast,
can be extremely useful from the perspective of an intervening agent. Knowing,
for example, that assassins in training are typically accompanied by supervising
assassins who intervene only if the trainee fails can be quite useful for an intervening
agent whose goal it is to save the victim.
Most examples of actual causation that I have discussed so far concern causes and
effects in the past—as indicated by ’c caused e’, in the past tense. These are the most
intuitive examples. One reason is that relations of actual causation depend on how
events actually occur. And it is often much easier to evaluate this in retrospective.
Moreover, the term ’actual’ suggests that actual causation describes events that
have already occurred or are currently occurring, while events that may occur in
the future could still turn out differently.
However, I will not take actual causation to be so confined. That is, actual
causation may well describe a relation between events that will occur in the future.
Again, a key advantage of allowing actual causation to concern sequences of events
in the future is that it explains why we are interested in actual causation from the
perspective of intervention. This is because only events that will occur in the future
can be under the control of intervening agents.
Earlier I have argued that a natural way to understand the term ’actual’ is to
contrast it with ’potential.’ But this contrast has to be taken with caution if applied
13
1. Introduction
to sequences of events in the future. If we take future relations of actual causation
to be under control, this entails that the circumstances can be changed such that the
events may or may not occur. In this sense future events are potential rather than
actual. If this is the case, what does it mean to talk of actual events in the future?
Actual events in the future are those events that will occur unless an intervening
agent prevents them. In this sense the trainee’s pulling the trigger of his gun will
be an actual cause of the victim’s death, unless an agent will have intervened on
the trainee.
Actual causation is more accurately described as a backward-looking concept, as
suggested by Hitchcock (2017). Backward-looking does not mean that actual causa-
tion is necessarily concerned with events in the past. Instead it reflects the idea that
actual causation describes "effect-backward reasoning." This is the kind of reasoning
we employ if we ask for the causes of a particular kind of effect and is contrasted
with "cause-forward reasoning" (Hitchcock, 2017, 118), where we ask for the effects
of a particular cause.
1.2. Actual Causation and other Causal Concepts
The purpose of this section is a preliminary clarification of the relation between
actual causation and other causal concepts. At the same time, this section shall
illustrate why actual causation is a crucial topic for functional accounts of causation.
One potential objection to my description of actual causation so far is that the
resulting problems are not problems that are to be solved by a theory of causation.
Instead they rather seem to concern the pragmatics of causal reasoning in particular
applications, such as explanation, intervention and the ascription of responsibility.
Another worry is that, if the aim of my account is to draw distinctions among causes
rather than between causes and non-causes, then it does not seem to be dealing
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with the philosophical question of what causation fundamentally is.
In a sense the objections are exactly right. The account that I propose here
already assumes that actual causation and other concepts of causation can be spelled
out with reference to some kind of counterfactual conditional. At the same time,
however, I think that from a philosophical point of view there is much more to
be said about causation than what would be provided by a minimal theory that
captures the difference between causal and non-causal relations. In particular, there
is much more to be said from the perspective of a functional account that tries to
elucidate why we entertain certain forms of causal reasoning.
Arguably, the most controversial feature of actual causation is the distinction
between salient causes and mere background conditions. There are many theorists
who do not hesitate to discuss problems associated with preemption and other
forms of redundancy. But even among these theorists most are highly critical of the
distinction between causes and background conditions (see e.g. Lewis (1973a); Hall
(2004), a more detailed discussion will be provided in Chapter 2).
Let me explain why I think that the distinction between cause and mere back-
ground condition is so important and needs to be covered by a functional account.
According to Woodward, X is a contributing cause of Y relative to some variable set
V if and only if (1) there is a path of direct causes leading from X to Y and (2)
there is an intervention on X that changes the value of Y if all variables in V that
are not part of this path are held fixed at some value (Woodward (2003), 55, for a
more detailed discussion of this definition see Chapter 4). Note that this definition
explicitly refers to a particular causal model that is constituted by a set of variables
V.7 Moreover, note that for X to be a contributing cause of Y it is sufficient that an
intervention on X leads to a change in Y given that the other variables inV (that do
not lie on the path between X and Y) are held fixed at some value. This value does
7Chapter 3 will give a detailed exposition of the causal models framework.
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not have to be the value that reflects the actual state of the target system or even
a state that the target system is likely to be in. As a consequence, decisions about
which variables are part of V and decisions about the variables’ possible values
have significant influence on whether X is a contributing cause of Y.
Here is an example (taken from Statham (2017)). Usually the consumption of
bottled water (BC) is not considered to be a cause of heart disease (HD). In a causal
model that consists of these two variables, there would be no edge leading from
BC to HD because there is no intervention on BC that changes the value of HD.
However, consider the possibility that water reacts with plastic bottles in a way that
produces chemical X, which causes heart disease if consumed. Figure 1.1 shows a
model of the situation, where XW represents whether the chemical reaction occurs
and XC represents whether the dangerous chemical is consumed. According to
this causal model, water consumption is a contributing cause of heart disease. For
if we set XW = 1, then there is an intervention on BC that changes the value of
HD. Thus, Woodward’s definition yields the result that water consumption is not
a cause of heart disease according to a model with V1 = {BC,HD}, but that it is a
cause according to a model withV2 = {BC,XW,XC,HD}.
Figure 1.1.: Is consumption of bottled water a contributing cause of heart disease?
Whether XW should be included in V depends on whether XW = 0 is a back-
ground condition that can be taken for granted, or whether XW = 1 is a scenario
that is to be taken seriously. The variable-relativity of Woodward’s definition, thus,
makes the notion essentially dependent upon context-sensitive considerations re-
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garding background conditions.
In a response to Michael Strevens’s review of Making Things Happen8 Woodward
also offers a definition of contributing cause that is not relative to a set of variables:
"X is a contributing cause of Y simpliciter (in a sense that isn’t relativised
to any particular variable set V) as long as it is true that there exists a
variable set V such that X is correctly represented as a contributing cause
of Y with respect to V" (Woodward (2008), 209, emphasis original).
This definition can be understood in two ways, depending on what variable sets
VWoodward admits. If Woodward is only referring to the restrictive variable sets
(that draw a line between background conditions and factors that are to be taken
seriously) then this definition still essentially involves context-sensitive considera-
tions. However, if Woodward means to include all possibleV, including cases like
the dangerous chemical in the bottled water example, then the notion may not be
context-sensitive. However, note that this definition would be extremely permis-
sive. If there is just one causal model according to which a change in C leads to a
change in E, then C is considered a contributing cause of E. Woodward is aware
of the permissiveness (even of the non-derelativised notion of contributing cause).
He argues that
"the bare claim that X causes Y is not very informative. From the per-
spective of a manipulability account, what one would really like to know
is not just whether there is some manipulation of (or intervention on) X
that will change Y; that is, whether it is true that X causes Y. One would
also like to have more detailed information about just which interven-
tions on X will change Y (and in what circumstances) and how they will
8Michael Strevens criticizes the variable relativity of Woodward’s definition for reasons that are
different from those discussed here. For a discussion of Strevens’s (2007) objection see Woodward’s
defense (2008), Strevens’s reply (2008) and McCain (2015) and Statham (2017) who argue that
Strevens’s criticism is based on a misunderstanding of Woodward’s definition of intervention.
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change Y" (Woodward, 2003, 66).
The more specific information is, of course, provided by the structural equations of
the causal model. But Woodward also takes this as a motivation for defining useful
distinctions among causes, such as those suggested in Woodward (2010).
The crucial point here is that it seems like Woodward’s framework offers two
options. The first option is that the notion of contributing cause is relativised
to a set of variables V and, thus, essentially depends on the cause/background
distinction. This notion seems to be sufficiently restrictive in order to be informative
from the perspective of an intervening agent with particular pragmatic goals. The
second option is that the notion of contributing cause is derelativised but extremely
permissive. In order to provide a theory of causation that is informative from the
perspective of an intervening agent one then has to provide further, more specific,
contextual information such as provided by claims of actual causation.
Georgie Statham (2017) argues that we should not derelativise. She argues that
"[t]o the extent that we don’t know about all the causal systems that exist in the
universe, it [...] becomes impossible to be sure that any given causal claim is false."
She concludes that "it seems preferable to just claim that X is a cause of Y relative to
a particular [variable set]" (899). However, I think that it is preferable to assume that
there is some such highly permissive and derelativised notion of causation. There
are contexts where such a notion of cause is relevant, for example, as a constraint
on fundamental physical theories. At the same time, however, I emphasize that
a functional theory of causation such as the one that I will provide here needs to
address also other notions of causation that are richer in pragmatic content than this
minimal notion of causation. Otherwise, we will not be able to explain why agents
are interested in causal claims, for example, in contexts that concern manipulability
and responsibility.
Looking at concepts of actual causation is particularly promising in this regard.
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Concepts of actual causation, as I have described them above, involve specific
contextual information that is relevant, for example, from the perspective of an
intervening agent. This information concerns the actual state of the kind of target
system under consideration. Therefore, hypothetical scenarios such as the possibil-
ity of dangerous chemicals in the heart disease are largely irrelevant, unless we are
dealing with a situation where the rare chemical reaction occurs.
I have argued for the relevance of actual causation by contrasting it with other
causal concepts in Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation because this the-
ory will be relevant in the following discussion. However, I think that the argument
extends to other accounts of causation. Consider, for example, process theories of
causation as defended by Wesley Salmon (1984) and Phil Dowe (2000). According
to these theories, the defining criterion of a causal process is the transmission of
a mark or a conserved quantity. However, Hitchcock (1995) argues that this crite-
rion fails to account for explanatory relevance. For example, "John Jones avoided
becoming pregnant during the past year, for he has taken his wife’s birth control
pills regularly, and every man who regularly takes birth control pills avoids preg-
nancy" (Salmon, 1971, 34).9 The problem for process theories is that the criterion
of transmission is too permissive in order to exclude cases like these. John Jones’s
taking birth control pills is a causal process, however, not one that is relevant for his
not becoming pregnant. So, causal process theories may capture a certain minimal
concept of causation. But they are not sufficient to explain why causation serves the
function that it does, for example, in contexts of causal explanation. The basic con-
cept of causal process would have to be complemented with more specific notions
in order to give a satisfactory functional account.
9Explanatory relevance is one central problem for Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948) deductive-
nomological theory of explanation, which states that an explanation deduces the explanans from
a set of initial conditions using at least one general law.
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1.3. The Relation to other Approaches to Causation
Other Accounts of Causation
In this section I will put my own contribution into relation with existing strands
in the literature on causation—both beyond and within the tradition of counterfac-
tual conditionals. There is range of approaches that make different assumptions
about what causation fundamentally amounts to. In addition to the counterfactual
accounts that will be at the centre of my discussion, there are, first, regularity ac-
counts (Hume (1777/1975); Mill (1843/1882); Mackie (1974); Baumgartner and Falk
(forthcoming)). According to these accounts, causation ultimately comes down to
underlying laws of nature that need to be distinguished from merely accidental
generalizations. Second, there are probabilistic accounts. According to these ac-
counts, causation ultimately amounts to an increase of the probability of the effect
(Reichenbach (1956); Suppes (1970); Cartwright (1979); Skyrms (1980); Eells (1991)).
A central concern of these theories is to discern causal relations from spurious cor-
relations, such as those resulting from a common cause. Third, there are accounts
that define causation in terms of processes, as discussed in the foregoing section.
I will focus on the idea that actual causation can be spelled out in a useful way
in terms of counterfactual conditionals. The idea that causation is closely related to
such counterfactual conditionals goes back at least to David Hume (1777/1975)10 and
has been central to philosophical debates since the pioneering work of David Lewis
(1973a). One straightforward way of implementing counterfactual conditionals
would be to require that effects depend counterfactually on their actual causes.
However, this criterion seems to fail with regard to redundancy. Redundancy
means that in the absence of the cause there are other factors that sustain the
effect, which means that the effect does not depend counterfactually on the cause.
10Hume takes this to be equivalent to his regularity account, see Chapter 2.
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Proponents of counterfactual theories have put forward a range of accounts of the
problem of redundancy. Lewis’s (1973a) original approach requires that effects be
connected to their actual causes by a chain of counterfactual dependence. Later
Lewis (1986a) suggested that causation comes down to quasi-dependence, a notion
that appeals to the idea of counterfactual dependence as well as the intuition that
actual causation is an intrinsic relation. Finally, Lewis (2000; 2004) proposed an
account of causation as influence. Here the key idea is that the specific way in
which the effect occurs depends counterfactually on the way the cause occurs. All
these accounts have been confronted with counterarguments, which will be discuss
in Chapter 2.
Even though my focus will be on accounts according to which actual causation
is usefully spelled out in terms of counterfactual dependence under certain contin-
gencies, I take the resulting pluralism about actual causation to be of a more general
nature. That is, I do think that the pluralism is most conveniently defended within
the framework of causal models. However, I also think that the pluralism affects
other theories of actual causation as well. Lewis’s original ancestral dependence
account, for example, involves a distinction between causation and causal depen-
dence that is analogous to my distinction between total and path-changing actual
causation. Likewise, Lewis’s quasi-dependence account seems to suggest that we
can distinguish between dependence and quasi-dependence and, presumably, also
within the framework of the influence account one can distinguish different kinds
of influence.11
Other Projects in the Philosophy of Causation
My pluralist theory about actual causation is motivated by a functional approach.
Following Woodward (2014; 2015), such a functional approach can be contrasted
11It is an interesting question whether these distinctions extend to other theories that do not use
counterfactual conditionals. But this question is beyond the scope of my discussion.
21
1. Introduction
with contributions to the metaphysical project of causation which has the aim to
determine the "truth-makers" or "grounds" of causation.12 Further questions that
are relevant in this project concern whether causation is among the fundamental
constituents of reality, and what the true relata of the causal relationship are. More-
over, contributors to this project tend to emphasize that the analysis should not be
spoiled by merely pragmatic considerations. I will not have much to say about the
metaphysical project. For the most part I will take it for granted that causation, and
actual causation more specifically, can be spelled out usefully in terms of counter-
factual conditionals in one way or another. Thereby, I do not, however, mean to
commit to the metaphysical claim that causation reduces to counterfactuals. More-
over, by saying that causation can be usefully spelled out in terms of certain kinds
of counterfactuals I explicitly endorse the relevance of pragmatic factors.
According to Woodward (2014), two further projects within the philosophy of
causation are the descriptive project and the fit with physics project. Proponents of
the descriptive project, according to Woodward, "attach considerable importance
to constructing accounts whose aim is to describe or reproduce (what they take
to be) the causal judgments of "ordinary folk" regarding various scenarios" (692).
Woodward refers to mostly intuition-guided contributions such as those discussed
in Collins et al. (2004). But presumably studies on causal reasoning performed by
experimental philosophers or empirical psychologists (Walsh and Sloman (2005);
Knobe and Fraser (2008); Lombrozo (2010)) are also part of this project. A purely
descriptive account is surely to be distinguished from the functional project. For
whether a certain concept fulfils a particular function is an evaluative question.
However, I will not take the distinction to be so clear cut. The reason is that I take
my functional account to be informed by descriptive claims. This seems to be in
agreement with contributors such as Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) and Sytsma et
12Woodward identifies Tooley (1977), Armstrong (1983), and Bird (2005) as instantiations.
22
1.3. The Relation to other Approaches to Causation
al. (2012) who take their functional accounts to be informed by empirical studies on
causal judgement.
The fit with physics project, according to Woodward, is the somewhat vaguely
defined project focussing "on issues having to do with the relationship between
causal claims [...] and what is imagined by some philosophers to be "fundamental
physics"" (2014, 692). Woodward identifies sceptical arguments along the lines of
Hartry Field (2003) and Barry Loewer (2009) as examples for this project.13 Here,
again, the contrast with the functional project does not seem to be as clear cut.
Field’s and Loewer’s arguments seem to draw at least part of their motivation from
a perceived lack of usefulness of causal notions in physics. And Mathias Frisch ar-
gues against the scepticism of Field and Loewer and provides a "functional defense
of causal reasoning [...] in physics" (2014, 11).14 I will not address the fit with physics
project. Nevertheless, I think that my functional analysis of actual causation might
as well be usefully applied to causal reasoning—at least—in experimental physics.
For example, do physicists try to identify the actual causes of measurement results
and phenomena or is it sufficient to find potential causes? Sometimes measurement
deviations or surprising phenomena motivate a systematic search for underlying
actual causes, such as in the discovery of the Cosmic Microwave Background Radi-
ation. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to point to potential causes, for example,
when the deviation is within the limits of the errorbars. Moreover, selective causal
reasoning seems to be particularly relevant in experiments. In fact, it has been ar-
gued that experiments are designed to enable selective causal reasoning. According
to Norwood Russell Hanson, it is the very point of skilful experimentation "to bring
together a cluster of theoretical considerations in a single, tersely-expressed hy-
pothesis [and] to torture it in an experiment, each phase of which keeps everything
13The contributions in Price and Corry (2007) are also concerned with this project.
14See Frisch (forthcoming) for an argument that the functional and the fit-with-physics project are
not necessarily distinct projects.
23
1. Introduction
constant except one set of factors [...]" (1958, 67).
1.4. Overview of the Chapters
The thesis has three parts. Part I will provide the background for my pluralist
account. In Chapter 2 I will introduce two central problems for theories of actual
causation: the problem of redundancy and the problem of selection. In Chapter 3
I will review accounts that address these problems by employing the framework
of causal models. In Part II I will develop my pluralist account. In Chapter 4 I
will argue from an interventionist perspective that we need to distinguish a range
of different concepts of actual causation. In Chapter 5, I will argue that we also
need a pluralist account with regard to the function of these concepts. In Part III
I will explore consequences of the pluralist account with particular regard to the
context-sensitivity of actual causation. In Chapter 6 I will show that attempts to
provide a principled approach to actual causation in the law face difficulties. In
Chapter 7 I will provide a new argument for incorporating a distinction between
default and deviant values into the formal framework of causal models. In Chapter
8 I will summarize the main results and provide an outlook.
Part I – A Unified Account of Actual Causation?
Chapter 2 – The Problems of Redundancy and Selection
In Chapter 2 I will introduce two challenges for theories of actual causation: the
problem of redundancy and the problem of selection. There are four kinds of
redundancy: symmetrical overdetermination, early preemption, late preemption,
and trumping. I will also review four kinds of approaches for solving the problem
of redundancy that retain the basic idea of counterfactual dependence. First, I
will discuss the idea that effect events are to be construed in a very fine-grained
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way. Second, I will review Lewis’s account of transitive causation. Third, I will
address attempts to exploit the intrinsic nature of causation. Finally, I will address
Lewis’s idea that causation is to be spelled out in terms of influence. I will point
out where these accounts encounter difficulties in order to prepare the discussion
of the following chapters.
I will then turn to the problem of selection. I will point out what exactly the prob-
lem of selection is by identifying what I call Mill’s challenge: selection is capricious
and not justified. Mill’s challenge can be met by showing that there are principles
that guide causal selection and that these principles are justified. I will address two
kinds of approaches and assess whether they meet Mill’s challenge. First, there are
contextual-variable accounts. According to these accounts, the problem of selec-
tion arises if some contextual variable (e.g. causal field, contrast class, framework)
is left implicit. Second, I will discuss normality-based accounts. According to
these accounts, we tend to select those factors that are abnormal, where normality
can be understood in a range of different ways, including descriptive as well as
prescriptive senses. I will argue that normality-based accounts are contextual as
well, yet they are more informative than the contextual-variable accounts because
they can explain why causal selection is a largely stable phenomenon and why we
legitimately select some causes rather than others.
Chapter 3 – Causal Models for a Unified Account?
In Chapter 3 I will review existing attempts to provide a unified account of actual
causation in the framework of causal models. After a brief introduction to the
formalism of causal models I will first address a series of accounts that define actual
causation as dependence given that certain variables are held fixed at their actual
values. These accounts provide a successful treatment of cases involving early
preemption but face problems in cases involving symmetrical overdetermination.
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I will then address accounts that define actual causation as dependence given that
certain variables are set to non-actual values. These accounts succeed with respect
to early preemption and symmetrical overdetermination. However, they do so at
the price of providing a notion of actual causation that seems to be too permissive
in order to capture certain causal intuitions. In particular, they face the Problem
of Isomorphism. The Problem of Isomorphism describes instances where two
example cases seem to have isomorphic causal models but give rise to conflicting
causal judgements. This is a problem for accounts of actual causation that are based
solely on the structural features of causal models. Therefore, a number of authors
have suggested extending the formalism of causal models by a distinction between
default and deviant values. I will introduce such accounts and will illustrate how
the distinction is supposed to solve the Problem of Isomorphism.
Part II – Pluralism about Actual Causation
Chapter 4 – Pluralism about Actual Causation
In Chapter 4 I will advance a pluralist account about actual causation. I will ar-
gue that we need to distinguish total actual causes, path-changing actual causes,
and contributing actual causes. Total actual causation involves a straightforward
counterfactual dependence of the effect on the cause. The notion of path-changing
actual causation involves counterfactual dependence given that certain values are
fixed at their actual values. Finally, contributing actual causation involves counter-
factual dependence given that certain variables are set to non-actual values. The
pluralist account is supported by two lines of argument. First, I will provide a set
of toy examples that raise difficulties for unified accounts and I will show that my
pluralist theory accounts for them. Second, I will provide a functional justification.
An important function of reasoning in terms of actual causation is to indicate suit-
able targets of intervention. That is, claims about the actual causes of an undesired
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effect inform agents about suitable interventions that help avoid this effect. But
if this is the case, then these claims should at least tell the agent whether one or
several interventions have to be applied and whether the additional interventions
need to target other aspects of the situation that are currently actualized. Moreover,
I shall distinguish two kinds of context-sensitivity. Context-sensitivity1 concerns
the normality or typicality of an individual variable’s possible values. Context-
sensitivity2 concerns considerations regarding possible violations of the model’s
structural equations.
Chapter 5 – Responsibility and the Limits of Interventionism
In Chapter 5 I will examine the assumption that the function of concepts of actual
causation is to facilitate intervention. More specifically, I will identify two kinds of
situations where interventionist explanations of the function of actual causation face
difficulties. First, interventionists have difficulties to explain our interest in certain
selective claims of total actual causation. Interventionists argue that we identify
norm-violating factors as actual causes because they are particularly suited as tar-
gets for intervention. However, there are cases where token claims of total actual
causation clearly do not correspond to such suitable targets for intervention. Sec-
ond, in cases of redundancy the difference between symmetric overdetermination
and late preemption is (at least sometimes) difficult to capture from an interven-
tionist perspective. I will argue that where the interventionist perspective reaches




Part III – Consequences
Chapter 6 – Actual Causation in the Law
In Chapter 6 I will discuss the concept of actual causation in the law. In the law
the notion of actual causation goes back to the American Legal Realists of the early
20th century. These were concerned with delineating the factual elements of a legal
inquiry from those elements that depend upon norms and policy. "Actual causation"
is meant to refer to the factual elements that can be approached in a principled
way, while the norm-related and context-sensitive elements are described by the
notion of "proximate cause." This, however, seems to stand in conflict with the more
recent use of the term "actual causation" in the causal models literature, where
many contributors take it to be a context-sensitive notion. In this chapter I will
disentangle these apparently conflicting takes on the context-sensitivity of actual
causation. There seem to be two possible solutions. The first possible solution
is that the causal models literature (or large parts of it) has been right in arguing
that actual causation is (at least sometimes) context-sensitive. Then the literature on
causal models should provide us with arguments that undermine the Legal Realist’s
project. Alternatively, it could be the case that a principled account is possible and
that contributors to the causal models literature simply have been misguided in
using the term actual causation in order to refer to context-sensitive aspects of
causal reasoning. I will argue that either conclusion would be too quick. Context-
sensitivity1 can indeed be excluded from the lawyer’s causal inquiry. However, it
is unlikely that the Legal Realist is able to exclude context-sensitivity2. I thus use
the distinction introduced in Chapter 4 in order to shed new light on the notion of
actual cause in legal inquiry.
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Chapter 7 – Causation and the Problem of Disagreement
In Chapter 7 I will provide a new argument for incorporating the default/deviant
distinction into causal models. There are two ways to formalize context-sensitivity
in causal models. Either (i) one can adjust the model such that it reproduces
the plausible causal claims directly or (ii) one can enrich the causal structure by
introducing a distinction between default and deviant values of variables. Thomas
Blanchard and Jonathan Schaffer have argued for strategy (i) putting forward a
series of forceful arguments against the distinction between defaults and deviants.
I will argue—pace Blanchard and Schaffer—that defaults have an important role to
play. My argument is based on cases where causal reasoners agree about the causal
structure but disagree about the appropriate causal judgements. In this kind of
context causal models should be seen as a means of representation that facilitates
a clarification of different kinds of disagreement: epistemic disagreement about









2. The Problems of Redundancy and
Selection
2.1. Two Problems for Counterfactual Theories of Actual
Causation
In this chapter I will introduce and discuss two problems for counterfactual theories
of actual causation: the problem of redundancy and the problem of selection. The
discussion of these two problems shall motivate and prepare the accounts of actual
causation that will be discussed in Chapter 3. At the same time, this chapter shall
support a claim that I have put forward in the Introduction: actual causation is a
contextual notion.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 I will briefly explain what a
counterfactual theory of actual causation is. In section 2.3 I will introduce four kinds
of redundancy and explain why they are a problem for counterfactual definitions
of actual causation. In section 2.4 I will address four approaches to redundancy
that have been suggested and discussed by proponents of counterfactual accounts:
fragility, ancestral dependence, quasi-dependence, and influence. I will explain
why these accounts have been considered unsatisfactory. I will then turn to the
problem of selection. In section 2.5 I will specify what the problem of causal selection
is. More specifically, I will identify what will be called Mill’s challenge: the claim that
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causal selection is capricious, that is, that there are no guiding principles for selection
and that we are not justified to select. In section 2.6 I will discuss contextual-
variable accounts of causal selection. According to these accounts, the problem
of selection is solved by identifying a certain contextual variable, such as relevant
contrast classes. Contextual-variable accounts succeed in explaining the apparent
capriciousness of causal selection. However, they do not give guiding principles
for fixing the relevant contextual variable. In section 2.7 I will address recent and
promising attempts to spell out selection in terms of a concept of normality. I
will argue that these accounts are clearly contextual as well—because the notion of
normality is contextual. Nevertheless, the notion of normality also shows that there
are at least some guiding principles for causal selection and that these principles
are sometimes justified.
2.2. Counterfactuals and Actual Causation
A counterfactual conditional is a conditional of the form ’if the bottle had been
hit, then the bottle would have shattered.’ Both the term ’counterfactual’ and this
example seem to imply that the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is false.
But in the following I shall presume a broader understanding of counterfactuals that
is common among philosophers. According to this understanding, counterfactuals
can have antecedents that may be true, as in ’if the bottle were hit, then it would
shatter.’1
The first explicit counterfactual definition of causation was provided by David
Hume in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777/1975). Unfortunately,
however, Hume took the definition to be equivalent to his definition in terms of
regularities.2 For a long time, regularity analyses of causation dominated the philo-
1This is different in the psychological literature, where counterfactuals are typically considered to
have false antecedents, see Hoerl et al. (2011).
2"we may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first,
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sophical debate. Following a systematic analysis of the semantics of counterfactual
conditionals in terms of possible worlds (Stalnaker (1968); Lewis (1973b)), David
Lewis’s seminal article Causation (1973a) put counterfactuals on the agenda of the
philosophy of causation.
Lewis’s original counterfactual account of causation is developed in three stages.
We shall look briefly at the first two stages and address the third stage in section 2.4.2.
At the first stage Lewis defines a notion of counterfactual dependence as follows:
"Let there be two families A and C of propositions A1,A2, ... and C1,C2, .... If there
are true counterfactuals that relate all propositions in family A to propositions in
family C such that A1  C1,A2  C2, ..., then the C’s depend counterfactually on
the A’s" (1973a, 561, emphasis original). Here A  C is the counterfactual ’if it
were the case that A, then it would be the case that C.’
Not all instances of counterfactual dependence are causal. Consider the math-
ematical function f (x) = ax. There is a relation of counterfactual dependence
between the value of the coefficient a and the slope of the function’s graph. But
the dependence is clearly not causal. Lewis rules out such instances by requir-
ing counterfactual dependence among propositions that describe the occurrence
of events: "The family e1, e2, ... of events depends causally on the family c1, c2, ... iff
the family O(e1),O(e2), ... of propositions depends counterfactually on the family
O(c1),O(c2), ..." (562, emphasis originial). This is the second stage of Lewis’s ac-
count.
For example, the bottle’s shattering depends causally on its being hit. More
precisely, this means that whether the bottle shatters (O(s)) or not (¬O(s)) depends
on whether it is hit (O(h)) or not (¬O(h)). This is captured by two counterfactual
conditionals O(h)  O(s) and ¬O(h)  ¬O(s). Lewis distinguishes two cases.
First, if the bottle is not hit and does not shatter, then the second counterfactual is
are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the
second never had existed" (Hume (1777/1975, Section VII, emphasis original).
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automatically true. In order to establish causal dependence we have to check the first
counterfactual. Second, if the bottle is hit and shatters, then the first counterfactual
is automatically true and we have to check whether the second counterfactual is
true. The second case concerns the actual causal claim that the bottle’s shattering
was caused by its being hit.
In the following we will look at two particular problems that arise for coun-
terfactual accounts. The first problem is the problem of redundancy. In Lewis’s
terminology the problem is that in cases of redundancy effects do not depend
causally on their purported causes. The problem of selection is that an effect stands
in a relation of causal dependence to a much broader range of conditions than those
that would typically be called causes.
There are other problems for counterfactual accounts. Lewis’s possible-world
semantics is based on a similarity relation between worlds. Instead of a principled
account, Lewis provides a set of rules that he derives from "what we know about
the truth and falsity of counterfactuals" (1979, 43). It is a particular challenge to
provide similarity relations that disallow backtracking counterfactuals, such as ’if
the bottle had been shattered, then it would have to have been hit.’ However, these
problems shall not concern us here because they concern counterfactual theories of
causation generally and we shall focus on actual causation.
2.3. Redundancy
Redundancy means that in the absence of a cause there are other factors that sustain
the effect. This means that the effect does not depend counterfactually on the cause.
Thus, redundancy undermines counterfactual dependence as a necessary criterion
for actual causation.
Redundancy will be treated here as a threat to counterfactual dependence being a
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necessary condition for actual causation. Does redundancy affect potential causation
as well? Suppose counterfactual dependence is taken as a necessary condition for
potential causation as follows: if c is a potential cause of e, then there are possible
circumstances in which e depends counterfactually on c. This is not undermined by
the kinds of redundancy that will be discussed here. Suppose, for example, Suzy
and Billy throw stones at a bottle and Suzy preempts Billy in destroying the bottle.
One kind of possible circumstance is that Billy does not throw. Then the bottle’s
shattering would depend on Suzy and, thus, Suzy is a potential cause. Likewise,
Billy is a potential cause because one possible kind of circumstance is where Suzy
does not throw and, thus, the bottle’s shattering depends on Billy’s throwing.
This being said, there may be other kinds of redundancy that affect potential
causation. Consider, for example, mental causation. Presume some kind of non-
reductive physicalism, that is, there are mental properties that are not physical. At
the same time, we shall assume that mental properties are strongly dependent upon
physical properties, for example, because they are constituted by them. Are mental
properties potential causes of other mental properties? According to causal exclu-
sion arguments (see e.g. Malcolm (1968); Kim (1989)), they are not. For if mental
properties M are realized by physical properties P and these physical properties
P are caused by other physical properties P′, then it seems that there is no causal
work left for the mental properties M′ that correspond to P′. In this sense mental
and physical processes can be understood as redundant causes.
In the following discussion we will focus on four kinds of redundancy that
affect actual causation: symmetric overdetermination and early preemption, late
preemption, and trumping. In symmetric overdetermination two (or more) events
c1 and c2 cause some effect e and both c1 and c2 are sufficient for the effect e. This is
a problem for counterfactual definitions because this means that e does not depend
counterfactually on either c1 or c2. For example, suppose a forest fire was caused
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by two lightning bolts, l1 and l2, such that each of the lightning bolts would have
been sufficient for the fire. Then the fire does not depend counterfactually on either
of the lightning bolts. Yet we think that both of the two lightning bolts are causes
of the fire.
In cases of preemption there are also two (or more) events c1 and c2 that would
be sufficient for the occurrence of e. But here only one of the events (c1) causes e
while the other event (c2) is preempted. Preemption comes in two varieties: early
and late preemption. An example for early preemption is the following situation,
called "Backup":
"an assassin-in-training is on his first mission. Trainee is an excellent
shot: if he shoots his gun, the bullet will fell Victim. Supervisor is
also present, in case Trainee has a last minute loss of nerve (a common
affliction among student assassins) and fails to pull the trigger. If Trainee
does not shoot, Supervisor will shoot Victim herself. In fact, Trainee
performs admirably, firing his gun and killing Victim" (Hitchcock, 2001,
276).
Trainee’s shot is the cause of Victim’s death. But Victim’s death does not depend
counterfactually on Trainee’s shot. For if Trainee had not shot, Supervisor would
have shot and Victim would have died anyway. This kind of preemption is called
early preemption because the alternative causal process (Supervisor’s shooting
Victim) is doomed at an early stage, that is, before Supervisor has pulled the trigger
of her gun.
The following case is an example of late preemption:
"Suzy and Billy, expert rock-throwers, are engaged in a competition to
see who can shatter a target bottle first. Both pick up rocks and throw
them at the bottle, but Suzy throws hers a split second before Billy.
38
2.3. Redundancy
Consequently Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering the bottle. Since
both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy’s would have shattered the
bottle if Suzy’s had not occurred [...]" Hall (2004, 235).
As in early preemption there are two processes that could cause the bottle’s shatter-
ing: Suzy’s throwing her stone and Billy’s throwing his stone. Since only Suzy hits
the bottle, we identify her throwing as the actual cause of the bottle’s shattering.
Yet there is no relation of counterfactual dependence between the bottle’s shattering
and Suzy’s throwing her stone. For Billy’s stone would have destroyed the bottle
if Suzy had not thrown. The crucial difference to "Backup" is that the only reason
why Billy’s stone does not shatter the bottle is that by the time the stone arrives at
the bottle’s original position, the bottle has been destroyed by Suzy’s stone. Gen-
erally, in late preemption the primary process interrupts the alternative process
only through causing the effect. This is different from early preemption where the
primary process interrupts the alternative process in some other way and earlier.
For example, Supervisor’s attack on the Victim is interrupted already at the stage
where Supervisor sees that Trainee pulls the trigger.
Finally, here is an example of trumping:
"Imagine that it is a law of magic that the first spell cast on every day
match the enchantment at midnight. Suppose at noon Merlin casts
a spell (the first that day) to turn the prince into a frog, that at 6:00
P.M. Morgana casts a spell (the only that day) to turn the prince into a
frog, and that at midnight the prince becomes a frog" (Schaffer, 2000a,
165).
There are two processes that could bring about the effect: Merlin’s spell and Mor-
gana’s spell. According to the law of magic, only Merlin’s spell is an actual cause of
the transfiguration, because it was cast first. The difference between trumping cases
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and cases of early and late preemption is that in trumping the alternative process is
not interrupted at all and comes to an end just as the preempting process. There are
also other, more mundane, instances of trumping. For example, suppose "the major
and the sergeant stand before the corporal, both shout "Charge!" at the same time,
and the corporal decides to charge" (Schaffer, 2000a, 175). Again none of the two
causal processes is interrupted, for the corporal hears both orders. Yet many think
that only the major’s order is an actual cause of the sergeant’s charging because
orders of higher-ranked officers trump orders of lower-ranked officers.
Schaffer describes these two cases as instances of trumping preemption. But are
trumping cases really cases of preemption?3 In a sense this seems to be wrong
because both causal processes run to completion, just as in cases of symmetrical
overdetermination. Describing the case as an instance of symmetrical overdeter-
mination, however, seems to neglect the asymmetry between the trumping cause
and the trumped cause. In Chapter 4 we will see that both the fact that both causal
processes run to completion and the preceived asymmetry are important features of
this kind of case. I will argue that the difference between the two factors is not one
between a cause and a non-cause but rather a difference between different kinds of
actual causes.
2.4. Four Approaches to Redundancy and Their Problems
In this section I will discuss four (kinds of) counterfactual accounts that address
cases involving redundancy. But before we turn to these accounts let me briefly note
that other accounts also face difficulties with redundancy. First, consider regularity
theories. According to Mackie (1974), for example, a cause has to fulfil the INUS
criterion, that is, it has to be an insufficient but necessary element of an unnecessary
but sufficient set of antecedent conditions. This criterion, however, faces difficulties
3This has been contested, for example, by Halpern and Pearl (2005) and Hitchcock (2011).
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with regard to preemption cases. For both the preempting and the preempted
factors fulfil the INUS criterion. A detailed treatment of preemption along these
lines is provided, for example, by Richard Wright (1985). I will discuss Wright’s
account in Chapter 6.
Preemption also raises problems for probabilistic accounts of actual causation
(Menzies (1989, 1996); Fenton-Glynn (2015)). According to probabilistic accounts of
causation, causes raise the probability of their effects. Yet, consider the following
probabilistic version of early preemption. Suppose that this time the assassin in
training is not as experienced. In fact, it is the trainee’s first mission and it is
highly unlikely that he will hit the victim upon pulling the trigger of the gun. His
supervisor, however, is reliable. If she decides to intervene, it is highly unlikely
that she will miss her target. Yet, the supervisor will shoot only if she sees that
the assassin in training fails to pull the trigger of his gun. The trainee pulls the
trigger of his gun and, against all odds, kills the victim. As in deterministic early
preemption the victim’s death is caused by the trainee’s pulling the trigger of his
gun. And this is so even though the trainee’s pulling the trigger of his gun (at least
on one reading of the case) decreased the probability of the victim’s death.
Finally, preemption raises problems for process theories of causation because
it leads to so-called misconnection (see e.g. Ehring (2003) and the discussion in
Dowe (2004)). Suppose we take transference of a conserved quantity as a sufficient
criterion for causation. In the late preemption case this means that Suzy will be
identified as an actual cause of the shattered bottle because the momentum of her
stone is transferred to the bottle. Yet due to the minute gravitational influence on
the bottle there is also a causal process linking Billy’s throwing his stone and the
bottle’s shattering, even though Billy’s throwing his stone is clearly not an actual
cause. That is, process accounts misconnect Billy’s throwing his stone and the
bottle’s shattering.
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Thus, redundancy poses a challenge to the most common theories of causation. I
have indicated here that contributors to each of these theories have given accounts
of redundancy. In the following, however, we shall focus on the tradition of coun-
terfactual accounts. The reason is that the problems that this tradition faces will be
most instructive for the discussion in the subsequent chapters.
2.4.1. Fragility
Consider the Suzy-Billy case. The case describes two processes that compete for
being the actual cause of one and the same effect event: the bottle’s shattering. But
do they really? Billy throws his stone a little later than Suzy and, presumably, from
a different angle. Thus, if he had destroyed the bottle, then the bottle’s shattering
would clearly have been different from the shattering that results from Suzy’s stone.
Thus, it seems like an undue simplification to say that Suzy’s and Billy’s throws
compete with each other. If we employ a more precise description of the possible
outcomes, then there is a particular bottle shattering that depends counterfactually
upon Suzy and another particular bottle shattering that depends upon Billy.4
The general idea is that, given we find a sufficiently detailed event description,
counterfactual dependence as a criterion for causation can be restored. Such details
are captured if we employ a fine-grained individuation scheme that specifies an
event’s exact time and manner of occurrence. These details are then considered to
be essential features of the event. Consequently, such an event tends to be fragile in
the sense that it could not have occurred at a different time or in a different manner.
By contrast, a coarse-grained individuation scheme does not refer to such details.
Consequently, events tend to be robust under such an individuation scheme.
However, fragility as a solution to redundancy has two problems. First, it depends
4Similar solutions apply to symmetrical overdetermination and early preemption: the fire caused
by two lightning bolts is not exactly the same as a fire caused by just one of the lightning bolts,
Supervisor’s shot will kill the Victim in a slightly different way than Trainee’s shot.
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upon the contingent fact that the causal processes lead to different outcomes (even
if the difference is ever so slight). This need not be so. For example, in cases of
trumping the exact manner in which the corporal charges does not depend on the
ordering officer’s rank (at least it does not need to depend on this).
Second, fragility leads to a profusion of causation, that is, it introduces causal
relations where we typically think there are none. Consider the following situation:
"Boddie eats a big dinner, and then the poisoned chocolates. Poison
taken on a full stomach passes more slowly into the blood, which slightly
affects the time and manner of the death. If the death is extremely fragile,
then one of its causes is the eating of the dinner" (Lewis, 1986a, 198).
This is implausible. A similar worry arises in the Suzy-Billy case. If we apply a suf-
ficiently fine-grained individuation scheme to the bottle shattering, the shattering
will depend upon the minute gravitational force exerted by Billy’s stone. Conse-
quently, Billy’s throwing would count as an actual cause of the bottle’s shattering
after all. Thus, the problem is that with fragile events we generate causal relations
where there are clearly none.
Note, however, the context-dependence of individuation schemes. Suppose the
murderer intended Boddie to die quickly and without pain. The murderer may
regret that Boddie’s dinner caused the death to be so long and painful instead. The
problem then is that there are no principled criteria that tell us when to take events
to be robust and when fragile. Lewis thinks that finding such principles "may not
be a hopeless project, but for the present it is not so much unfinished as unbegun"
(Lewis, 1986a, 199).
2.4.2. Ancestral Dependence
Lewis’s (1973a) original theory attempts to account for redundancy by defining cau-
sation as the ancestral of causal dependence. We shall begin with early preemption.
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too early too late
Figure 2.1.: Neuron diagram of Backup.
Figure 2.1 displays a neuron diagram that represents Backup. Neuron diagrams are
a graphical tool for representing causal structure like directed acyclic graphs. The
key difference is that neurons represent token events that do (full circle) or do not
(empty circle) occur. Moreover, the edges carry more information about the rela-
tion between the adjacent neurons. Arrows between neurons represent excitatory
influence. That is, a neuron is activated if one of its incoming arrows is attached
to an activated neuron. An exception are neurons that are (also) under inhibitory
influence, represented by edges with a circle instead of the arrow-head. If a neuron
is under inhibitory influence, then it is inactive, even if it receives also excitatory
input.
In virtue of what difference is Trainee’s shot a cause but not Supervisor’s shot?
According to Lewis (1973a), the key difference is that there is a chain of causally
dependent events linking Trainee’s actions (c1) to Victim’s death (e), but there is
no such chain for Supervisor’s actions (c2). The chain of causal dependence is
revealed if we consider an event, b, that lies on the path leading from Trainee’s
actions to Victim’s death: the bullet’s propagating from Trainee’s gun to Victim.
Victim’s death depends causally on b and b depends causally on Trainee’s actions.
Thus, c1, b, and e constitute a chain of causally dependent events. By contrast,
there is no such chain between Supervisor’s actions (c2) and Victim’s death (e). Any
intermediate event that depends causally on Supervisor’s actions (that is, any event
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that occurs before Trainee’s pulling the trigger) does not stand in a relation of causal
dependence with Victim’s death. Therefore, Lewis refers to the existence of a chain
of causal dependence—i.e. a causal chain—as a defining criterion of causation: "one
event is a cause of another iff there exists a causal chain leading from the first to the
second" (Lewis, 1973a, 563).
Note that in order to act as an intermediate event in a chain of causal dependence
b has to be chosen appropriately. First, it should not occur too early because the
alternative (preempted) process has to be doomed already. Otherwise there is no
causal dependence of e on b. In Backup the bullet’s being on its way to Victim
fulfills this condition because at this stage it is clear that Trainee did not have a last
minute loss of nerve and Supervisor did not have to step in. If, in this situation, the
bullet would miraculously disappear, there would no longer be a backup process to
guarantee Victim’s death. By contrast, Trainee’s directing his gun at Victim would
be an event that is too early. Victim’s death does not depend causally on this event,
because even if Trainee had not aimed, then Victim would still have died through
Supervisor’s shot. Second, event b should not occur too late such that it also lies
on the path linking c2 with e. Otherwise b fails to depend causally on c1. Trainee’s
bullet’s propagating towards Victim fulfills this condition because it depends on
Trainee’s pulling the trigger. By contrast, victim’s heart failure would be an event
that is too late—presuming that both Trainee and Supervisor kill by aiming at their
victims’ hearts.
We shall now turn to late preemption. The problem with late preemption is that
there is no event b that would establish a chain of causal dependence between the
actual cause and the effect.5 Consider the Suzy-Billy scenario. There is no event
that could establish a chain of causal dependence between Suzy’s throwing and the
bottle’s shattering (Lewis (1986a)). We would need to identify an event that occurs
5Symmetrical overdetermination and trumping pose problems for the same reasons.
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no earlier than the bottle’s shattering. For only due to the bottle’s shattering it is
the case that Billy’s attempted shattering is doomed. But the bottle’s shattering
is already too late because it lies on both the path originating in c1 and the path
originating in c2 and, therefore, it does not depend causally on Suzy’s throwing.
Thus, Lewis’s causal chain approach fails to account for late preemption.
Another problem with Lewis’s causal chain account arises from the assumption
of transitivity. The problem is that there are cases where causation is not transitive.
One such case is the "Dog Bite" case (McDermott, 1995). A right-handed terrorist
plans to detonate a bomb. However, a dog bites off the terrorist’s right forefinger.
Therefore, the terrorist uses his left forefinger instead to detonate the bomb. The
terrorist’s detonating the bomb with the left forefinger depends on the dog bite
and the bomb’s exploding depends on the terrorist’s detonating the bomb with the
left forefinger. Yet, we do not consider the dog bite a cause of the explosion. The
problem is a mismatch in the chain of dependence: the dog bite influences which
finger the terrorist uses to detonate the bomb, but the bomb explodes no matter
which finger is used to detonate it.
Another counterexample is "Boulder":
"a boulder is dislodged, and begins rolling ominously toward Hiker.
Before it reaches him, Hiker sees the boulder and ducks. The boulder
sails harmlessly over his head with nary a centimeter to spare. Hiker
survives his ordeal" (Hitchcock, 2001, 276).
Again there is a chain of causal dependence: Hiker would not have ducked if the
boulder had not approached him and Hiker would not have survived if he had not
ducked. But clearly the boulder’s falling is not a cause of Hiker’s survival. The
falling boulder is the only reason that Hiker’s life was threatened in the first place.
These problems are particularly severe since the assumption of transitivity is also
built into the following two accounts. However, for now we shall sideline issues of
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transitivity. I will get back to them in Chapter 3.
2.4.3. Quasi-dependence
Lewis (1986a) develops the quasi-dependence account as an extension of the original
counterfactual account in order to deal with late preemption. The central idea is
to appeal to the intuition that causation is an intrinsic relation. Imagine a new
situation in which Suzy throws her stone at a bottle and Billy is absent. Suzy’s
destroying the bottle is an intrinsic duplicate of Suzy’s destroying the bottle in the
original scenario. Moreover, in the new situation the bottle’s shattering does depend
on Suzy’s throwing the stone. If Suzy causes the shattering in this new situation and
causation is an intrinsic matter, then it should follow that Suzy causes the shattering
in the original situation.
Thus, according to Lewis’s updated account, e quasi-depends on c if (i) "in its
intrinsic character it is just like processes in other regions (of the same world, or
other worlds with the same laws) situated in various surroundings" (1986a, 205)
and (ii) in these other processes the counterpart of e depends counterfactually on
the counterpart of c. In analogy to the ancestral dependence account, a causal chain
is then defined as "a sequence of two or more events, with either dependence or
quasi-dependence at each step" (Lewis, 1986a, 205). An event c is an actual cause of
event e if there is such a causal chain.
Lewis’s definition of quasi-dependence raises a number of questions: what are
criteria of similarity between processes? Surely, we will not find exact duplicates
of the process initiated by Suzy in circumstances where Billy is absent because
if Billy is absent, then also his minute gravitational influences on the process are
absent. What exactly are the other "various surroundings"? Surely, we would need
a criterion for picking the right surroundings that does not entail a circular reference
to intrinsicness. These problems may be solved by a more careful definition (as, for
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example, the one provided by (Hall, 2004)) and shall not concern us here.
A more serious problem is the following. The core idea of the quasi-dependence
account is to combine two criteria for causation: counterfactual dependence and in-
trinsicness. However, sometimes counterfactual dependence is an extrinsic matter
as, for example, in cases of double prevention:
"Suzy is piloting a bomber on a mission to blow up an enemy target,
and Billy is piloting a fighter as her lone escort. Along comes an enemy
fighter plane, piloted by Enemy. Sharp-eyed Billy spots Enemy, zooms
in, pulls the trigger, and Enemy’s plane goes down in flames. Suzy’s
mission is undisturbed, and the bombing takes place as planned. If
Billy hadn’t pulled the trigger, Enemy would have eluded him and shot
down Suzy, and the bombing would not have happened" (Hall, 2004).
Double prevention means that a cause c prevents an event d that otherwise would
have prevented the effect e. In this particular case Billy’s pulling the trigger prevents
Enemy’s attack on Suzy. Otherwise Enemy’s attack would have prevented the
bombing of the target. The bombing of the target depends upon Billy’s pulling
the trigger. Yet this counterfactual dependence is not an intrinsic matter because it
depends on the extrinsic absence of disabling factors. Let me explain. We shall call
the sequence of Billy’s attacking Enemy and the resulting bombing of the target by
Suzy a process S. Consider a scenario that involves a duplicate of S but also a bomb
placed under Enemy’s seat which would have killed enemy just after Billy’s attack
on Enemy. Due to the bomb Suzy’s destroying the target no longer depends upon
Billy. Thus, the bomb is a factor that is extrinsic to S but undermines counterfactual
dependence. Alternatively, the presence of the bomb would have to be counted as
intrinsic. But that would lead to the implausible result that the bomb is a cause of
the target’s being destroyed as well (see (Hall, 2004, 245)).6
6This example has a structure that is similar to preemptive prevention cases that will be discussed
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The conflict between intrinsicness and dependence has led Hall (2004) to the
conclusion that we need to distinguish two concepts of causation: one, called
’dependence’ that reflects intuitions associated with counterfactual dependence
(and the intuition that omissions can be causes) and another, called ’production’
that reflects intuitions associated with intrinsicness (alongside with locality and
transitivity). We shall not discuss this proposal here in detail. What matters for
our purposes is that due to the conflict between dependence and intrinsicness,
quasi-dependence does not solve the problems associated with redundancy.
2.4.4. Causation as Influence
In his last attempt to account for redundancy Lewis goes back to fragility. Given that
there are no clear criteria for event individuation, according to Lewis, we should
make sure that our account of causation does not depend on this issue. For this
reason Lewis introduces the notion of an alteration:
"Let an alteration of an event E be either a very fragile version of E or
else a very fragile alternative event which may be similar to E, but is
numerically different from E" (2004, 88).
Going back to the Billy-Suzy case, one alteration of the actual bottle’s shattering
S is the shattering as caused by Suzy’s stone (S1).7 This alteration is numerically
identical to S and is instantiated. Another alteration of S is the shattering as it would
have been caused through Billy’s stone (S2). This alteration is numerically different
from S (and S1) and not instantiated in the given scenario. The notion of alteration
enables us to sideline questions regarding fragility. If we suppose that S is fragile,
then S1 and S2 are alternative events. If we suppose that S is robust, then S1 and S2
in Chapter 6.
7Individuating the alteration with reference to Suzy threatens to make the account circular. It is
close to trivial that Suzy’s shattering the bottle depends upon Suzy’s throwing her stone. But one
could just as well describe S1 by the exact position and velocity of the shattering pieces of glass.
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are not alternative events. As long as we talk about alterations we do not have to
decide this question.
The notion of an alteration can also be applied to the respective cause events. The
supposed cause event is Suzy’s throwing her stone ST. Instead we shall consider
the numerically identical alteration ST1 that specifies the exact time at which Suzy
throws her stone. If Suzy had thrown a little earlier (alteration ST2) than she actually
did, this would have had an influence on the bottle’s shattering to the effect that
it also would have occurred a little earlier. The idea of Lewis’s influence account
of actual causation is to exploit this kind of dependence. More specifically, Lewis
defines influence as a relation between a range of alterations:
"C influences E iff there is a substantial range C1,C2, . . . of different not-
too-distant alterations of C (including the actual alteration of C) and
there is a range E1,E2, . . . of alterations of E, at least some of which differ
such that if C1 had occurred, E1 would have occurred, and if C2 had
occurred E2 would have occurred, and so on" (2004, 91).
In analogy to the earlier accounts, causation is defined as the ancestral of influence:
"C causes E iff there is a chain of stepwise influence from C to E" (ibid).
Does the influence account solve the problems raised by the four kinds of of re-
dundancy? Cases of symmetrical overdetermination are straightforwardly solved:
for each of the two (or more) overdetermined causes there is a substantial range
of alterations, such that alterations of the effect event depend counterfactually on
them. For example, the forest fire would have happened earlier and in a different
way if either one of the lightning bolts had occurred earlier and in a different way.
Next, consider late preemption. There is a substantial range of alterations of
Suzy’s throwing that will have an influence on the exact way the bottle shatters.
However, also alterations of Billy’s actions will have an influence on the exact way
the bottle shatters. This was the reason why fragility was rejected as a solution
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to redundancy.8 Lewis’s response is that the notion of influence is gradual: there
can be more or less influence. Consequently, according to Lewis, also the notion of
cause is gradual: "Suzy’s throw is much more of a cause of the bottle’s shattering
than Billy’s" and this is because, "altering Suzy’s throw while holding Billy’s fixed
would make a lot of difference to the shattering, whereas altering Billy’s throw
while holding Suzy’s fixed would not" (Lewis, 2004, 92).
According to Lewis, one major advantage of the influence account is that it also
accounts for trumping. Consider alternative orders that the major could have given
to the corporal. These form a range of alterations and the corporal would act
differently on receiving these orders. By contrast, the sergeant does not exert this
kind of influence on the corporal. If the sergeant had given a different order, the
corporal would still have obeyed the major and charged.
Let us take stock. So far I have presented four kinds of redundancy: symmet-
rical overdetermination, early preemption, late preemption, and trumping. These
raise challenges for any account of actual causation and in particular those that are
framed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. I have then discussed four kinds of
counterfactual approaches to redundancy and have highlighted the difficulties that
these accounts face. First, fragility is problematic because it leads to a profusion
of causes. In particular, applying a fine-grained individuation scheme to the effect
event does not solve the problem posed by preemption cases because it has the result
that both preempting and preempted factors are identified as actual causes. Second,
ancestral dependence fails with regard to late preemption (and symmetrical overde-
termination and trumping) because in these cases there are no intermediate events
that could form a chain of counterfactual dependence. Third, quasi-dependence
faces problems because it involves a criterion of intrinsicness that is conflict with
counterfactual dependence. Finally, the influence approach seems to account for
8This problem affects early preemption as well. There are tiny influences that the behaviour of the
preempted backup assassin has on the exact way the victim is killed.
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all kinds of redundancy. But like the fragility account it has the consequence that
in early and late preemption both the preempting and the preempted factors are
actual causes (but to a lesser degree than the preempting factor). Moreover, the
influence account accounts for the asymmetry between trumping and trumped fac-
tors in cases like the one involving the major, the sergeant, and the corporal. This is
an advantage over the other counterfactual accounts. Yet, as we will see in Chapter
4 this is still problematic because there is an important intuition according to which
in some (to be specified) sense both the trumping and the trumped factors are ac-
tual causes. Finally, another potential problem for the ancestral dependence, the
quasi-dependence, and the influence account is that they require actual causation
to be transitive. We shall now turn to the problem of selection.
2.5. Causal Selection: Mill’s Challenge
The problem of causal selection was first discussed by John Stuart Mill (1843/1882) in
the context of his account of induction. As the "main pillar of inductive science" Mill
considers the "Law of Causation" that "is but the familiar truth, that invariability of
succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some
other fact which has preceded it" (236). The invariability of succession, however,
seems to be violated in many cases. For example, suppose a person dies of eating
a poisoned dish. According to Mill, this causal relation is grounded in the fact that
death invariably succeeds eating poisoned food. However, there does not seem to
be such an invariable sequence because there are instances where poisoned food is
eaten but death does not follow, for example, because the person who ingested the
food gets her stomach pumped.
Yet, according to Mill, this kind of counterexample does not threaten the invari-
ability of succession. He argues that selective features of a situation such as eating
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a poisoned dish are not legitimately called a cause. Instead "[t]he real Cause, is the
whole of these antecedents ; and we have, philosophically speaking, no right to
give the name cause to one of them, exclusively of the others" (237). According to
Mill, the invariability of succession is saved because once we take the whole of the
antecedents into consideration the effects are determined. For example, eating the
poisoned dish in conjunction with the fact that the stomach is not being pumped
and the absence of all other potentially preventing factors is the total cause of the
person’s dying. If all these elements of the total cause are in place, then death
invariably follows.
Mill justifies rejecting causal selection by arguing that "[n]othing can better show
the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction between the cause of a
phenomenon and its conditions, than the capricious manner in which we select
from among the conditions that which we choose to denominate the cause" (238).
By describing causal selection as capricious, Mill argues that there are no underlying
criteria and a fortiori no rational criteria. Mill draws the revisionary conclusion that
one should not perform causal selection and reserve the term cause for the totality
of factors that could make a difference to the effect.
In the following I shall refer to Mill’s argument against causal selection as Mill’s
challenge. In order to meet Mill’s challenge we would, first, need to identify selection
criteria that give rise to a descriptively adequate account of causal selection. Second,
we would have to show that the criteria have rational grounds. This amounts to
giving an explanation why we are justified to apply the respective rules of selection.
These two points are different because, in principle, it might be possible to identify
regularities in selective causal reasoning even if these regularities are not justified
(they could simply be systematic biases).
Isn’t the term "causal selection" suggesting an implausible description of causal
reasoning? Usually we do not begin with a set of conditions sufficient for the effect
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and then select from this set the factors that appear most salient (Collingwood,
1938). More plausibly we come up with certain particular candidate factors and
examine whether they are part of the total cause. Richard Wright (1985), for example,
claims that this is the case in legal inquiry. If some harm occurred, then typically
we do not ask for a set of sufficient conditions. Instead we begin by determining
tortious behaviour and then investigate whether it is part of such a set of conditions.
But even if "selection" is not an adequate description of the underlying process of
causal reasoning, it points to an important challenge: why do certain factors have
a privileged status as opposed to other factors that are considered to be mere
background conditions?
Many philosophers follow Mill. For example, Lewis sidelines the issue of causal
selection, arguing that he has "nothing to say about these principles of invidious
discrimination" (Lewis, 1973a, 162).9 Likewise, Hall argues that in causal selection
"we typically make what are, from the present perspective, invidious distinctions,
ignoring perfectly good causes because they are not sufficiently salient" (Hall, 2004,
228). Hall contrasts this with an "egalitarian sense of ’cause’" according to which
"the complete inventory of a fire’s causes must include the presence of oxygen and
of dry wood" (ibid.).
In a sense, Lewis’s and Hall’s sidelining the problem of selection should be
surprising, given that they take the problem of redundancy so seriously. Mill’s
argument against causal selection has a close analogy to fragility-based accounts
of redundancy. Both accounts seem to explain away the respective problems by
proposing a highly revisionary understanding of actual causation. In the case of
fragility this involves an extremely detailed description of the involved events. As a
consequence we would have to identify many more factors as actual causes than is
typically acknowledged. In Mill’s case this involves an exhaustive description of the




conditions that precede the effect. The resulting notion of causation is much more
restrictive than typically acknowledged. Thus, if fragility leads to an unsatisfactory
account of redundancy, shouldn’t we think of Mill’s account as an unsatisfactory
approach to selection?
2.6. Contextual Accounts
One reason for the popularity of Mill’s view is that it is difficult to find definite and
substantial criteria for distinguishing salient causes from background conditions.
One such account is addressed by Mill. According to this account, we tend to
identify events, that is, "instantaneous changes or successions of instantaneous
changes" (237) as causes and identify states as background conditions. States,
according to Mill, "possess [...] more or less of permanency ; and might therefore
have preceded the effect by an indefinite length of duration, for want of the event
which was requisite to complete the concurrence of conditions" (ibid.). Mill argues
against this suggestion that the event "has really no closer relation to the effect
than any of the other has" (ibid.). And, indeed, it is easy to find counterexamples.
Suppose there is an explosion in Jones’s flat because there was a gas leak. The
instantaneous change that led to the explosion is Jones’s lighting his cigarette but
typically we also identify the state of gas being present as a salient cause of the
explosion.
Another substantial account is suggested by Ducasse, who argues that "if a given
particular event is regarded as having been sufficient to the occurrence of another, it
is said to have been its cause; if regarded as having been necessary to the occurrence
of another, it is said to have been a condition of it" (Ducasse, 1926, 58). But this does
not seem to work better even in the most mundane cases of selection such as, for
instance, with regard to the lightning that causes a forest fire under the condition
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that there is oxygen. The lightning is clearly not sufficient for the fire.10
But there is an alternative to accounts that give substantial criteria: contextual
accounts. According to proponents of these accounts, the capriciousness of causal
selection can be accounted for by the capriciousness of the contexts in which causal
selection takes place. The earliest and most prominent contextual account is pro-
vided by Mackie (1974). According to Mackie, there are two reasons why we
distinguish between causes and conditions. The first reason is associated with the
semantics of causal claims and concerns what Mackie calls the causal field. Ac-
cording to Mackie, causal questions, such as "what caused this explosion?", can be
expanded such that they seek explanation not for an event but to an "event-in-a-
certain-field" (35). For example, the question for the cause of the explosion can
be expanded to: "’What made the difference between those times, or those cases,
within a certain range, in which no such explosion occurred, and this case in which
an explosion did occur?’" The expansion can refer to the field as being "this block
of flats as normally used and lived in" (35, emphasis original). One aspect of this
causal field is that people in this block of flats normally strike matches to light their
cigarettes. Thus, Jones’s striking a match to light his cigarette is ruled out as an
answer to the expanded question. It does not indicate a difference between the
flat where the explosion occurred and other flats in the block where no explosion
occurred. By contrast, gas leaks do not normally occur in this block of flats. So,
the gas leak does not belong to the causal field and, thus, qualifies as a cause in the
narrow sense.
The second reason why we distinguish between causes and conditions, according
to Mackie, is associated with the pragmatics of causal claims. Mackie argues that
"among factors not [ruled out by the causal field] we still show some preference" (35).
10Other suggestions refer to factors that we can control at all (Collingwood, 1938), the "event [that] is
subject much more readily to operational control than others" (Beck, 1953, 374), or the factors that
are particularly uncontrollable because they are volatile (Nagel, 1953, 698); for further examples
and references see the discussion in van Fraassen (1980).
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While the point about the causal field concerns the meaning of causal claims, Mackie
considers these more specific preferences to be rather a conversational matter. We
do not mention certain determinants because they happen to be irrelevant or simply
less relevant than other determinants that earn the status of causes in the narrow
sense.
Another kind of contextual account arises from approaches to causation as a
contrastive notion. Causation as a contrastive notion is not a two-place relation
as in ’C causes E’ but a three place relation as in ’C causes E rather than E∗’ or a
four place relation as in ’C rather than C∗ causes E rather than E∗.’11 Schaffer (2005)
argues that causal selection can be accounted for if we consider that the context
of a causal claim influences the contrasts C∗ and E∗. Thus, causal claims appear
to be capricious because relevant parts of their semantics are kept implicit when
the claims take binary form. Once we make the contrasts explicit capriciousness is
eliminated.
Unlike Mackie, Schaffer (2012) considers selection to be exclusively linked to
semantics and not to pragmatics. He gives three arguments. First, according to
Schaffer, failures to select the suitable causes do not render a causal claim irrelevant
but rather seem to render the claim false. For example, saying that the forest fire
was caused by the presence of oxygen, according to Schaffer, is a claim that is not
just an irrelevant truth, but false. Second, ordinary speakers assert the negation of
claims that fail to select the suitable causes. For example, ordinary speakers assert
sentences like "[t]he presence of oxygen did not cause there to be a forest fire, what
caused the fire was the lightning" (43). Third, Schaffer argues that cancellation12
11Contrastive accounts of causation have been defended by Hitchcock (1996), Schaffer (2005), and
Northcott (2008).
12Cancellation is a standard test to distinguish conversational implicatures from semantic entailments.
Conversational implicatures can be blocked by an explicit negation. Schaffer gives the following
example: "if I say of a job candidate that she has excellent handwriting, I can block the implicature
that she is a poor philosopher by saying "but I don’t mean to suggest that she is a poor philosopher"
(2012, 44). By contrast, semantic entailments cannot be cancelled.
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does not help for claims that fail to select the suitable causes. That is, according to
Schaffer, we do not make claims like: "[t]he presence of oxygen caused there to be a
forest fire, but I don’t mean to suggest that the lightning strike played no role" (44).
So, according to both Mackie’s and Schaffer’s accounts, the binary causal ex-
pression ’C causes E’ does not reveal the full meaning of a causal claim. The full
meaning is captured if we fix an additional variable that reflects the relevant context.
In Mackie’s account the contextual variable is the causal field and in Schaffer’s ac-
count it is the contrast of the cause and the contrast of the effect. Further contextual-
variable accounts have been provided by Waters (2007) and Strevens (2011). Waters
gives a contextual account that addresses the actual difference-makers in genetics.
The contextual variable is the population (e.g. of fruit flies) that the geneticist looks
at. According to Strevens, the contextual variable is the framework, a concept similar
to Mackie’s causal field.
Do contextual-variable accounts meet Mill’s challenge? According to these ac-
counts, the issue of causal selection arises only because the content of the contextual
variable is left implicit. In a world of ideal causal speakers where the contextual
variables are explicit the problem of causal selection would not even occur. Thus, if
we want to understand contextual-variable accounts as providing a reply to Mill’s
challenge, then the proponents of these accounts argue that Mill’s challenge results
from a misunderstanding of the content of causal claims. The challenge is met if
we use the causal idiom more carefully making sure that the contextual variable is
made explicit.
But an important question remains unanswered: given a causal claim in binary
form, what are the criteria for recovering the content of the contextual variable?
Mackie does not tell us how to pick the relevant causal field. Schaffer states explicitly
that "there is no obvious general procedure to recover the specific contrast applicable




However, we often communicate successfully about causes in the binary form.
Why is that the case? The explanation available for the contextualist is that we com-
municate successfully with binary causal statements because we share sufficiently
similar contexts. Analogously, communication fails if we do not have sufficiently
similar contexts. But under what circumstances are contexts sufficiently similar? In
the following section we will see that there can be said more about this.
2.7. Normality
2.7.1. Hart and Honoré
Normality was introduced as a criterion for causal selection by Hart and Honoré
(1959). Hart and Honoré’s aim is an account of causation in the law that is based on a
theory of common sense causal reasoning. The first part of their book Causation in the
Law provides such a theory. Hart and Honoré’s central concern is to identify among
the factors that are necessary for an effect those factors that count as causes in the
context of legal responsibility. Hart and Honoré describe two kinds of constraints.
First, the factor must be either a voluntary action or an abnormal condition. Second,
the factor should not be defeated by an event that occurs after the factor and before
the effect. In the following I shall focus on the the first constraint. A more detailed
discussion of the second constraint (which concerns the notion of proximate cause)
will be provided in Chapter 6.
A voluntary action, according to Hart and Honoré, is one that is not "done ’un-
intentionally’ (i.e. by mistake or by accident); or ’involuntarily’ (i.e. where normal
muscular control is absent); ’unconsciously’, or under various types of pressure"
such as those exerted by other persons, obligation or the lack of alternatives (38).
The criterion of voluntary action, according to Hart and Honoré, puts constraints
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on the transitivity of causation. When we ask for the causes of some event how far
do we have to trace back the causal history before we stop? Hart and Honoré argue
that "[w]e do not trace the cause through the deliberate act" (40).
Abnormality and normality can be understood in two different ways, according
to Hart and Honoré. First, functional normality describes the "usual state or mode
of operation" of some object of inquiry. For example, if we investigate what caused
a train accident, then the "normal speed and load and weight of [a] train and the
routine stopping or acceleration" (32) are aspects of the usual mode of operation.
These aspects are typically backgrounded because they do not not "’make the dif-
ference’ between the accident and things going on as usual" (33). Second, normality
can be related to duties or responsibility. For example, we identify the gardener’s
failure to water the flowers as a cause of the flowers’ dying but not everybody else’s
failure because the gardener rather than everybody else is responsible for watering
the flowers (see 35f).
Moreover, what counts as normal, according to Hart and Honoré, depends in
two kinds of ways on the context. First, there is a contextual dependence on the
kind of effect. Typically we do not identify oxygen as a cause of fire, but merely
as a background condition. However, "[i]f a fire breaks out in a laboratory or in a
factory, where special precautions are taken to exclude oxygen during part of an
experiment or manufacturing process, since the success of this depends on safety
from fire, there would be no absurdity at all in such a case in saying that the presence
of oxygen was the cause of the fire" (33). The reason, according to Hart and Honoré,
is that it is part of the normal functioning of the laboratory or factory processes that
oxygen is absent. Thus, oxygen is not the cause of a fire in the woods, for example,
but it is the cause of a fire in this kind of laboratory or factory. What counts as a
cause of the fire depends on the particular kind of context where the fire occurs.
Second, there is contextual dependence on the interest of the causal reasoner.
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This concerns examples, where "in one and the same case [...] the distinction
between cause and conditions may be drawn in different ways" (33). For instance,
[t]he cause of a great famine in India may be identified by the Indian peasant as
the drought, but the World Food authority may identify the Indian government’s
failure to build up reserves as the cause and the drought as a mere condition" (33).
The peasant, presumably, takes the government’s food policy to be a normal state
of affairs. Therefore, the peasant backgrounds this factor and categorizes it as a
mere condition. The World Food authority, by contrast, takes the occurrence of a
drought as something that is normal in a country with the climate and geography
of India and identifies the government’s failure to build up reserves as abnormal if
compared to other such countries.
An immediate problem for Hart and Honoré’s account is that there are causes
that are neither abnormal nor voluntary acts. Lipton, for example, objects that "our
ordinary notion of causation must allow for the beliefs that fire burns, sunlight
warms, water quenches thirst, and innumerable other causal truisms at the heart of
our ordinary conception of the world" (Lipton, 1992, 134).
This worry can be understood in two ways. First, it can be understood as pointing
to a limitation of Hart and Honoré’s criterion—a limitation that can be overcome
by providing an alternative criterion of delineation between causes and conditions.
In the following section we will discuss an extended notion of normality, according
to which, for instance, the stone’s being cold is a normal state and it’s being heated
is an abnormality.
Second, the worry can be understood as a more principled criticism regarding
any account along these lines. Even an extended notion of normality will draw a
line between causes and conditions. But maybe we should not draw such a line.
For even if a factor is only a background condition, it has a causal role to play. I will
not address this worry in detail in this chapter. But later we shall see that Hart and
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Honoré’s criterion (and related criteria) should not be understood as a criterion for
distinguishing between causes and non-causes. Instead it is rather to be understood
as a criterion for distinguishing among causes.
2.7.2. Extending Normality
According to Hart and Honoré, normality is defined either by functional or by
moral and legal norms. In the more recent philosophical literature, however, the
notion of normality has been given an even broader meaning. Sarah McGrath, for
example, suggests a notion of normality that is "highly abstract" in the sense that "it
is normal for x toφ iff x is supposed toφ" (McGrath, 2005, 138). What x is supposed to
do can depend on a wide range of different standards, such as "artifactual standards
governing what things like alarm clocks are supposed to do [...], biological standards
governing what organs like hearts are supposed to do, [...] [and] physical standards
governing the natural world" (McGrath, 2005, 138f).
While McGrath’s artifactual standards are similar to Hart and Honoré’s functional
norms, the biological and physical standards need further explanation. One way
to understand physical standards is provided by Maudlin. According to Maudlin,
the structure of Newton’s laws provides a way of distinguishing normal or default
behaviour from abnormal or non-default behaviour. Maudlin argues that Newton’s
first law, the "law of inertia, [...] specifies [...] how the motion of an object will
progress if nothing acts on it." The first law, then can be understood as describing
an object’s default or normal behaviour. "The second law then specifies how the
state of motion of an object will change if a force is put on it" (2004, 430, emphasis
original). In other words, the second law describes the non-default or abnormal
behaviour of the object. Thus, Maudlin suggests a distinction between default




Maudlin also extends this distinction to what he calls "quasi-Newtonian" laws.
Quasi-Newtonian laws hold whenever there are "inertial laws that describe how
some entities behave when nothing acts on them, and then there are laws of devi-
ation that specify in what conditions, and in what ways, the behavior will deviate
from the inertial behavior" (ibid., 431).13 This applies, for example, to the human
biology: "[t]he inertial state of a living body is, in our usual conception of things,
to remain living: That is why coroners are supposed to find a "cause of death" to
put on a death certificate" (ibid., 434). Maudlin seems to think of intertial or quasi-
inertial behaviour as underwritten by natural laws or other regularities employed
by science. But if we extend this idea to regularities that inform common sense, we
may be able to account for Lipton’s counterexamples that we encountered in the
foregoing section. The quasi-inertial state of an object may be construed in such a
way, for example, that it remains cold. Relative to this inertial state sunlight would
count as a cause of the object’s warming.
2.7.3. Empirical Accounts
So far I have discussed accounts that argue for normality by appealing to causal
intuitions. There have been also a number of empirical studies that investigate
the role of normality in causal reasoning more systematically. This research can be
traced back to studies on the availability of counterfactuals performed by Tversky
and Kahneman (1973).14 A key scenario in the more recent literature15 is the pen
vignette:
"The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked
with pens. The administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens,
13A similar distinction between quasi-inertial and quasi-non-inertial processes is employed by Hüt-
temann’s "disruptive concept of causation" (2013; forthcoming).
14See Hitchcock (2011) for a discussion of the relation between availability of counterfactuals and the
role of norms in causal reasoning.
15See Rose and Danks (2012) for an overview.
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but faculty members are supposed to buy their own. The administrative
assistants typically do take the pens. Unfortunately, so do the faculty
members. The receptionist has repeatedly emailed them reminders that
only administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens. On Mon-
day morning, one of the administrative assistants encounters Professor
Smith walking past the receptionist’s desk. Both take pens. Later that
day, the receptionist needs to take an important message... but she has
a problem. There are no pens left on her desk" (Knobe and Fraser, 2008,
443).
The pen vignette describes a situation where the combination of the actions of
two agents leads to an undesired outcome. The only difference between the two
actions is that the Professor’s taking the pen violates the department’s policy while
the administrative assistant conforms with the policy. Test subjects were asked
to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: (1)
’Professor Smith is the cause of the problem.’ (2) ’The administrative assistant is
the cause of the problem.’ Knobe and Fraser found that test subjects "agreed with
the statement that Professor Smith caused the problem and disagreed with the
statement that the administrative assistant caused the problem" (2008, 443). From
this Knobe and Fraser infer that "moral judgments actually play a direct role in the
process by which causal judgments are generated" (ibid.).
Knobe and Fraser’s study indicates that prescriptive norms affect causal reason-
ing. But what is the role of statistical norms? Statistical norms do not prescribe
a certain behaviour but merely describe what is common behaviour. While pre-
scriptive and descriptive norms are often congruent, this is not necessarily the case,
as Professor Smith’s behaviour illustrates. Justin Sytsma, Jonathan Livengood and
David Rose (2012) argue that we need to distinguish two types of typicality in order
to characterize the role of statistical norms. First, there is typicality that relates
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to population-level statistical norms which describe "how people generally behave
in a given type of situation" (816). This amounts to claims about how members
of faculty or administrative assistants typically behave. Second, there is typicality
that relates to agent-level statistical norms which describe how the particular agent
"herself generally behaves in [a given type of] situation" (ibid.). This amounts to
claims about how a particular agent such as Professor Smith or the administrative
assistant behaves.
Based on variations of the pen vignette Sytsma et al. provide evidence to the effect
that ordinary causal judgments are insensitive to considerations of population-level
statistical norms. That is, even if the vignette describes Professor Smith’s behaviour
as statistically typical for members of faculty while the administrator’s behaviour
was described as statistically atypical for administrative assistants, test subjects
identify Professor Smith as the cause to the same degree just as in the original
study.16 One could think that prescriptive norms override the statistical norms. But
Sytsma et al. show that even in the absence of prescriptive norms, information about
the population-level statistical norms does not influence the causal attribution.
Moreover, Sytsma et al. provide evidence to the effect that ordinary causal judg-
ments are sensitive to typicality rather than atypicality in the case of agent-level
statistical norms. That is, if the pen vignette specifies that it is unusual for Professor
Smith to take pens (her taking the pen was an exception from her usual behaviour),
then Professor Smith is less identified as a cause of the pen shortage.17 In Chapter
5 we will have a closer look at these results and, in particular, Sytsma et al.’s claim
that these results support their view that selective causal judgements of this kind
are related to considerations about responsibility.
16A similar interpretation can be given to results provided by Roxborough and Cumby (2009)
17One might think that this rating is related to the fact that Professor Smith’s repeated violation of
the pen policy accumulates: the more often she takes pens the more likely it is that because of her
actions there are no more pens. But Kirfel and Lagnado (2017) provide evidence to the effect that
agent-level atypicality is also relevant in kinds of situation where this kind of accumulation does
not occur.
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The pen vignette and related examples take a central place in the recent research
of experimental philosophers and empirical psychologists. Nevertheless, the use
of these studies has also attracted criticism. For example, Samland and Waldmann
argue that pen-vignette like studies do not track the influence of norms on causal
judgements but rather on judgements of accountability. The authors claim that
causal queries are ambiguous. "[I]n the context of human action [the term ’cause’]
can both refer to the question of whether a mechanism underlying a causal relation
is present and to the question whether an agent can be held accountable" (2016, 165).
When presented with cases like the one described in the pen vignette, test subjects
form hypotheses about which of the two senses of causation are intended. Moreover,
the pragmatic contextual factors of the pen vignette favour an understanding of the
causal query in terms of accountability. This is because (1) the causal relations
are trivial (the relation between the taking of pens and the resulting problem is
obvious), (2) the cover story refers to norm violation, and (3) the query concerns
agents as causal relata. Their studies provide evidence to the effect that changing
the pragmatic contextual factors can eliminate the influence of norm violation on
causal judgements.
Another kind of criticism concerns the scope of the conclusions supported by
studies such as those based on the pen vignette. According to Danks, Rose, and
Machery, the evidential basis provided by such experiments does not warrant the
claim that "[n]ormative considerations (broadly construed) influence causal cog-
nition (broadly construed) and are perhaps even constitutive of various cognitive
processes involved in aspects of causal cognition" (Danks et al., 2014, 254f). More
specifically, the authors object that studies based on scenarios like the pen vignette
involve learning causal relations from description and, thus, only probe a "highly
language-driven kind of causal reasoning" (ibid., 256). Danks et al. provide evi-
dence to the effect that if test subjects need to infer the causal relations from the
66
2.7. Normality
cover story, then moral norms have no effect on the judgements.
2.7.4. Normality: A Reply to Mill’s Challenge?
Proponents of normality typically emphasize the volatile character of normality. As
we have seen above, Hart and Honoré, for example, argue that which norms are
relevant depends on the specific effect and on the specific interests of the involved
causal reasoners. Halpern and Hitchcock, who also propose to incorporate a notion
of normality into their theory of actual causation, likewise argue that the resulting
notion of causation is "(i) subjective, (ii) socially constructed, (iii) value-laden, (iv)
context-dependent, (v) and vague" (2015, 431).
On an abstract level we can distinguish two ways in which normality depends on
the context. First, normality is often understood as referring to a range of different
kinds of norms, involving functional, legal, moral, and statistical norms. These
different dimensions can have different relevance in different contexts. When I fail
to get up in time because my alarm clock did not work, the functional sense of
normality is relevant. It is difficult, by contrast to apply a moral notion of normality
to this case. If a murderer kills someone, the moral or legal sense of normality
applies but the functional sense does not. This kind of context-dependence seems
to be particularly problematic when different norms apply to the same case but pull
in opposing directions as, for example, in "[m]ost people speed. If the posted speed
limit is 55 miles per hour, is driving at 55mph normal for conforming to the law, or
abnormal for violating the statistical expectation?" (Blanchard and Schaffer, 2017,
193).
Second, even with regard to one kind of norm there is contextual variation. What
is against the law, that is, legally abnormal is relative to the legal system. What is
socially normal, is relative to the society you live in. What is statistically normal
depends on the population that you look at. Physical standards such as Maudlin’s
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criterion of inertial behaviour seem to be an exception. For whether the dynamics of
a system is inertial or not does not depend on the reference frame. However, with
Maudlin’s extension of the concept to quasi-Newtonian laws even this criterion
seems to become context-dependent. Mathias Frisch (2014) describes a case where
the (non-inertial) trajectory of a satellite orbiting Earth is taken to be the satellite’s
default trajectory. Suppose the satellite has a rocket propulsion that makes it move
uniformly along a straight line. Relative to the satellite’s orbiting around Earth the
resulting inertial trajectory is not a default.
Does this mean that accounts based on normality fail to meet Mill’s challenge?
Schaffer, for example, argues that Hart and Honoré’s account deals with certain
standard cases of selection "but at the price of such vagueness that it seems merely
verbally distinct form the" view that it causal selection is capricious (2005, 343).
However, even though normality is context-dependent it is not completely capri-
cious. First, what is the relevant kind of norm in a given context is not nearly as
arbitrary as opponents of normality seem to assume. Take, for example, the speed-
ing case. Suppose one of the speeding cars is involved in an accident. Suppose
also that the accident would not have happened if the driver had conformed to the
posted speed limit. So the driver’s behaviour violated the legal norm. In a legal
inquiry that is concerned with finding the causes of the accident this will be the
relevant norm. Whether or not most people speed is not important (unless they
were also involved in the accident).
The same holds for what counts as normal according to each of the individual
dimensions of normality. What is descriptively normal may depend on the relevant
reference population. But once the reference population is fixed, objective statistical
measures of normality can be defined. It is a matter of controversy whether an objec-
tive definition is possible for prescriptive norms. Yet, they are still relatively robust
across a wide range of contexts. Most agents will agree about whether a particular
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artefact is functional or not. There is also considerable cross-cultural agreement
about certain basic moral norms such as those that forbid killing humans, stealing,
and lying (see e.g. Walzer (1994)). The robustness of normality considerations is
also aptly illustrated by one of the standard examples of causal selection: a forest
fire of which we say that it is caused by a lightning under the background condition
of oxygen. Let us assume that this delineation is based on the assumption that we
think that the presence of oxygen in the atmosphere is normal, whereas a lightning
is abnormal. Surely it is possible to construct a situation that makes oxygen look like
a salient cause and, thus, undermines the underlying notion of normality. Putnam
gives an example: "Imagine that Venusians land on earth and observe a forest fire.
One of them says, ’I know what caused that—the atmosphere of that darned planet
is saturated with oxygen’" (1982, 150). But note that Putnam goes as far as invoking
visiting Venusians in order to make this point. Moreover, even though there is
contextual variation, the choice of a norm in any particular context is not arbitrary.
An artefact fulfils functional norms if it serves its purpose. So once the purpose of
a particular artefact is agreed upon, the functional norms are fixed. Often (but not
always) there are also independent reasons for why a particular set of legal norms
holds in a particular country. Finally, many think that also with regard to certain
basic moral principles we can give rational foundations, for example, in a Kantian
tradition.
Thus, even if normality does not give hard and fast criteria for causal selection,
it shows that selection is not entirely capricious as stated by Mill. Moreover, it
seems that normality provides an explanation for why we are justified in selecting
certain factors as salient (this was the second part of Mill’s challenge as defined in
section 2.5). Selecting the morally and legally abnormal, for example, seems to be
justified in contexts where we are interested in assigning responsibility. Selecting
the statistically and functionally abnormal seems to be justified in contexts where
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we are interested in changing some undesired outcome by means of intervention
(Hitchcock and Knobe (2009)). A much more detailed discussion of this functional
aspect of causal selection will be provided in Chapter 5.
2.8. Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented two problems for counterfactual accounts of actual
causation: the problem of redundancy and the problem of selection. I have dis-
cussed several approaches to the problem of redundancy and I have highlighted
the challenges that these approaches face. This overview prepares the discussion
of causal model accounts of actual causation that will be given in the following
chapters. Moreover, I have argued pace Mill and more recent opponents of causal
selection that selection is to be taken seriously and that an informative response can
be given in terms of notions of normality. I have also pointed out an analogy be-
tween the problem of redundancy and the problem of selection. Both problems can
be explained away by referring to fragility and the notion of total cause, respectively.
However, the strategy of explaining away the problems in these ways disregards
an important sense in which judgements of actual causation are contextual. First,
whether two factors are competing for being causes of the same effect event, de-
pends on how fine-grained the description of the effect event is. And whether a
fine-grained description is acceptable, depends on the context. Second, whether a
factor is identified as an actual cause or merely as a background condition, depends
on the relevant notion of normality. And whether a particular notion of normality
is relevant, depends on the context.
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In this chapter I will review causal-model based approaches that aim at a unified
concept of actual causation. More specifically, I will begin by addressing two kinds
of accounts. First, there are accounts that spell out actual causation in terms of
counterfactual dependence given that certain other variables are held fixed at their
actual values (as suggested by Pearl (1998; 2000), Hitchcock (2001), and Halpern
(2015)). These accounts provide a solution to preemption cases. With regard to the
Backup case, for example, the idea is that holding fixed the fact that the supervisor
does not intervene, we can restore a counterfactual dependence of the victim’s
death on the actions of the assassin in training. And, therefore, the assassin in
training is an actual cause. We will see that this kind of approach is too restrictive
in order to account for cases of symmetrical overdetermination. Here we need to
employ a second kind of approach according to which actual causation amounts
to counterfactual dependence given that we set other variables to non-actual values
(as suggested by Halpern and Pearl (2005)). With regard to the lightning case,
for example, the idea is that under the contingency that the first lightning does
not occur, there is a counterfactual dependence of the fire on the second lightning.
And, therefore, the second lightning is an actual cause of the fire (and for reasons
of symmetry the same holds for the first lightning).
Thus, it seems like the approaches based on causal models provide successful
accounts of the instances of redundancy that have been so difficult to handle from
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the perspective of other counterfactual approaches.1 However, the definitions have
been shown to be too undemanding. There are instances where these definitions
identify certain factors as actual causes that are typically not perceived to be actual
causes. For example, consider a case called "Bogus Prevention" (Hiddleston, 2005).
An assassin threatens to poison a victim’s drink. The victim’s bodyguard pours a
harmless antidote in the drink but the victim would have survived anyway because
the assassin had a last minute change of heart and decides not to administer the
poison after all. We typically do not identify the antidote as an actual cause of the
victim’s survival because there was no need to neutralize any poison. But given the
non-actual contingency that the assassin administered the antidote, there would
have been a counterfactual dependence of the victim’s survival on the bodyguard’s
action. And, thus, the bodyguard’s actions do qualify as actual cause, according to
Halpern and Pearl’s definition.
Moreover, we will see that the model of Bogus Prevention is structurally isomor-
phic to models of symmetrical overdetermination cases—meaning that substituting
the variables of one case by the variables of the other case leads to identical models.
This is troubling for approaches like those discussed so far. These approaches rely
on structural criteria in order to discern factors that are actual causes from factors
that are not actual causes. But the fact that the structurally isomorphic cases give
rise to different judgements seems to suggest that causal judgements are deter-
mined by non-structural features of the cases. This has been called the Problem of
Isomorphism (Menzies (2004, 2007, 2017); Hitchcock (2007b); Hall (2007); Halpern
(2008); Halpern and Hitchcock (2015)).
As a reaction there have been suggestions to extend the formalism by a distinction
between default and deviant values that supposedly reflects the non-structural
differences. Default values are those values that variables are expected to take on
1An exception are instances of trumping. I will address these in Chapter 4.
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or that variables should take on. Thus, the default/deviant distinction explicitly
involves subjective, context-sensitive, and norm-laden considerations. There are
several ways of employing the default/deviant distinction. Here we will focus on
an account that employs a normality ordering over possible worlds as suggested
by Halpern and Hitchcock (2015).
An important consequence of employing such a normality ordering over worlds
is that it takes into account the normality or abnormality of the purported cause
variable. This means that Halpern and Hitchcock’s approach seems to allow only
those variables as actual causes that take on a deviant value. We will see that, thus,
Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual causation, combined with normality
orderings à la Halpern and Hitchcock promises to provide a unified concept of
actual causation that deals not only with the problem of redundancy but also with
the problem of selection.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.1 I will introduce the formal
framework of causal models. In section 3.2 I will review some criteria for choosing
appropriate causal models. In section 3.3 I will present a first set of definitions of
actual causation within this framework. The common idea of these definitions is
that actual causation amounts to counterfactual dependence under the assumption
that certain variables are being held fixed at their actual value. In section 3.4 I will
turn to another kind of definition, according to which actual causation is related to
counterfactual dependence under the assumption that certain variables are set to
non-actual values. In section 3.5 I will discuss how the problem of late preemption
has been addressed with the help of these definitions. In section 3.6 I will introduce
the Problem of Isomorphism. In section 3.7 I will review suggestions to introduce a
distinction between default and deviant behaviour. In section 3.8 I will show how
the distinction is supposed to solve the Problem of Isomorphism and I will raise
some initial doubts regarding this solution, which will prepare a more detailed
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discussion of defaults in Chapter 7. Finally, in section 3.9 I will briefly illustrate
how Halpern and Hitchcock’s normality ordering over worlds promises to provide
a response to the problem of selection.
3.1. Causal Models
The use of structural models for representing causal relations goes back to Sewall
Wright’s (1920; 1921) work on the genetics of guinea pigs in the 1920s. Subsequenty,
the framework has been applied fruitfully in econometrics and a wide range of
social sciences including sociological, psychological, and political theory (see the
overview in Goldberger (1972)). The version of the causal model framework that
has been applied most fruitfully in the recent philosophical literature on causation
goes back to the pioneering work of Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, and Richard
Scheines (1993) and Judea Pearl (2000).
A causal model M is defined as an ordered pair, 〈V,E〉, where V is a set of
variables and E a set of structural equations.2 The variables inV have two or more
possible values. These values represent potential states of affairs or events in the
model’s target system. A variable’s taking on one of the values represents an actual
state of affairs or event in the target system.
The set of variables V has two disjoint subsets: the set of exogenous variables
and the set of endogenous variables. The values of exogenous variables are deter-
mined by factors external to the causal model. They do not depend on the values
of other variables inV. The corresponding structural equations (sometimes called
exogenous equations) simply ascribe a particular value to the exogenous variables.
I will follow Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) convention and summarize the content of
exogenous equations by the context ~u, a vector that specifies the actual value of each
exogenous variable. The values of endogenous variables depend on the values of
2Henceforth I follow the exposition of the framework in Hitchcock 2001, if not stated otherwise.
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other variables inV. The corresponding structural equations (sometimes called en-
dogenous equations) refer to exogenous and sometimes other endogenous variables
on the right hand side. In deterministic causal models the values of endogenous
variables are fully determined once the values of the exogenous variables are given.
The structural equationsEprovide a summary of the counterfactual dependencies
that hold between the states of affairs or events. In a causal model there are as many
structural equations as there are variables such that every variable appears on the
left hand side of exactly one equation. Structural equations are minimal, that is, they
must not refer to variables that the variable on the left hand side does not depend
on. So if for all x′, x, y, z, Z = fZ(x, y) = fZ(x′, y), then Z does not depend on X and
X should be eliminated from fZ. Moreover, structural equations are complete in the
sense that they have to refer to all variables inV that the variable on the left hand
side depends on. That is, if for some x, x′, y, z, fZ(x, y) , fZ(x′, y), then Z depends
on X and fZ(X,Y) is in E.
Unlike mathematical equations, structural equations are not symmetric, so it
matters whether a variable is on the left hand side or the right hand side of the equal
sign. This reflects the asymmetry of causation. The syntax of structural equations
is otherwise similar to the syntax of mathematical equations in that the value of
the variable on the left hand side can be calculated by mathematical operations on
the variables on the right hand side. The relevant operations include (but are not
limited to) ·,+,−, as well as functions that select the minimum value and maximum
value: min{., .},max{., .}. Often the employed variables will be binary. Then it is
useful to define structural equations in terms of symbols from sentential logic, which
translate to mathematical equations as follows: ¬X = 1 − X; X ∨ Y = max{X,Y};
X ∧ Y = min{X,Y}.
Models are sometimes defined as an ordered pair 〈S,E〉 (see e.g. Halpern and
Pearl (2005)). E is again a set of structural equations and S is the signature, which is
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a tuple (U,V,R). According to this notation, U is the set of exogenous variables,
V the set of endogenous variables, and R is a function that associates with every
variable in U and V a set of possible values. Unless stated otherwise, I will use
the simpler notation where a model is denoted by 〈V,E〉—with V referring to all
variables of the model.
Causal models can be represented by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). These are
extremely useful for a quick (but incomplete) grasp of the causal relations of the
target system. A causal graph is a set of nodes that correspond to the variables in
V. The nodes are connected by directed edges that correspond to the structural
equations in E. There is a directed edge leading from variable X to variable Y iff
variable X features in the minimally complete structural equation for Y. In a causal
graph exogenous variables are represented by nodes that have no incoming edges,
whereas the nodes of endogenous variables always have incoming edges. Note that
DAGs typically do not provide full causal information. The incoming arrows to the
node of variable Y tell us what variables Y causally depends upon but they do not
convey information about how Y depends on these variables. This information is
provided by the structural equations.
It will be useful to introduce some terminology for family relations between
variables. When a variable features on the right hand side of the equation for an
endogenous variable, then it is a parent of this variable. Analogously, an endogenous
variable is a child of every variable that features on the right hand side of its equation.
Only endogenous variables have parents among the variables in V. The notions
of ancestor and descendant describe the transitive closure of the parent and child
relation, respectively. So if A is a parent of B and B a parent of C, then A is an ancestor
of C. Analogously, if C is a child of B and B is a child of A then C is a descendant of
A.
It will also be useful to introduce the notion of a directed path or route. A directed
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path or a route is a sequence of variables X1,X2, . . . ,Xn such that the Xi are parents
of the Xi+1 which means that a series of arrows leads from X1 to Xn. Causal graphs
are usually acyclic, that is, there are no directed paths or routes that lead from a
variable X back to X. In other words acyclicity means that a variable is never its
own ancestor or descendant.
3.2. The Art of Modelling
Given a particular target system, how do we arrive at a causal model of it? Unfor-
tunately, there are no exhaustive criteria. In this sense generating a causal model is
an art rather than a science (Halpern and Hitchcock (2010); Woodward (2016)). But
the literature covers some pitfalls that are to be avoided plus some general rules of
thumb.
Consider the selection of an appropriate set of variablesV. A causal model gives
a partial representation of the target system. An important requirement is that
the model "must include enough variables to capture the essential structure of the
situation being modeled" (Hitchcock, 2007b, 503). This is of course only helpful
to the extent that we have an idea of what the essential structure is. One way to
think about this is to require that a causal model be stable in the sense that adding
further variables to the model should not overturn causal judgements (Halpern and
Hitchcock (2010); Halpern (2016)).
Next, consider the variables’ possible values. First, the values of different vari-
ables should not represent events that stand in a logical relation. This is analogous to
Lewis’s (1986c) constraint that the events involved in causal claims be distinct. Sup-
pose Martha says "hello" loudly. There is a counterfactual dependence of Martha’s
saying "hello" loudly on her saying "hello." But the counterfactual dependence is a
logical dependence, not a causal dependence. Halpern and Hitchcock (2010) sug-
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gest to motivate this constraint as follows. Suppose we define one variable H1 such
that H1 = 1 if Martha says "hello" and H = 0 otherwise and another variable H2 such
that H2 = 1 if Martha says "hello" loudly and H2 = 0 otherwise. The combination
H1 = 0∧H2 = 1 should be excluded because it is logically impossible for Martha to
not say "hello" but say "hello" loudly.
Second, the values of any individual variable should be mutually exclusive
(Halpern and Hitchcock, 2010). Suppose, for example, we want to express the
dependence of the bottle’s shattering on Suzy’s throwing her stone. If ST = 1 rep-
resents the fact that Suzy throws her stone, then ST = 0 should imply that Suzy
does not throw the stone. The requirement of mutual exclusivity is related to the
contrastive character of causal claims, discussed in the foregoing chapter. If we
claim that c rather than c∗ causes e rather than e∗, then this implies that c , c∗ and
e , e∗.
Another somewhat vague criterion is that the values of particular variables should
not represent "unactualized possibilities we consider "too distant" to take seriously"
(Hitchcock, 2001, 279). The rationale behind this requirement is that certain vari-
ables can easily become dependent upon other variables if we take scenarios into
consideration that are very far fetched.
I conclude that the criteria for constructing apt causal models are vague and
leave the concrete modelling decisions underdetermined. This is not necessarily
a problem but is is an aspect of causal models that we shall keep in mind for the
following discussion.
3.3. Early Preemption
In this section I shall address causal model accounts of actual causation that are
motivated by the problems raised by cases that involve early preemption. The core
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idea of these accounts is that counterfactual dependence of the effect on the cause
is being restored by fixing variables other than the cause and the effect variable at
their actual values. Accounts along these lines have been suggested by Pearl (1998;
2000), Hitchcock (2001) and Halpern (2015). In this section I shall introduce in detail
the two accounts by Hitchcock and Halpern.
Figure 3.1 displays a causal graph for "Backup," our example of early preemption.
An assassin in training and her supervisor both set off to a mission to kill the victim.
The assassin in training pulls the trigger of her gun (T = 1) and shoots the victim
who dies instantly (VD = 1). If the trainee had not pulled the trigger, then her
supervisor would have shot the victim instead (S = ¬T). The victim dies if either
of the two assassins pulls the trigger of their guns (VD = T ∨ S).
Figure 3.1.: Early preemption.
The trainee’s actions are the actual cause of the victim’s death. Yet VD’s value does
not depend upon T because the supervisor waits as a backup. Thus, straightforward
counterfactual dependence fails as a criterion for actual causation. However, in the
absence of the backup the counterfactual dependence is restored. That is, holding
fixed the fact that the supervisor does not shoot (no matter what the trainee does),
the victim’s death does depend upon trainee’s actions.
More generally the idea is that actual causation does not require straightforward
counterfactual dependence. Instead it requires that there be certain variables such
that if these variables are being kept fixed at their actual values, then the effect
depends counterfactually on the cause. Judea Pearl (1998; 2000) was the first to
make this idea explicit within the formal framework of causal models. According
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to Pearl, the defining criterion for X = x to be an actual cause of Y = y is that we can
generate from the original causal model a reduced model (called a "natural beam")
in which Y depends counterfactually on X. More specifically, we are required to
arrive at such a reduced model by replacing the structural equations of variables
other than X and Y by structural equations that simply set these variables to the
values that they have in the actual context ~u. The details of this particular account
will not be relevant in the following. But we will see that Pearl’s idea of generating
a reduced causal model and then testing counterfactual dependence is common to
all causal model accounts of actual causation that will be discussed here.
The idea of testing counterfactual dependence in a reduced causal model is cen-
tral, for example, to Hitchcock’s (2001) account of actual causation. Hitchcock
motivates his account by considering the meaning of arrows in causal graphs. He
takes them to express what he calls explicitly non-foretracking counterfactuals. On
the common understanding counterfactuals are completely foretracking. Complete
foretracking means, for example, that if T had taken on a different value, then S and
VD would have taken different values as well, according to the structural equations.
So, if we intervene on the trainee such that he does not shoot, the counterfactuals
entail that the supervisor will shoot instead and that the victim will die anyway. The
arrow from T to VD expresses a counterfactual that is not completely foretracking
in the sense that it captures only the direct effect on VD while the effect on S is
expressed by the other outgoing arrow.
More specifically, the arrow leading from T to VD means that there is some value
s of S for which VD depends on T if S is held fixed at s, otherwise the minimality
requirement would exclude T as an argument of the structural equation for VD.
In "Backup" the value of S for which VD depends on T is the actual value. This is
why the arrow from T to VD, according to Hitchcock, represents an active causal
route, that is, a causal route along which causal influence propagates in the actual
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situation. Here is Hitchcock’s definition of an active route:
"Act: The route 〈X,Y1, . . . ,Yn,Z〉 is active in the causal model 〈V,E〉 if
and only if Z depends counterfactually upon X within the new system
of equations E′ constructed from E as follows: for all Y ∈ V, if Y
is intermediate between X and Z, but does not belong to the route
〈X,Y1, . . . ,Yn,Z〉, then replace the equation for Y with a new equation
that sets Y equal to its actual value in E. (If there are no intermediate
variables that do not belong to this route, then E′ is just E.)" (2001, 286).
The core idea, as in Pearl’s account, is to test counterfactual dependence of the ef-
fect on the cause in a reduced causal model. This reduced causal model is generated
from the original causal model by fixing those variables at their actual values that
lie on a path from cause to effect other than the path under consideration. Hitchcock
then identifies the existence of an active causal route between two variables as a
necessary and sufficient condition for causation:
"Let c and e be distinct occurrent events, and let X and Z be variables such
that the values of X and Z represent alterations of c and e respectively.
Then c is a cause of e if and only if there is an active causal route from X
to Z in an appropriate causal model 〈V,E〉" (2001, 287).
Why is the process of the trainee’s shooting the victim 〈T,VD〉 an active route,
according to Hitchcock’s definition? There is only one variable, S, that is intermedi-
ate between T and V but not on the route 〈T,VD〉. The actual value of this variable
is S = 0, representing that the supervisor does not shoot. Thus, the new system
of equations E′ is: T = 1, S = 0, and VD = T ∨ S. In this system of equations VD
depends counterfactually on T. Thus, the trainee’s pulling the trigger causes the
victim’s death.
Here is an example for an inactive route. Suppose the trainee fails to pull the
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A B
Figure 3.2.: Boulder.
trigger (T = 0). As a result the supervisor shoots the victim (S = 1 and VD = 1). Is
〈T,S,VD〉 an active route? No. Since there are no intermediate variables between
T and VD that do not belong to this route, we have E′ = E. But in E variable VD
does not depend counterfactually on T. This reflects the intuitive judgement that
the trainee’s refraining is not a cause of the victim’s death.
One problem for the accounts discussed in the previous chapter was that they
employ assumptions about transitivity that lead to problems in cases like "Boulder."
We shall now see how Hitchcock’s causal route account deals with this kind of case.
The discussion will also illustrate the model-dependence of Hitchcock’s account.
Here is a causal model of "Boulder" (see figure 3.2A, for the DAG): F = 1 shall
represent the boulder’s falling, D = F the fact that if the boulder were to fall, then
Hiker would duck, and S = ¬F ∨ D the fact that Hiker would survive if either
the boulder did not fall or Hiker ducked. According to Hitchcock’s definition,
the boulder’s falling is not a cause of Hiker’s surviving because there is no active
route linking F and S. First, consider the direct route 〈F,S〉. The only variable that is
intermediate between F and S is D. Replacing the structural equation for D by D = 1
and, thus, fixing D at its actual value does not render S counterfactually dependent
on F. Second, consider the indirect route 〈F,D,S〉. There are no intermediate
variables that do not belong to this route. Thus, the structural equations are not to
be altered. Since S does not depend counterfactually on F in the original system of
equations, the indirect route is inactive. Thus, there is no active route from F to S.
Consequently, the boulder’s falling is not an actual cause of Hiker’s survival, which
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is the correct verdict.
Note that the route’s 〈F,D,S〉 being inactive rests on the fact that there are no in-
termediate variables along the alternative route. This is not necessarily so. Suppose
we interpolate a variable B between F and S, representing the boulder’s approach-
ing Hiker’s head. This gives the following set of structural equations (see figure
3.2B, for the DAG): F = 1, D = F, B = F, and S = ¬B ∨ D. Holding fixed B = 1
does render S counterfactually dependent upon F with the result that the boulder’s
falling is a cause of Hiker’s survival, which is of course highly implausible.
Does the active route approach fail to account for Boulder after all? Hitchcock’s
strategy here is to reject the model with the interpolated variable because it is not
an apt representation. An important requirement for apt representation, according
to Hitchcock, is that the model should not represent scenarios that are not to be
taken seriously. In order to see what this means, consider what kinds of scenarios
are possible, according to this model. To begin with, take variables F and D as
an illustration. Our including these variables in the model reflects that we take
seriously two kinds of possibilities. First, there are possibilities that conform to the
structural equations: either the boulder falls and Hiker ducks or the boulder does
not fall and the Hiker does not duck. Second, there are possibilities that violate the
structural equations. In particular, there is the possibility that the boulder falls but
Hiker nevertheless does not duck. This is not unreasonable because we can imagine
a situation where the boulder falls but Hiker fails to recognize the threat. Thus, F
and D are unproblematic.
Let us now have a closer look at the interpolated variable B. In order to render
〈F,D,S〉 active as suggested above we have to make sure that the interpolated
variable B does not lie on this path but only on the path 〈F,B,S〉. This is the case if B
represents the presence of the boulder at a point where it is too late for Hiker to duck
upon recognizing the threat. Again we need to check whether we are willing to take
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seriously all possible scenarios. But here is a problem. The new model requires
us to imagine the scenario where the boulder approaches Hiker’s head without
having fallen. This is also the scenario that the active route criterion requires us
to take into consideration: we need to check the counterfactual dependence of S
on F holding fixed that the boulder approaches Hiker’s head (B = 1). But this is,
of course, implausible. Thus, including B into the model is to be rejected and the
active route approach is saved.
Alternatively, suppose we live in a world where such mysterious appearances of
boulders are a serious possibility. In this world hikers often die because boulders
take them by surprise without having fallen. Suppose also that Hiker was lucky
to encounter a boulder that is not of this mysterious kind such that it had to be
dislodged before it could approach Hiker. In such a world it is plausible to think
of the boulder’s falling as a cause of Hiker’s survival, which is again exactly the
verdict reproduced by the active route approach.
I conclude that Hitchcock’s active route criterion gives the correct result with
regard to our example of early preemption and it does so without incorporating
potentially problematic assumptions about transitivity. At the same time, the ap-
proach illustrates the relevance of the underlying modelling decisions. However,
in the following section we will see that this definition faces problems with re-
gard to other kinds of examples, especially with regard to cases of symmetrical
overdetermination.
But before that we shall consider another, more recent, definition that works
in terms of fixing variables at their actual values and that has been suggested by
Halpern (2015; 2016). Here is the definition:
~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ in (M, ~u) iff
AC1 (M, ~u) |= (~X = ~x) ∧ ϕ.
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AC2I There is a set ~W of variables in V and a setting ~x′ of the variables
in ~X such that if (M, ~u) |= ~W = ~w∗, then
(M, ~u) |= [~X← ~x′, ~W ← ~w∗]¬ϕ.
AC3 ~X is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2I.
Like Hitchcock’s active route definition, Halpern’s definition explicitly refers to a
causal model M under a particular value assignment, which is given by the context
~u. The first major difference is that Halpern’s definition identifies an actual cause
as a set of variables ~X whose elements Xi each take on a particular value xi, as given
by the vector ~x. In Hitchcock’s definition actual causes were defined as individual
variables. I will address this difference in the following section.
The definition consists of three conditions. First, it has to be the case that both
the cause event and the effect event have to be instantiated in the current model M
and context ~u. This is analogous to Hitchcock’s account where the variables have
to take on the values that represent the cause and effect event.
The second condition is a sophisticated counterfactual conditional. It requires
that there be a set ~W of variables such that if we keep fixed these variables at their
actual values ~w∗, then changing the value of the cause variable will lead to a change
in the effect.3 Again, there is a similarity to Hitchcock’s active route definition in
that the variables in ~W are to be held fixed at their actual values.
However, there is also an important difference. Hitchcock’s definition of actual
causation depends on the activity of a single path linking cause and effect. The activ-
ity of the path is revealed by holding fixed intermediate variables on all other paths.
Halpern’s definition is more general in that it does not specify which variables have
to be held fixed. This can be seen as an advantage for Halpern’s definition because
3The sophisticated counterfactual reduces to a straightforward counterfactual if it is fulfilled with
~W = ∅.
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Figure 3.3.: The chief assassin’s order is an actual cause of the victim’s death.
it can handle cases like the following (see the DAG in figure 3.3, Halpern (2015)).
Suppose the chief assassin orders two assassins (the trainee and his supervisor) to
kill the victim. This time they are both supposed to shoot and each shot is lethal.
That is, if the chief assassin issues her order (CA = 1) then both the trainee (T = CA)
and the supervisor (S = CA) attack the victim and the victim dies (VD = T ∨ S).
Presumably, the chief assassin’s issuing her order is an actual cause of the victim’s
death. But, according to Hitchcock’s definition, there is no active route linking the
order to the victim’s death. The route 〈CA,T,VD〉 is not active because if we keep
fixed the actual fact that the supervisor attacks the victim, then the victim’s death
does not depend on the chief assassin’s order. And the route 〈CA,S,VD〉 is inactive
for the same reasons. Halpern’s definition, by contrast, does identify the chief
assassin as actual cause, with ~W = ∅.4
Finally, Halpern’s definition involves a minimality condition (AC3). AC3 guar-
antees that the definition does not count factors as causally relevant that are un-
necessary for the effect. This condition does not have an analogue in Hitchcock’s
definition because Hitchcock’s definition only considers individual variables.
In this section I have presented two definitions that make use of Pearl’s idea that
actual causation amounts to counterfactual dependence in a reduced model, where
the reduced model is generated by fixing variables other than the cause and the effect
4There is another difference. In Hitchcock’s definition the variables Y that are to be held fixed are
identified as intermediate variables. Halpern’s variables ~W do not have to be intermediate. This
difference, however, is not important. Any variable that is causally relevant for the effect e but
does not lie on one of the paths from X to Z will not be affected by an intervention on X and, thus,
will keep its actual value without being held fixed.
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at their actual values. These definitions are successful with regard to standard cases
of early preemption. One crucial advantage of these definitions over alternative
definitions discussed in the foregoing chapter is that, given an appropriate model,
they do not fail with regard to cases such as "Boulder." But what about the other
forms of redundancy?
3.4. Symmetrical Overdetermination
Unfortunately, the definitions of actual causation provided in the previous section
do not apply to cases of symmetrical overdetermination. Suppose both the assassin
in training (T = 1) and his supervisor (S = 1) shoot at the same time and that both
their bullets hit the victim lethally (VD = T ∨ S, see the graph in figure 3.4). In this
kind of case we identify both the trainee’s and the supervisor’s actions as actual
causes.
Figure 3.4.: Symmetrical overdetermination.
However, the definitions discussed so far do not not give this result. In the
reduced causal model where the supervisor variable is kept fixed at its actual value
S = 1 there is no counterfactual dependence of VD on T. Given that the supervisor
pulls the trigger of her gun, the victim will die, no matter what the assassin in
training does.
An exception is Halpern’s definition. Here an actual cause can take the form of a
conjunct of two variables. If we assume that ~X = {S,T}, then there is a counterfactual
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dependence of the effect on ~X. However, this definition does not reflect the fact that
either of the two assassins is an individual actual cause of the victim’s death. This is
particularly problematic if we look at the case from an interventionist perspective:
in order to save the victim we need to apply two interventions, one directed at the
assassin in training and one directed at the supervising assassin. I will get back to
this problem in Chapter 4.
There is a way to save the basic idea that actual causation amounts to counter-
factual dependence under certain contingencies. The victim’s death does depend
on the trainee’s attack in situations where the supervisor does not pull the trigger
of her gun. That is, if we set the supervisor variable to the non-actual value S = 0,
then VD depends counterfactually on T. In general, the idea is that in cases of
symmetrical overdetermination, the counterfactual dependence between cause and
effect can be restored if we set certain factors to non-actual values.
This kind of counterfactual dependence was already envisioned by Pearl’s (1998;
2000) original theory, where he uses it in order to define a notion of contributing
cause. The details of Pearl’s definition shall not concern us here.5 Instead we shall
look at the more developed definition provided by Halpern and Pearl (2005). In
order to introduce this definition let me discuss the following preliminary sugges-
tion:6
AC2IIpre There is a set ~W of variables in V and a setting (~x′, ~w′) of the
variables in (~X, ~W) such that
(M, ~u) |= [~X← ~x′, ~W ← ~w′]¬ϕ.
The difference between AC2IIpre and AC2I is that AC2IIpre allows us to set the
5It is known to face counterexamples, as indicated below.
6In order to arrive at a definition of actual causation AC2IIpre has to be seen in combination with AC1




variables in ~W to non-actual values ~w′ whereas AC2I only allows us to keep them
fixed at their actual values ~w∗. With this amendment we get T = 1 as an actual cause
of VD = 1 with ~W = S and ~w′ = 0, and analogously for S = 1.
At a first glance it also seems to be the case that this preliminary definition still
gives the correct verdict with regard to early preemption. It still allows us to reduce
the model of "Backup" to a model where S = 0 is fixed such that the trainee is
classified as an actual cause of the victim’s death. Moreover, it reproduces the
judgement that in the current situation the supervisor’s behaviour is not an actual
cause of the victim’s death—she does not even attack the victim. Formally, this
can be seen as follows: in the given situation we have (M, ~u) |= S = 0 ∧ VD = 1
(condition AC1). Then condition AC2IIpre cannot be fulfilled because if we set S = 1,
there is no possibility for the victim to survive (that is, there is no possibility for
¬ϕ), which means that AC2IIpre is not fulfilled.
However, consider a model of "Backup" that includes variables that inform us
about whether the assassins set off to their missions (see figure 3.5). In the actual
situation both the assassin in training and her supervisor set off to a mission to kill
the victim (TM = 1 and SM = 1). The assassin’s pulling the trigger then depends
on whether she sets off to the mission (T = TM) and the supervisor’s pulling
the trigger depends upon the supervisor’s setting off and the trainee’s pulling the
trigger (S = SM ∧ ¬T).7
Figure 3.5.: An expanded model of "Backup."
7In the following I will use this expanded model of the early preemption case in order to motivate
Halpern and Pearl’s version of condition AC2. In their treatment the condition seems to be
motivated by cases of late preemption instead. However, in section 3.5 we will see that their
model of late preemption is problematic.
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With regard to this model the amended definition gives the counterintuitive result
that the supervisor’s setting off to her mission is an actual cause of the victim’s death.
If we choose ~W = {TM,T} with TM = 0 and T = 0, then the value of VD depends
on SM. This is problematic because this more complex causal model seems to be
perfectly legitimate.
The problem can be avoided if we choose ~W more carefully. The problem is that
by setting T to w′ = 0 we establish a causal process leading from the supervisor’s
setting off to the mission SM = 1 via the supervisor’s pulling the trigger of her gun
S = 1 to the victim’s death VD = 1. And this causal process was not there in the
actual situation. This can be avoided by taking into account the processes that are
active in the actual situation, as follows:
AC2II "There exists a partition (~Z, ~W) of V with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting
(~x′, ~w′) of the variables in (~X, ~W) such that if (M, ~u) |= Z = z∗ for all
Z ∈ ~Z, then both of the following conditions hold:
(a) (M, ~u) |= [~X← ~x′, ~W ← ~w′]¬ϕ [...].
(b) (M, ~u) |= [~X ← ~x, ~W′ ← ~w′, ~Z′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all subsets ~W′ of ~W8
and all subsets ~Z′ of ~Z [...]" (Halpern and Pearl, 2005, 853).
In the following I will refer to this as the HP definition of actual causation. In
analogy to Hitchcock’s account (in most cases9) the variables in ~Z can be understood
as constituting an active causal route that connects the cause ~X = ~x and the effect ϕ.
The account differs from Hitchcock’s account in that the off-path variables ( ~W) can
be set to some non-actual value ~w′. This is expressed by condition AC2IIa. But we
have seen that condition AC2IIa is too permissive because it does not track whether
the change in the effect from ϕ to ¬ϕ is due to the change in ~X or due to the change
8An earlier definition by Halpern and Pearl (2001) as well as Pearl’s definition of contributing cause
in (Pearl, 1998, 2000) skips the requirement "for all subsets ~W′ of ~W." But this leads to problems,
as shown by a counterexample provided by Hopkins and Pearl (2003).
9See Halpern (2016, 62ff) for a discussion of counterexamples.
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in ~W. With AC2IIb Halpern and Pearl add a restriction that picks out those changes
in ϕ that are due to the change in ~X. The condition states that setting any subset of
variables in ~W to non-actual values should not affect ϕ given (1) that we keep the
supposed actual cause fixed at its actual value ~X = ~x and (2) that all the variables
in an arbitrary subset of the variables along the active causal route are fixed at their
actual value (~Z′ = ~z∗).
Let me illustrate how this amended condition helps with regard to the expanded
model of early preemption. We shall begin with the trainee’s setting off to the
mission TM. AC1 is fulfilled because in the actual situation it is the case that the
trainee sets off to the mission (TM = 1) and the victim dies (VD = 1, in the following
abbreviated by ϕ). AC2II is fulfilled if we partition V such that ~Z = {TM,T,VD}
and ~W = {SM,S}. AC2IIa is fulfilled for this partition because the victim does not
die (¬ϕ) if neither the assassin in training nor the supervisor set off to their missions
(TM = 0 and SM = 0). AC2IIb is fulfilled because given the fact that the assassin in
training sets off to her mission, ϕ cannot be affected by changing SM or S, which
are elements of ~W.
Now turn to SM. The supervisor’s setting off to the mission is not an actual cause
of the victim’s death because there is no partition such that AC2IIa and AC2IIb
are fulfilled at the same time. The only partitions that render VD counterfactually
dependent upon SM are (i) ~Z = {SM,S,VD}, ~W = {TM,T} with ~w′ such that TM = 0
and T = 0 and (ii) a partition with only W = {T}. But for these partitions condition
AC2IIb is not fulfilled. There exists a subset ~Z′ = {S} of ~Z such that if we fix ~Z′ = z∗
(that is: S = 0), then the effect does not occur (¬ϕ). Thus, the definition reproduces
our intuitive judgement that the trainee’s actions are an actual cause of the victim’s
death but not the supervisor’s actions.
Thus, the Halpern-Pearl definition of actual causation seems to be superior to
Hitchcock’s active route criterion because it handles cases of symmetrical overde-
91
3. Causal Models for a Unified Account?
termination as well as cases of early preemption.
3.5. Late Preemption
In Chapter 2 we have seen that late preemption is particularly problematic for
counterfactual accounts. Unlike early preemption it cannot be solved by identifying
an intermediate event that, together with the presumed cause and effect event,
would constitute a chain of counterfactual dependence. In this section I will discuss
two models that have been employed by Halpern and Pearl (2005) in order to tackle
late preemption. The first model is by far the most common model in the current
literature but is problematic for a number of reasons. The second model is a time-
indexed model that is much less common but more appropriate. The review of these
approaches has two purposes. First, I shall assess the advancement that the causal
model framework provides with regard to late preemption. I will argue that only
the time-indexed model brings genuine progress. Second, this section shall prepare
a discussion of late preemption in the context of intervention and responsibility that
will be provided in Chapters 4 and 5.
Here is a common way to model the Suzy-Billy example of late preemption.10
Let ST = 1 and BT = 1 represent that Suzy and Billy both throw stones towards the
bottle, respectively. Moreover, let SH = 1 and BS = 1 represent Suzy’s hitting the
bottle and the bottle’s shattering. Finally, BH = 0 shall represent Billy’s not hitting
the bottle. The causal structure shall be represented by the causal model displayed
10Among others this model is suggested by Halpern and Pearl (2001); Hopkins and Pearl (2003);
Halpern and Pearl (2005); Hitchcock and Knobe (2009); Halpern and Hitchcock (2010); Halpern
(2015, 2016); Menzies (2017); Hitchcock (2017).
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in figure 3.6, with the following structural equations:
SH = ST,
BH = BT ∧ ¬SH,






Figure 3.6.: Causal graph of late preemption: Billy and Suzy throw stones at a bottle.
Suzy throws a little earlier, her stone hits the bottle and the bottle shatters. Billy’s stone
passes the initial position of the bottle only moments later. If Suzy had not hit the
bottle, then Billy would have hit and shattered it.
With this model it should not come as a surprise that the definitions presented
in the previous sections account for late preemption. For this model has exactly
the same structure as the expanded model of early preemption discussed in the
foregoing section. In order to see the structural equivalence, simply replace Suzy’s
throwing her stone and hitting the bottle by the trainee’s setting off to the mission
and his pulling the trigger of his gun. Likewise replace Billy’s actions with those of
the supervisor and the victim’s death with the bottle’s shattering.
However, there are two major problems with this model.11 First, according to
11Another problem is that the relation between ST and SH seems to be at least partly conceptual
because Suzy’s hitting the bottle requires that Suzy has thrown her stone (the same holds for the
relation between BT and BH). This means that the model violates one of the rules of apt modelling
detailed in section 3.2. The problem is that this would allow a scenario where Suzy’s stone hits
the bottle without Suzy having thrown the stone. Yet, this is not a deep problem. We can redefine
the variables. Suppose Suzy throws from the right side and Billy from the left. Accordingly, the
intermediate variables can be defined as RH describing whether the bottle is hit from the right
side and as LH whether the bottle is hit from the left side. If Suzy hits the bottle, the bottle will
be hit from the right side and if Billy hits the bottle, the bottle will be hit from the left side. These
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the model, BS is not a cause of BH. This is clearly wrong. Billy’s not hitting the
bottle is caused by the bottle’s being broken at the time when Billy’s stone arrives.
In order to reflect this relation one would have to include a directed edge leading
from BS to BH. Second, the model takes SH to be a direct cause of BH. But this is
clearly wrong as well. Direct causation requires that there be an intervention on SH
that changes the value of BH given that all other variables are kept fixed at some
value. But this is not the case. For suppose we keep fixed the fact that the bottle is
shattered (BS = 1, for example, because there is a third person who throws a stone
and destroys the bottle after Suzy but before Billy). Then intervening on SH will
not make a difference to the value of BH. Likewise, if we hold fixed that the bottle
is not shattered, then intervening on Suzy’s hitting will not make a difference to
Billy’s hitting the bottle. For instance, think of a situation where Suzy’s stone does
not have not enough momentum to destroy the bottle.
This is so troublesome because the model thereby essentially misrepresents late
preemption. The difference between early and late preemption is that in late pre-
emption the alternative process only fails because the effect has already occurred.
That is, the only influence of the preempting process on the preempted process is via
the effect event. This requirement is violated by the direct causal relation between
SH and BH. In fact, by including this causal relation the Suzy-Billy case is turned
into a case of early preemption, as the structural equivalence with the assassin case
illustrates. Consequently, this treatment of late preemption does not genuinely ad-
vance the discussion if compared to Lewis’s account of ancestral dependence (aside
from the fact that this treatment does not require transitivity).
Luckily, however, Halpern and Pearl give also an alternative model (which is
much less recognized) that represents the relation between SH, BH, and BS more




This model is governed by two kinds of equations that incorporate time indices:
Hi = Ti ∧ ¬BSi−1
BSi = BSi−1 ∨Hi.
According to the first equation, the bottle is hit at time τ = i if someone throws the
stone at τ = i and the bottle was not already shattered at time τ = i − 1. According
to the second equation, the bottle is shattered at time τ = i if it was shattered earlier
(τ = i − 1) or if it is hit at time τ = i. Plugging in the details of the Suzy-Billy case
yields the following set of structural equations:
H1 = ST,
BS1 = H1,
H2 = BT ∧ ¬BS1,
BS2 = BS1 ∨H2,
H3 = T3 ∧ ¬BS2,
BS3 = BS2 ∨H3.
Here T3 and H3 are added in order to represent the time-invariance of the model.
Figure 3.7 displays the corresponding causal graph.
Figure 3.7.: Time-indexed model of the late preemption case.
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The HP definition reproduces the correct causal judgments with regard to this
model. First, ST = 1 is an actual cause of BS3 = 1. Take ~W = {BT} and ~w′ = 0.
Then setting ST = 0 leads to BS3 = 0 (AC2IIa fulfilled). Moreover, if ST = 1 (Suzy
throws), BT = 0, and keeping fixed any subset of H1 = 1, BS1 = 1, and BS2 = 1 still
gives BS3 = 1 (AC2IIb fulfilled). By contrast, BT = 1 is not an actual cause of BS3 = 1
because there is no partition ~Z ∪ ~W that fulfills both AC2IIa and AC2IIb. H2 must
be assigned to ~Z and BS1 must be assigned to ~W with ~w′ = 0. Otherwise BS3 does
not depend counterfactually on BT (AC2IIa). But then there are subsets ~W′ and ~Z′
that violate AC2IIb. If we set BS1 = 0 and H2 = 0, then BS3 = 0. Thus, Halpern
and Pearl provide a model that avoids the problems of the model in figure 3.6 and
where the HP definition still gives the correct verdict.
Note that the time-indexed model essentially distinguishes between different
events of bottle shattering. According to this model, for example, BS1 = 1 needs
to represent an event that is distinct from BS2 = 1. Thus, the model requires an
extremely fine-grained scheme for event individuation.12 In Chapter 2 we have
seen that such a fine-grained individuation has been considered to be problematic.
The main worry, according to Lewis, is that there are no principled guidelines for
when such a fine-grained individuation scheme is appropriate and when it is not.
However, this worry does not seem to apply to Halpern and Pearl’s time-indexed
model. There is a rationale behind choosing a fine-grained individuation scheme in
this context. Only the fine-grained individuation allows us to capture an important
feature of the causal structure of late preemption cases: Suzy’s hitting the bottle
causes it to shatter, the bottle’s being shattered is a cause of Billy’s failing to hit the
bottle, which is the reason why Billy does not shatter the bottle at a later time.
12Another problem is that it would be incoherent to speak of BS1 = 1 and BS2 = 1 as representing
events. The shattering of the bottle at τ = i cannot be a cause of the shattering of the bottle at time
τ = i + 1. If anything at all, the shattering at τ = i is a cause of the bottle’s not shattering at τ = i + 1.
Instead, we should rather think of BS1 and BS2 as describing states. The bottle’s being shattered at
time τ = 1 can be seen as a cause of its being shattered at τ = i + 1. I shall not try to resolve issues
associated with the notion of event here.
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I conclude that the definitions of actual causation that use the causal model frame-
work have made advancements with regard to cases of late preemption. Halpern
and Pearl’s time-indexed model reproduces the relevant causal intuitions by em-
ploying a fine-grained individuation scheme with regard to the effect event. In the
context of late preemption the fine-grained individuation scheme is independently
justified because it reveals essential aspects of the underlying causal structure. At
the same time, the treatment of late preemption illustrates the relevance of the un-
derlying causal model’s being an apt model—a restriction that shall be particularly
relevant in the following discussion.
3.6. The Problem of Isomorphism
The use of causal models has without doubt increased the degree of precision in dis-
cussions of redundancy cases. However, more recently philosophers of causation
have argued that there are principled limitations for accounts of actual causation
that are based on standard causal models. The pessimism arises from a range of
cases where causal judgements supposedly cannot be captured by these standard
causal models. The most prominent problem is the Problem of Isomorphism (Men-
zies (2004, 2007, 2017); Hitchcock (2007b); Hall (2007); Halpern (2008); Halpern and
Hitchcock (2015)). There are examples of pairs of cases that appear to have iso-
morphic counterfactual structure, yet, different causal judgements apply. This is
taken to indicate that our causal judgements depend on considerations that go be-
yond the counterfactual structure and, thus, beyond the content of standard causal
models. Therefore, many have suggested extending causal models such that they
distinguish between default and deviant behaviour. The idea is that through this
extension the diverging causal judgements can be explained.
Instances of the Problem of Isomorphism involve pairs of cases that have iso-
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morphic causal models. Two causal models are isomorphic iff their "patterns of
counterfactual independence and dependence are identical, modulo the use of dif-
ferent variables" (Menzies, 2017, 159). That is, two causal models M1 and M2 are
isomorphic iff the structural equations of model M1 can be generated from the
structural equations of M2 by substitution of variables, and vice versa.
Before we continue let me make a remark about terminology. There is a question
regarding what exactly is taken to be isomorphic. According to Menzies, the pairs
of examples are isomorphic on the level of counterfactual structure and diverge with
regard to causal structure (2017, 154). By contrast, Halpern and Hitchcock (2015)
take the causal structure to be isomorphic and say that the cases diverge with
regard to judgements of actual causation. Both terminological choices, however,
are imprecise in the sense that they suggest an isomorphism between the target
systems. However, what is taken to be isomorphic are only the models of the pairs
of cases.13 A detailed discussion of this point will be provided in Chapter 7. In the
following I shall speak of isomorphisms as a relation between causal models. The
relations within these models will be referred to as structural equations. From this
I distinguish judgements or claims of actual causation. These judgements or claims
may diverge in instances of the Problem of Isomorphism.
Here is an example of a case (called "Careful Poisoning") that is structurally
isomorphic to "Backup":
"Assistant Bodyguard puts a harmless antidote in Victim’s coffee. Buddy
then poisons the coffee, using a type of poison that is normally lethal, but
which is countered by the antidote. Buddy would not have poisoned
the coffee if Assistant had not administered the antidote first. Victim
drinks the coffee and survives" (Hitchcock, 2007b, 519).
13Correspondingly, substitution of variables is an operation that is performed at the level of causal
models, not at the level of target systems.
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Here is a causal model of the case: first, A is a two-valued variable representing
whether there is antidote in the coffee (A = 1) or not (A = 0). Second, P represents
whether there is poison in the coffee (P = 1) or not (P = 0). Third, VS represents




VS = A ∨ ¬P
The structural isomorphism with the standard causal model of "Backup" can be
revealed by substituting A by T (the actions of the assassin in training), P by ¬S (the
negation of the supervising assassin’s actions) and VS by VD (describing whether
the victim dies)14—which gives exactly the structural equations presented in section
3.3.
The structural isomorphism entails that in both cases the same counterfactual
dependencies and independencies hold. In Careful Poisoning the victim’s survival
does not depend on the bodyguard’s administering the antidote. Likewise, in
"Backup" the victim’s survival does not depend upon the trainee’s actions. This
is because in both cases the influence is mediated by two causal paths that cancel
out. Moreover, in both cases the effect depends on these factors if the third factor
is held fixed at its actual value. If we hold fixed that Buddy administers the
poison (P = 1), then the Victim’s survival does depend on the bodyguard’s actions
(VS = A). Likewise, if we hold fixed that the supervisor does not shoot (S = 0), then
the victim’s death depends on the trainee’s actions (VD = T).
In Careful Poisoning the victim’s survival depends counterfactually on the body-
14Note the particular value assignment: in Careful Poisoning VS describes whether the victim survives
(1) or not (0) and in Backup VD describes whether the victim dies (1) or not (0).
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guard’s action given that we hold fixed the fact that Buddy administers his poison.
This means that the definitions provided by Hitchcock (2001), Halpern (2015), and
Halpern and Pearl (2005) identify the bodyguard’s administering antidote as an
actual cause of the victim’s survival. But this seems to be wrong. The bodyguard’s
administering antidote is the reason why Buddy poisons the coffee in the first place.
So "Careful Poisoning" is a counterexample to definitions like those introduced
in sections 3.3 and 3.4. One way to respond to this counterexample would be to
search for a refined definition that excludes the bodyguard’s administering antidote
as an actual cause. However, the problem is that any such refinement would need
to exclude the trainee’s actions in Backup as actual cause as well. The reason for
this is that the bodyguard and the trainee are equivalent from the perspective of
the causal models. This is why the two cases form an instance of the Problem of
Isomorphism.
Here is another example of two cases that have isomorphic causal models but
give rise to conflicting causal judgements. Consider "Bogus Prevention" (going
back to Hiddleston (2005)).
"Assassin is in possession of a lethal poison, but has a last-minute
change of heart and refrains from putting it in victim’s coffee. Body-
guard puts antidote in the coffee, which would have neutralized the poi-
son had there been any. Victim drinks the coffee and survives" (Halpern
and Hitchcock, 2015, 428).
The case can be represented with the following causal model. First, let P = 0 if
the assassin does not put poison into the coffee and P = 1 otherwise. Second, let
A = 1 if the bodyguard administers the antidote and A = 0, otherwise. Third, let
VS = 1 if the victim survives and S = 0 otherwise. The structural equation for the
victim’s survival is VS = ¬P ∨ A. In the actual situation we have A = 1, P = 0, and
VS = 1, so the victim survives.
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This model is structurally isomorphic to the model of the overdetermination case
discussed in section 3.4. If we substitute P by ¬T (the negation of the trainee’s
action), A by S (representing the supervising assassin’s behaviour), and VS by VD,
then we obtain exactly the structural equations that describe the case where both
assassins simultaneously fire lethal shots at the victim.
The structural isomorphism entails—again—that in both cases the same counter-
factual dependencies and independencies hold. In either case the victim’s survival
or death does not depend on either of the other two variables. Moreover, in either
case the victim’s survival or death does depend on each of the variables given that
the other variable is held fixed at the non-actual value. Given that the supervisor
does not shoot, the victim’s death depends on the trainee’s actions. The same holds
for the trainee. Likewise in Bogus Prevention. Given that the assassin administers
poison, the victim’s survival depends on the bodyguard’s actions. And given that
the bodyguard does not administer antidote, the victim’s survival depends on the
assassins action.
In Bogus Prevention, survival depends on the bodyguard’s administering anti-
dote given that the poisoning variable is set to a non-actual value (P = 1). Thus,
according to the HP definition, the antidote is an actual cause of the victim’s sur-
vival. But this is implausible because there was never any poison that needed to be
neutralized.
Thus, Bogus Prevention is a counterexample to the HP definition. Again, one
way to respond to this counterexample would be to search for a refined definition
that excludes the bodyguard’s behaviour as an actual cause. However, the problem
is that any such refinement would at the same time exclude the trainee’s actions
in symmetrical overdetermination as an actual cause. The reason for this is that
the bodyguard and the trainee are equivalent from the perspective of the causal
models.
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I conclude that the Problem of Isomorphism poses a principled challenge to the
kind of account that we have discussed so far. It generates counterexamples that
cannot be fixed through a straightforward refinement. Any such refinement would
capture the new examples at the price of loosing the old examples. The reason is
that the corresponding cases are represented by isomorphic causal models. That
is, at the level of causal models there is nothing to distinguish between the cases.
This suggests that causal models miss something crucial about the example cases,
something that would explain why they evoke conflicting causal judgements.
3.7. Defaults
In this section I will review accounts that aim to solve the Problem of Isomor-
phism by employing a distinction between default and deviant values of variables.
Roughly speaking, a default is a value that a variable is expected to take on or that
it should take on if no further information is given. The notion of default is usually
associated with the notion of normality that we have discussed in Chapter 2. The
idea is that a default is a value that a variable normally takes on, whereas deviant
values are abnormal. Most authors do not distinguish between different kinds of
normality at this stage but invoke a notion of normality that integrates descriptive
and prescriptive notions.15
The default/deviant distinction has been implemented in a variety of ways. The
first distinction can be drawn between (1) accounts that integrate the default/de-
viant distinction into the semantics of counterfactual conditionals and (2) accounts
according to which the default/deviant distinction is a conservative extension of
standard causal models.
15See e.g. Halpern and Hitchcock (2015). Bear and Knobe (2017) provides empirical evidence to the
effect that a mixed notion of normality is operative in many contexts. However, Beckers and




Let us first address integrated accounts (Menzies (2004, 2007, 2009); Huber (2013)).
Here the default/deviant distinction directly affects the truth conditions of counter-
factuals. The idea is that actual causation (difference making, in Menzies’s terminol-
ogy) is to be defined directly in terms of counterfactual dependence, that is, without
the restrictions discussed in the previous sections: "C makes a difference to E in an
actual situation relative to the model M if and only if CM E and ∼ C M ∼ E"
(Menzies, 2004, 166). But this counterfactual is evaluated not with regard to the
actual world but with regard to the most normal world.
I shall illustrate the idea by showing how this kind of account deals with the iso-
morphism between symmetrical overdetermination and Bogus Prevention.16 First,
consider symmetrical overdetermination. Presumably the most normal possible
world is where neither the assassin in training nor the supervising assassin attack
the victim and the victim survives. In this world both the actions of the trainee
and the supervisor make a difference to the victim’s survival and, thus, they are
actual causes. Second, consider Bogus Prevention. Presumably the most normal
possible world is one where the assassin does not administer any poison and the
victim survives. In this world the bodyguard’s actions do not make a difference to
the victim’s survival and, thus, the bodyguard is not an actual cause.
Integrated accounts are to be distinguished from accounts that incorporate the
default/deviant distinction as a conservative extension of causal models. Conser-
vative extension accounts (Halpern and Pearl (2005); Hitchcock (2007b); Halpern
(2008); Halpern and Hitchcock (2015); Halpern (2016)) leave the semantics of coun-
terfactual conditionals unchanged but argue that defaults and deviants determine
which counterfactuals feature in our judgements of actual causation. According to
Halpern and Hitchcock (2015), causal reasoners have, "in addition to a theory of
causal structure (as modelled by the structural equations), a theory of ’normality’
16The problems arising from the isomorphism between "Backup" and "Careful Poisoning" are not as
easily accounted for, see the treatment in Menzies (2017).
103
3. Causal Models for a Unified Account?
or ’typicality’" (433).
A key difference between the two kinds of accounts is that integrated context-
sensitive theories imply one kind of causal concept while conservative extension ac-
counts (at least sometimes) distinguish context-sensitive causal notions from causal
notions that are independent of the context. Halpern and Hitchcock, for example,
"envision a kind of conceptual division of labour, where the causal model (S,F )
represents the objective patterns of dependence that could in principle be tested by
intervening on the system, and  represents the various normative and contextual
factors that also influence judgements of actual causation" (2015, 435, F denotes the
set of structural equations).
How exactly does the default/deviant distinction restrict causal claims? Within
conservative extension accounts (which shall be the focus in the following) there
are three possible ways in which this can be achieved. First, there are accounts
(e.g. Halpern and Pearl (2005)) that simply prohibit deviant variable settings. Sec-
ond, there are accounts according to which the default/deviant distinction affects
a normality ranking that runs over possible worlds (Halpern and Hitchcock (2013,
2015)). A third alternative is to impose such normality rankings on sets of contexts
(Halpern (2016)). In this section I shall focus on normality rankings that run over
possible worlds.
According to Halpern and Hitchcock (2015), a causal reasoner’s theory of nor-
mality takes the form of an order over a set of worlds. A world is defined as
an assignment of values to all variables in a causal model. That is, "a world is a
complete description of a situation given the language determined by the set of
endogenous variables" (434).
Take the three-variable model of "Backup" as an example. Table 3.1 lists all
possible worlds of this model, including the actual world where the trainee shoots












Table 3.1.: Possible worlds in "Backup." The actual world is printed in bold type.
the possible worlds also include those worlds that do not conform to the structural
equations. For example, there is a possible world in which both the trainee and the
supervisor shoot and the victim still survives.
Normality is then represented in terms of an ordering over worlds, where s  s′
means that world s is at least as normal as world s′. The ordering is reflexive,
which means that for all worlds s it is true that s  s, that is, each world s is at
least as normal as itself. Moreover, it is transitive, that is if s  s′ and s′  s′′,
then s  s′′. Finally, the order is partial in the sense that there are worlds that are
incomparable. That is, there are worlds s and s′ such that neither s  s′ nor s′  s
holds. Incomparability accounts for the fact that normality can be evaluated along
multiple dimensions.
The next step is to incorporate the normality ordering into the causal model. An
extended causal model M = (S,E,) is a model that includes the normality ordering
along with the signature and the structural equations of a standard causal model.
Moreover, the definition of actual causation needs to be adjusted such that it reflects
the normality ordering. Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) suggest adding the criterion
that s~X=~x′, ~W= ~w′,~u  s~u to Halpern and Pearl’s version of condition AC2 which yields:
AC2III There exists a partition (~Z, ~W) of V with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting
(~x′, ~w′) of the variables in (~X, ~W) such that if (M, ~u) |= Z = z∗ for all
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Z ∈ ~Z, then both of the following conditions hold:
(a) (M, ~u) |= [~X← ~x′, ~W ← ~w′]¬ϕ and s~X=~x′, ~W= ~w′,~u  s~u.
(b) (M, ~u) |= [~X ← ~x, ~W′ ← ~w′, ~Z′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all subsets ~W′ of ~W
and all subsets ~Z′ of ~Z.
For future reference it will be useful to introduce the notion of a witness. A witness
for ~X = ~x being a cause of ϕ in context ~u is a world s where ~X and ~W take on non-
actual values such that the effect does not occur (¬ϕ). With the added normality
condition the witness s~X=~x′, ~W= ~w′,~u has to be at least as normal as the actual world s~u.
3.8. Solving the Problem of Isomorphism
Let me put this new definition of actual cause to work and show how it is thought
to solve the Problem of Isomorphism. Consider the isomorphism of "Backup" and
"Careful Poisoning." We have to show that with the normality criterion the body-
guard’s administering the antidote is not an actual cause of the victim’s survival.
According to Halpern and Hitchcock, one natural choice for defaults would be A = 0
(representing the fact that the bodyguard does not administer antidote) and P = 0
(representing the fact that the assassin does not administer poison). With these de-
faults we arrive at a normality ordering according to which the actual world (A = 1,
P = 1, VS = 1) is less normal than the witness of the bodyguard’s being an actual
cause (A = 0, P = 1, VS = 0). That is, with this normality ordering the bodyguard’s
actions are an actual cause.
So we need a different ranking. The value of P depends on the value of A. This
means, according to Halpern and Hitchcock, "that when we think about what is
typical for P, we should rank not just the typicality of particular values of P, but
the typicality of different ways for P to depend on A" (2015, 451). In particular,
Halpern and Hitchcock suggest a ranking where the most typical situation is one
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where the assassin does not administer poison regardless of the bodyguard’s actions
(P = 0). This is followed by a less typical kind of situation where the assassin
behaves according to the given structural equations (P = A). Finally, the least
typical situation is one where the assassin administers poison, again, regardless of
the bodyguard’s actions (P = 1).17
According to Halpern and Hitchcock, this choice results in a ranking that repro-
duces the correct judgement. In the actual world (A = 1, P = 1, VS = 1) variable
A takes on a deviant value and variable P takes on a value of medium typicality
(because it is determined by the given structural equation P = A ). In the witness
(A = 0, P = 1, VS = 0) variable A takes on a default value and we have P = 1
regardless of A, which is the least typical value for P. Presumably it is not clear
whether the gain in normality through the shift from A = 1 to A = 0 outweighs the
loss of normality through the shift from P = A to P = 1, which means that the two
worlds are incomparable. Incomparability means that the normality condition in
criterion AC2IIIa is not fulfilled and, thus, the bodyguard’s administering antidote
is not classified as an actual cause of the victim’s survival.
However, note that there is an alternative solution to this instance of the Problem
of Isomorphism that works without the default/deviant distinction. Blanchard and
Schaffer (2017) argue that an essential requirement for identifying actual causes is
that the underlying causal models be appropriate. Moreover, they argue that the
given instance of the Problem of Isomorphism arises because it involves a model
that is not appropriate. In particular, they argue that the given model of "Careful
Poisoning" leaves out essential information about whether the bodyguard’s antidote
neutralizes any poison or not. Including a corresponding variable yields the model
displayed in figure 3.8. This causal model is no longer isomorphic to the model of
17What are the reasons for accepting this particular ranking? Wouldn’t it be plausible to rank the
abnormality of the bodyguard’s violating the structural equations higher? After all the structural
equations are the most reliable information that we have about the case. A more detailed discussion
of this problem will be provided in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.8.: Careful Poisoning: including a variable representing the neutralization
breaks the structural isomorphism with "Backup".
"Backup." Blanchard and Schaffer (2017) use this case in order to develop a general
argument against the default/deviant distinction. They argue that instances of the
Problem of Isomorphism should instead be taken to indicate that one of the involved
models is not an appropriate representation. This argument shall be addressed in
much more detail in Chapter 7.
Next, consider Halpern and Hitchcock’s (2015) account of the isomorphism be-
tween symmetrical overdetermination and Bogus Prevention. In the actual situa-
tion the assassin refrains from administering poison, the bodyguard administers
the harmless antidote, and the victim survives (P = 0, A = 1, VS = 1). In the witness
world of the bodyguard’s being an actual cause the assassin administers poison, the
bodyguard does not administer antidote and the victim dies (P = 1, A = 0, VS = 0).
Halpern and Hitchcock assume, again, that refraining from action is more typical
than action for both the assassin and the bodyguard. That is, P = 0 and A = 0 are
the defaults. With these defaults the actual world and the witness are incomparable
and, thus, the bodyguard’s actions do not qualify as actual cause.
But, again, note that this problem is solved without the default/deviant distinction
if we use a model that includes a variable representing the neutralization process
(figure 3.9, see Halpern and Hitchcock (2015, 444) and Blanchard and Schaffer (2017,
201)). This model is not isomorphic to symmetrical overdetermination. Moreover,
the bodyguard’s actions are not an actual cause of the victim’s survival according
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Figure 3.9.: Bogus prevention: including a variable representing the neutralization
breaks the structural isomorphism with the overdetermination case.
to the definitions discussed earlier.
Blanchard and Schaffer (2017) also argue that incorporating the default/deviant
distinction is problematic for independent reasons. In particular, the specific choices
of what counts as default behaviour often seem to be ad hoc. For example, with
regard to Halpern and Hitchcock’s treatment of the poisoning cases there may well
be reasons to believe that there are senses in which the assassin’s administering
poison is typical. After all this is what assassins normally do and what they are
being paid for.
3.9. Defaults and the Problem of Selection
In the foregoing sections we have seen that the default/deviant distinction has been
motivated by the Problem of Isomorphism. However, the distinction has also been
considered as formalizing a solution to the problem of selection, introduced in Chapter
2. Let me show how Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) employ the normality ordering
over possible worlds in order to account for the fact that we typically identify a lit
match as an actual cause of a fire but not the presence of oxygen.18
18Similar considerations apply to the situation described in Knobe and Fraser’s (2008) pen vignette,
which I have discussed in section 2.7.
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The situation can be represented with a causal model consisting of three variables
as follows: first, there is a variable, M, which takes value 1 if the match is lit and
value 0 if it is not lit. Second, there is a variable, O, which takes value 1 if oxygen
is present and value 0 if no oxygen is present. Finally, there is a variable, F, which
takes value 1 if a fire occurs and 0 if not. The fire depends conjunctively on the match
and the presence of oxygen, that is, we have the structural equation F = M ∧O.
According to the HP definition, both the lit match and the presence of oxygen
qualify as actual causes of the fire. Thus, the definition does not reflect the intuitive
difference between the two factors. However, taking into account the normality
ordering we will see the difference. According to Halpern and Hitchcock, the
following is a plausible ordering:
(M = 0,O = 1,F = 0)  (M = 1,O = 1,F = 1)  (M = 1,O = 0,F = 0)
According to this ordering, the witness world of the match being the actual cause
(that is, the world where oxygen is present but no match is lit such that there is no
fire) is at least as normal as the actual world. But the witness world of the presence
of oxygen (that is, the world where the match is lit but no fire occurs because of the
absence of oxygen) is less normal than the actual world. The reason for this is that
the presence of oxygen is the default state.
Halpern and Hitchcock also emphasize the contextual character of the normality
ordering. If the fire occurs in a place that is typically voided of oxygen (e.g. in a
laboratory), then the normality ordering would be different such that the witness
of oxygen being an actual cause would be at least as normal as the actual world.
Thus, the account nicely reproduces the contextual character of selective causal




In this chapter I have reviewed causal model approaches to actual causation. The
Halpern-Pearl definition seems to be a particularly promising candidate because
it accounts for cases involving early and late preemption as well as for cases in-
volving symmetrical overdetermination, which all have been difficult to handle for
counterfactual theories of causation. Moreover, adding Halpern and Hitchcock’s
(2015) normality condition as a restriction to the Halpern-Pearl definition seems to
yield an approach that accounts also for the problem of selection. Thus, it seems





Pluralism about Actual Causation
113

4. Pluralism about Actual Causation
A key assumption underlying the debate that I have reviewed in the foregoing
chapter is that there is a unified concept of actual causation.1 As an example,
consider Halpern’s Actual Causality (2016). Surveying a range of toy examples
Halpern offers three competing basic definitions of actual causation and discusses
several ways of implementing considerations of normality. At the same time,
Halpern seems to be convinced that there is one unified concept of actual causation
that captures the causal intuitions in the wealth of example cases and he suggests
that his "modified" concept of actual causation comes closest. Moreover, even
authors who endorse causal pluralism seem to subscribe to the view that the concept
of actual causation is a unified concept among the plurality of other causal concepts.
For example, in Making Things Happen (2003), chapter 2, Woodward uses causal
models in order to clarify the relation between causation and manipulability. The
result is a theory that distinguishes between total causes, direct causes, contributing
causes, and actual causes. Thus, while Woodward accepts that there is a plurality
of causal concepts, he seems to assume that within that plurality ’actual causation’
refers to a unified concept.
In this chapter I will challenge the assumption that there is a unified concept of
actual causation and suggest a pluralist theory instead. In particular, I propose
that we distinguish between total, path-changing, and contributing actual causes.
1Chapter 4 builds on my article "Three Concepts of Actual Causation" (Fischer (forthcoming a))
accepted for publication by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science on 03/30/2021 (https:
//doi.org/10.1086/715201).
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Total actual causation amounts to a straightforward counterfactual dependence of
the effect on the cause. Path-changing actual causation amounts to counterfactual
dependence of the effect on the cause given that certain other variables are held
fixed at their actual values. Thus, path-changing actual causation is similar to
the definitions of actual causation provided by Pearl (2000), Hitchcock (2001), and
Halpern (2015). Finally, contributing actual causation amounts to counterfactual
dependence of the effect on the cause given that certain other variables are set non-
actual values and, thus, is similar to the concept captured by Halpern and Pearl’s
(2005) definition of actual causation.
I will provide two lines of argument for my pluralist account. The first line of
argument is based on three example cases that shall illustrate the problems that
unified accounts of actual causation face. The examples have in common that there
are two factors that both seem to qualify as actual causes. Yet, at the same time,
there is an important asymmetry between these factors. Extant unified theories
face a dilemma here: either they describe both factors as actual causes (and thus
cannot explain the asymmetry), or they dismiss the intuition that both factors are
actual causes (and account for the asymmetry by identifying only one of the factors
as actual cause). By distinguishing between total, path-changing, and contributing
actual causes, my account can both hold that each example involves two actual
causes, and explain the perceived asymmetry. For example, in trumping cases
like the case where the major and the sergeant order the corporal to advance (see
Chapter 2) both the major’s and the sergeant’s order appear to be actual causes
because the respective causal processes both run to completion. Nevertheless, the
major differs from the sergeant in that the major has more control over the situation
(he could have ordered the corporal to retreat). Extant accounts of actual causation
do not reflect this intuition in an appropriate way.2 On the one hand, there are
2There is an exception: Hitchcock’s (2011) contrastive account of actual causation in trumping cases
provides a solution that is very similar to the one that will be provided here. Even though Hitchcock
116
accounts that identify only the major as actual cause and, thus, account for the
perceived asymmetry between the two officers (such as Lewis’s influence account).
On the other hand, there are accounts that identify both the major and the sergeant
as actual causes but then treat them on a par (such as Halpern and Pearl’s (2005)
account). My pluralist theory accounts for the relevant intuitions by identifying the
major and the sergeant both as contributing actual causes but only the major as a
total actual cause.
The second line of argument is based on a functional approach to actual causation.
Following Woodward (2014), a functional approach, among other things, informs
us about relevant distinctions among causal concepts by considering the purpose
of such concepts. In particular, I will argue that if we take concepts of actual
causation to inform intervening agents about factors that are particularly suited for
intervention, then the distinctions between total, path-changing, and contributing
actual causation are important. The distinction between total and path-changing
actual causation, for example, is important from the interventionist perspective
because it informs the agent about how control about an effect can be achieved. Total
actual causation can be exploited by simply targeting the total actual cause. Path-
changing actual causation, by contrast, requires that the intervention on the path-
changing actual cause be combined with a secondary intervention that counteracts
the adverse consequences of the first intervention.
After presenting these two lines of argument I will examine the role of normality
in my pluralist account of actual causation. In particular, I will argue that we
need to discern two kinds of context-sensitivity. First, there are considerations that
concern the values of individual variables (context-sensitivity1). Second, there are
considerations that concern violations of structural equations (context-sensitivity2).
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.1 I will introduce three example
does not explicitly endorse a pluralism about actual causation in the article, his discussion involves
distinctions between concepts of actual causation that are similar to the ones discussed here.
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cases that raise problems for unified accounts of actual causation: trumping cases,
the Light Bulb case, and the Henchman case. In particular, I will show that the HP
definition fails to explain an intuitive asymmetry that is involved in each of these
cases. Moreover I will argue that, unlike the asymmetries discussed in the forego-
ing chapter, these asymmetries are not explained by considerations of normality. In
section 4.2 I will provide definitions of total, path-changing, and contributing actual
causation. I will show how the distinction between these concepts helps account
for the problem cases described in section 4.1 and I will relate the definitions to
differences between concepts of causation that have been drawn in the literature. In
section 4.3 I will turn to the second line of argument and provide a functional jus-
tification for the distinction between total, path-changing, and contributing actual
causes. Finally, in section 4.4 I will address the role of norms within this pluralist
account of actual causation and introduce the distinction between two kinds of
context-sensitivity.
4.1. Three Problem Cases
In this section we shall have a look at three example cases that pose problems for
the unified accounts discussed in the foregoing chapter. In the following discussion
I will focus on Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) account because I take this account to
provide the most advanced treatment of redundancy cases. I take the argument to
extend to the other accounts presented in the foregoing chapter and I will indicate
relevant differences as we go along.
4.1.1. Trumping
A major and a sergeant order a corporal to advance. The corporal receives both
orders at the same time and advances. What caused the corporal to advance? The
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case is ambiguous. On the one hand, the corporal receives both orders at the same
time. Thus, it seems like both orders are causes just as in situations of symmetrical
overdetermination. On the other hand, orders of higher-ranked officers trump
those of lower-ranked officers. Thus, it seems like there is an important asymmetry
between the two orders such that some have argued that the only cause is the
major’s order (Schaffer (2000a); Lewis (2004)).
Halpern and Pearl (2005) are aware of the ambiguity of trumping cases and they
offer two kinds of models. The first model is a coarse-grained model that consists
of three variables (see figure 4.1A for the DAG): there are two variables, M and S,
representing the major’s and the sergeant’s actions, respectively. These have three
possible values: 1 (order advance); −1 (order retreat); 0 (do nothing). Moreover,
there is a variable, A, representing what the corporal does. If the major issues an
order, then the corporal follows it, that is, A = M if M , 0. If the major does not
issue an order then the corporal follows the sergeant’s orders, that is, A = S if M = 0.
In the actual situation both the major and the sergeant order to advance and the
corporal advances: M = S = A = 1. With this model the HP definition identifies
both the major and the sergeant as actual causes of the corporal’s action.
A B
Figure 4.1.: Two models for trumping preemption.
But what about the perceived asymmetry between the major and the sergeant?
Halpern and Pearl (2005) argue that there is an alternative model according to which
only the major is an actual cause. The alternative model includes a variable SE that
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captures whether the sergeant’s order is effective. If the major does nothing (M = 0),
then SE = S. But if the major issues an order (M , 0), then the sergeant’s order is
not effective, a fact represented by SE = 0 (see figure 4.1B for the DAG).
According to Halpern and Pearl, this model reproduces Schaffer’s and Lewis’s
claim that only the major’s issuing the order is an actual cause of the corporal’s
actions. However, this does not seem to be a legitimate treatment of trumping
cases, at least if they are construed as cases where both causal processes run to
completion. In fact, Schaffer anticipates this kind of treatment of trumping cases.
In reply he argues that the judgement that the major is an actual cause but not the
sergeant seems to arise independently of considerations regarding such sophisti-
cated assumptions about the corporal’s decision module. Moreover, Halpern and
Pearl’s sophisticated model does not apply to cases like the Merlin and Morgana
case which is set up in a way that makes a treatment along these lines impossible.
But even if this treatment were legitimate, Halpern and Pearl’s account would not
be completely satisfactory. According to the coarse-grained model, both officers are
actual causes and, according to the fine-grained model, only the major is an actual
cause. That is, according to these models, it is either the case that the officers are
to be treated on a par or it is the case that only one of them is an actual cause. But
the intuition seems to be that both officers are actual causes and that there is an
asymmetry between them.
Could the perceived asymmetry be related to considerations of normality? First of
all, the case seems to be relatively neutral as regards considerations of normality. The
case does not provide any specific information about whether any of the involved
officers act according to any relevant norms or whether they violate any relevant
norms. But maybe norms are at play after all. Then their influence should become
clearer if the case is more drastic. So, suppose the orders require the corporal to
violate a moral norms. Then the major is an actual cause because there is a witness
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world which is more normal than the actual world ((M = 0,S = 0,C = 0), that is,
the world where none of the officers issue an order). But the same world is also a
witness for the sergeant’s being an actual cause. Thus, it seems that the perceived
asymmetry is not to be explained by considerations of normality.
4.1.2. The Light Bulb
Here is another problematic case:
"A and B each control a switch. There are wires going from an electricity
source to these switches and then continuing on to C. A must first decide
whether to flip his switch left or right, then B must decide (knowing A’s
choice). The current flows, resulting in a bulb at C turning on, iff both
switches are in the same position. B wants to turn on the bulb, so flips her
switch to the same position as A does, and the bulb turns on" (Halpern
2016, 100).
Figure 4.2A depicts a schematic representation of the kind of circuit that is de-
scribed here. The structural equations of the case, following Halpern, are: B = A,
saying that B copies the position of A’s switch, and C = 1 iff A = B, saying that the
light bulb is switched on if and only if the two switches are in the same position.
Causal intuitions are again ambiguous. On the one hand, both agents’ actions
are causes of the fact that this particular circuit is closed. On the other hand, there
is clearly an asymmetry between the two agents because only B has control over
whether the light is switched on. This ambiguity is also reflected by Halpern’s
discussion. On the one hand, Halpern states that "[i]ntuition suggests that A’s
action should not be viewed as a cause of the C bulb being on, whereas B’s should"
(ibid.). On the other hand, his treatment of the case in terms of normality (see the
discussion in section 4.1.4) suggests that he takes both agents to be causes, while
the perceived asymmetry between them is a matter of degree and is to be explained
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A B
Figure 4.2.: The Light Bulb. If both switches are either on the left or right side the
lamp C is switched on. A: the circuit. B: the causal graph.
in terms of considerations associated with normality. The HP definition (as well
as Halpern’s modified definition that is the focus of his discussion of the example)
treats both agents on a par and, thus, does not reflect the important fact that only B
has control over the lamp’s being switched on.
Is the asymmetry explained by considerations of normality? The case appears to
be relatively neutral with regard to normality. Thus, we should not expect that the
intuitive asymmetry is related to considerations of normality. Nevertheless, a good
way to test whether norms are at play is to make the case more drastic. We shall
replace the event of a lamp’s being switched on by the morally abnormal event of a
person getting an electric shock (as in the structurally equivalent scenario known as
’Shock C’ (McDermott (1995))). But even in this case the difference between A and
B does not seem to be explained by normality, if implemented in the way discussed
in Chapter 3. The world where A = 0, B = 1, and C = 0 is a witness for A being an
actual cause and it seems to be more normal than the actual world. But the same
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Figure 4.3.: The Henchman. The henchman copies the gangleader’s actions. The
victim dies if either the gangleader or the henchman shoots.
world is also a witness for B. Thus, both A and B qualify as actual causes.
4.1.3. The Henchman
Consider the following case, taken from Rosenberg and Glymour’s (2018) review of
Halpern’s Actual Causality. A gang leader (GS = 1) and his henchman (HS = 1) both
shoot and their enemy dies (ED = 1). The enemy would also have died if either only
the gang leader or only the henchman had shot. However, the henchman shoots if
and only if the gang leader shoots. We shall also assume that the two individually
lethal bullets kill instantaneously and hit at the same time, such that they stand in a
relation of symmetrical overdetermination. The causal graph is displayed in figure
4.3 and the structural equations are as follows:
HS = GS
ED = GS ∨HS
Clearly, both the gang leader and the henchman are to be identified as actual
causes of the enemy’s death. Yet, at the same time there seems to be an important
asymmetry between the two agents because the enemy’s death depends upon the
gang leader’s actions but not on the henchman’s actions.
Rosenberg and Glymour present this case as a counterexample to Halpern’s
modified definition. According to Halpern’s modified definition, the gang leader
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is an actual cause (because of the relation of counterfactual dependence) but the
henchman is not an actual cause because there is no way to restore the counterfactual
dependence of the enemy’s death on the henchman’s action by keeping the values
of other variables fixed at their actual values. Moreover, the henchman is not ‘part
of a cause’ according to Halpern’s modified definition, because {HS = 1,GS = 1}
violates the minimality condition: GS = 1 by itself is an actual cause.
The HP definition does identify both the gang leader and the henchman as actual
causes. However, it treats both agents on a par and, thus, does not explain the
intuitive difference between the two agents. Neither does consideration of nor-
mality explain the difference between the two agents. The only witness for the
gang leader being an actual cause is the world where none of the agents shoot
(GS = 0,HS = 0,ED = 0). But this is also the only witness world for the henchman.
Thus, if one of the two agents qualifies as actual cause, according to the normality
criterion, then the same should hold for the other agent.
4.1.4. Graded Causation to the Rescue?
The problem with the HP definition in the three examples is that it does not reflect
the intuitive asymmetry between the involved agents. Moreover, we have seen
that applying Halpern and Hitchcock’s (2015) normality criterion does not help
distinguish between the agents. However, there have also been suggestions to use
normality in order to implement a graded notion of actual causation. Prima facie this
could lead to a plausible solution to the problems because the difference between
the agents does not seem to be a difference between causes and non-causes but a
difference in degree.
One way to implement a graded notion of actual causation is to rank causes
according to the normality of their most normal witness (Halpern and Hitchcock,
2015, 436). According to this approach, both the short-circuit and the presence of
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oxygen are actual causes of the fire. But the short-circuit is a better cause because its
most normal witness (a world like the actual world but where the short-circuit does
not occur) is more normal than the most normal witness of the presence of oxygen
(a world like the actual world but without the presence of oxygen).
First, consider the variation of the trumping case where the officers issue norm-
violating orders. Presumably, the most normal world then is the one where none
of the orders is issued and the corporal does not do anything. But this is the best
witness for both the major and the sergeant, meaning that graded causation does
not help distinguish the two. Second, with regard to the Light Bulb case the witness
of A is (A = 0, B = 1) and the witness of B is (A = 1, B = 0). Both worlds seem to
be less normal than the actual world because both worlds involve a violation of a
structural equation. But apart from this there does not seem to be a difference in
the normality of these two witnesses that could explain the perceived asymmetry
between A and B. Finally, in the henchman case there is only one witness world for
the gang leader being an actual cause (GS = 0,HS = 0,ED = 0). But this is also the
only witness for the henchman being an actual cause. So, again, graded causation
does not explain the difference between the agents.
Halpern (2016) proposes yet another way to implement (graded) normality. With
regard to the Light Bulb case Halpern argues that
we can take the change from the world where both A = 1 and B = 1 to
the world where A = 1 and B = 0 to be smaller than the one to the world
where A = 0 and B = 1, because the latter change involves changing
what A does as well as violating normality (in the sense that B does not
act according to the equations), while the former change requires only
that B violate normality. This gives us a reason to prefer3 B = 1 as a
cause (2016, 102).
3A mere preference for B does not exclude that A is a cause as well. Thus, Halpern seems to assume
(rightly, I think) that both factors are causes but to a different degree.
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In order to show that A = 1 is an actual cause (according to Halpern’s modified
definition as well as the HP definition) we need to apply two interventions. First,
we need to intervene on A and, second, we need to intervene on B such that it
keeps its actual value. In order to show that B = 1 is an actual cause, however, we
have to apply only one intervention on B. Halpern takes this single intervention
to amount to a smaller decrease in normality than the combination of interventions
that is required to show that A is an actual cause.
In the following we will see that the distinction between applying one rather
than two interventions is indeed essential. Thus, I think that Halpern’s discussion
points to an important difference between A and B.4 However, Halpern employs
the number of interventions in order to implement a difference in normality between
A and B. And this seems to be problematic. The idea of normality was to rank
different interventions. The short-circuit is a better actual cause of the fire because
preventing the short-circuit leads to a world that is more normal than preventing
the presence of oxygen. But with Halpern’s new criterion it seems that the short-
circuit and oxygen are to be treated on a par because arriving at either factor’s
witness requires one intervention (see Rosenberg and Glymour (2018) for a similar
criticism of Halpern’s normality criterion). I conclude that none of the attempts to
implement a graded notion of actual causation via a criterion of normality helps
with regard to the three problematic examples.
4Similar considerations apply to the trumping case and the Henchman case, as will be argued in the
following section.
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4.2. Total, Path-changing, and Contributing Actual
Causation
4.2.1. Definitions
The ambiguity of the three example cases suggests that there are different concepts
of actual causation at play. Here are definitions of three concepts of actual causation.
Total Actual Cause
X = x is a total actual cause of ϕ in (M, ~u) iff
TAC1: (M, ~u) |= (X = x) ∧ ϕ,
TAC2: There exists a setting x′ of variable X such that
(M, ~u) |= [X← x′]¬ϕ. (4.1)
The definition of total actual cause amounts to straightforward counterfactual de-
pendence of the effect on the cause. Condition TAC1 says that in the actual situation
both the cause and the effect have to be instantiated and condition TAC2 expresses
the requirement of counterfactual dependence. The concept of total actual causa-
tion describes an important subclass of factors that are typically identified as actual
causes, yet, it surely does not capture all such factors since it does not apply to cases
involving redundancy.
Path-changing Actual Cause
X = x is a path-changing actual cause of ϕ in (M, ~u) iff
PAC1: (M, ~u) |= (X = x) ∧ ϕ.
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PAC2: There is a set ~W of variables inV and a setting x′ of variable X such
that if (M, ~u) |= ~W = ~w∗, then
(M, ~u) |= [X← x′, ~W ← ~w∗]¬ϕ.
This definition formalizes the idea that effects depend on their path-changing actual
causes given that certain other variables are being kept fixed at their actual values.
The definition captures the idea that preempting factors, such as the assassin in
training in Backup, are actual causes. But we will see that the definition also
helps account for cases where the path-changing actual cause does not preempt the
competing factors, as in the light bulb case. I choose the label ‘path-changing actual
cause’ because intervening on such a cause changes the causal path along which the
effect is influenced. If I intervene on switch A’s switch, then I will not prevent the
light’s being switched on. But as a result of the intervention the electric current will
run along a different wire. Note that the definition of path-changing actual cause is
wider than the definition of total actual cause, that is, every total actual cause is a
path-changing actual cause (with W = ∅), but not vice versa.
The definition is inspired by and closely related to Pearl’s (2000), Hitchcock’s
(2001), and Halpern’s (2016) definitions of actual causation. But let me point out
some differences. The definition differs from Hitchcock’s active route criterion
because it does not require that there is a single active route. Thus, it avoids problems
associated with cases where the influence is transmitted via several paths that are
active at the same time as in the example involving the chief assassin discussed in
section 3.3. Second, the definition is different from Halpern’s definition of modified
actual causation because it accepts only single variables X = x as actual causes but
not sets of variables ~X = ~x. The restriction is motivated by the fact that typically we
take the single variables of a causal model to be independently manipulable factors.
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Treating a set of variables as actual causes then seems to neglect the important fact
that several interventions are to be applied in order to avoid the outcome.5 One
consequence of restricting the definition as applying to individual variables is that
it does not account for cases of symmetrical overdetermiantion—this seems to be
Halpern’s motivation for endorsing the view that sets of variables can count as an
actual cause. But this is not a problem because for this purpose we have the concept
of contributing actual cause.
Contributing Actual Cause
X = x is a contributing actual cause of ϕ in (M, ~u) iff
CAC1: (M, ~u) |= (X = x) ∧ ϕ
CAC2: There exists a partition (~Z, ~W) of V with X ⊆ ~Z and some setting
(x′, ~w′) of the variables in (X, ~W) such that if (M, ~u) |= Z = z∗ for all
Z ∈ ~Z, then both of the following conditions hold:
(a) (M, ~u) |= [X← x′, ~W ← ~w′]¬ϕ.
(b) (M, ~u) |= [X ← x, ~W′ ← ~w′, ~Z′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all subsets ~W′ of ~W
and all subsets ~Z′ of ~Z.
Note that the concept of contributing actual cause is strictly more encompassing
than the concept of path-changing actual cause. Every path-changing actual cause
is also a contributing actual cause, but not vice versa. More specifically, path-
changing causaution describes the special case where the values of variables in ~W
may only be set to values ~w∗ that these variables take on in the actual situation.
The definition of contributing actual cause is almost identical to Halpern and
Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual cause. The only difference is that, again, my
definition is restricted to individual variables as actual causes.
5Schaffer (2003) gives a systematic defense of this view, which he calls individualism.
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4.2.2. Trumping, Light Bulb, and Henchman Reconsidered
Let us see how the distinction between these concepts helps account for the problem
cases of the foregoing section. We shall begin with trumping cases. Consider
Halpern and Pearl’s simple model of the case. According to this model, both the
sergeant and the major are identified as contributing actual causes. Given that the
major does not issue an order, the corporal’s behaviour depends upon the sergeant’s
order. The same is true for the major. Given that the sergeant does not issue an
order, the corporal’s actions depend on the major’s actions. However, there are
also actions available to the major where the dependence holds regardless of the
sergeant’s actions—in fact, the only case where the dependence is broken is in the
case where the major decides to issue no order at all. More specifically, the witness
(M = 0,S = 0,A = 0) indicates that the major is a contributing actual cause. But
there is also a witness (M = −1,S = 0,A = −1), according to which the major is a
total actual cause. Thus, we can accommodate the intuition that both officers are
actual causes and the perceived asymmetry is explained by the fact that only the
major is a total actual cause.6
Halpern and Pearl appear to endorse a similar account of the asymmetry. They
point out that the major is a strong cause while the sergeant isn’t (2005, p. 874).
The definition of strong cause builds upon the definition of contributing actual
cause (or actual cause in Halpern and Pearl’s terminology) and involves an extra
condition requiring that (M, ~u) |= [X← x, ~W ← ~w′′](Y = y) for all settings ~w′′ of ~W.
The major’s ordering to advance (M = 1) is a strong cause because for all possible
6A similar account of trumping cases has been provided by Hitchcock (2011) who employs a con-
trastive notion of causation. According to Hitchcock, the major’s ordering the corporal to advance
rather than ordering the corporal to retreat is a non-redundant cause of the corporal’s advancing rather
than retreating. By contrast, the major’s ordering the corporal to advance rather than issuing no order
at all is a redundant cause of the corporal’s advancing rather than doing nothing. My account is
contrastive as well: the fact that M = 1 is a contributing actual cause depends on the fact that 0 is
an alternative value of variable M and the fact that M = 1 is a total actual cause depends on the
fact that −1 is an alternative possible value.
130
4.2. Total, Path-changing, and Contributing Actual Causation
values of the sergeant variable S the corporal advances if M = 1. By contrast, the
sergeant is not a strong cause because the corporal does not advance if the major
orders to retreat.
However, one difference between my account and Halpern and Pearl’s account
is that they reject the concept of strong cause where it does not coincide with their
concept of actual cause: ‘in many of our examples, causality and strong causality
coincide. In the cases where they do not coincide, our intuitions suggest that strong
causality is too strong a notion’ (2005, p. 855). Just as Halpern and Pearl’s concepts
of strong cause and actual cause my concepts of TAC and CAC coincide in most
situations —situations that involve straightforward counterfactual dependence of
the effect on the cause. Moreover, in instances where CAC and TAC do not coincide,
the concept of TAC seems to be too restrictive to capture all those factors that are
intuitively identified as causes. But I do not take this to be a reason to endorse the
concept of CAC instead of the concept of TAC. Instead I argue that we need both
the concept of TAC and the concept of CAC. Endorsing both these concepts is what
enables us to accommodate the intuitions that apply to cases like trumping, where
two factors are causes in the weaker sense of CAC and only one factor is a cause in
the stronger sense of TAC.
There is a different question of whether the distinction between actual cause and
strong cause can give rise to a viable pluralist account if one endorses both concepts,
even in cases where the two concepts do not coincide. I think that such a pluralist
account could in principle be developed. However, I prefer a pluralist account in
terms of TAC, PAC, and CAC because it also accounts for the henchman case and
the light-bulb case, whereas the distinction between actual and strong causation
does not help in those examples.
I have argued that my account explains a perceived asymmetry between the major
and the sergeant. But presumably this will not satisfy authors like Lewis (2004) and
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Schaffer (2004) who claim that the sergeant is not a cause at all. Note that Lewis
and Schaffer do not just have a different way of accounting for certain basic causal
intuitions. They also have a different view on what the basic causal intuitions are
in the first place. But how do we know which are the ‘correct’ causal intuitions?
In section 4.3 I will address these concerns, arguing that identifying the sergeant as
(contributing) actual cause makes sense from the perspective of an agent who aims
to influence whether the corporal advances or not.
Next, turn to the Light Bulb case. B is a total actual cause of the light’s being
switched on because there is a relation of straightforward counterfactual depen-
dence. A is also an actual cause, however, it is only a path-changing actual cause:
we need to keep B fixed at its actual value, in order to reveal a counterfactual de-
pendence of C on A. In order to see the path-changing character of A in the causal
model we need to choose a model that reflects whether the current runs along the
left wire (LW) in figure 4.2A or along the right wire (RW), for example, a model
with structural equations as follows: B = A, LW = A ∧ B, RW = ¬A ∧ ¬B, and
C = LW ∨ RW. With this we can account for the intuition that both A and B are
actual causes for the light’s being switched on but at the same time we can account
for the intuition that B has better control over the lamp’s being switched on.
Finally, consider the Henchman case. The gang leader is a total actual cause
of the enemy’s death. The henchman is also an actual cause but he is only a
contributing actual cause: we need to set GS to a non-actual value in order to reveal
the dependence of the enemy’s death on the henchman’s actions.
4.2.3. Relation to Existing Accounts
The definitions of total, path-changing, and contributing actual cause are not novel
(apart from slight modifications as noted). What is new about my account, however,
is that I do not consider these definitions to be competing with each other. Instead, I
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take them to specify different and equally justified concepts of actual causation.7 In
order to further clarify my account I shall now point out the differences to existing
pluralist accounts.
My approach has similarities with a number of pluralist proposals. Hall (2004),
for example, argues that we need to distinguish between causation as dependence
and causation as production. The dependence notion, according to Hall, accounts
for the intuition that effects depend on their causes and can be applied to events as
well as omissions. The dependence notion maps straightforwardly onto my concept
of total actual causation. The production notion, according to Hall, accounts for
the intuition that causation is transitive, local, and intrinsic. Hall argues that the
production notion is in principle incompatible with the intuition that effects depend
on their causes, especially in situations involving omissions. Even though the
production notion seems to be the salient notion in examples involving redundancy
such as those discussed above, I do not see a straightforward way to map it onto
either one of my concepts of path-changing actual cause or contributing actual
cause.
It seems like Hall could accommodate the problem cases discussed in section
4.1, arguing that in each of the cases both factors are producers but only one of
them involves dependence. But it is easy to change the examples such that they
generate problems for Hall. One could, for example, make the henchman case a
case involving omissions. Suppose a child is drowning in a lake and any attempt
to save the child would be extremely risky because there is a violent thunderstorm.
There is a chief lifeguard and an assistant lifeguard who can save the child only
if they go out on the water together. The chief lifeguard is more experienced and
7Interestingly, Pearl (2000) seems to suggest a similar distinction. He defines a notion of actual cause
(similar to my concept of path-changing actual cause) and a notion of contributing cause (similar
to my concept of contributing actual cause). But he does not provide an explicit defence of a
pluralism about actual causation and in more recent publications (e.g. Halpern and Pearl (2005))
this distinction is not maintained. Instead, the HP definition is taken to capture the notion of
actual cause.
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her assistant always follows her decision. Because of the thunderstorm the chief
lifeguard decides to stay on land, and so does the assistant. As a result the child
drowns.
My theory says that both lifeguards are actual causes. The chief lifeguard is
a total actual cause and the assistant is a contributing actual cause, analogous to
the henchman case. According to Hall, the chief lifeguard is a cause in the sense
of the dependence notion, but the assistant lifeguard is not a cause at all—which
strikes me as unintuitive. The problem is that the lifeguards cannot be described as
producers because the child’s drowning results from omissions rather than actions.
A further difference between Hall’s and my approach is that my account is more
optimistic with regard to causal models as a framework for defining concepts of
actual causation. Hall thinks that a counterfactual analysis can be given only of
his dependence notion of causation, while for the production concept we need a
different kind of basic building block. Applying a terminology introduced by Hitch-
cock (2007c) one could say that Hall proposes an extramural pluralism, meaning
that he employs distinct kinds of basic building blocks (counterfactual conditionals,
regularities) in order to generate a plurality of causal concepts. Then my account
would be closer to an intramural pluralism because it generates a plurality of causal
concepts employing only one sort of basic building block: (sophisticated) counter-
factual conditionals framed in terms of causal models.
It will also be useful to compare my account with Cartwright’s (2007) pluralist
account. Cartwright argues that there is a wide variety of causal relations that is re-
flected by ‘content-rich causal verbs’, such as ‘compress’, ‘attract’, and ‘discourage’.
Cartwright states that on a unificationist view all these causal verbs are replaced
by the abstract terms ‘cause’ and ‘prevent’ or, even worse, ‘by one single piece of
notation—the arrow [of a causal graph]’ (2007, p. 21). This, she argues, is a problem
because the content of the rich causal verbs is lost on such a view.
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I agree with Cartwright that reducing all causal concepts to the kind of structural
dependence that is expressed by the arrows of a causal graph is problematic. But I
do not think that this is a problem for causal models. In fact, I take my account to
illustrate how the framework of causal models can be employed to define a plurality
of causal concepts. These causal concepts are surely not as specific as Cartwright’s
content-rich causal verbs. But neither are they as abstract as the arrows in a causal
graph. Instead, they are located at an intermediate level of abstraction, a level that
I take to be abstract enough to be applicable to a wide range of circumstances and,
at the same time, specific enough to give an agent clear guidance with regard to
suitable targets of intervention (see the argument in section 4.3).
There is another aspect of Cartwright’s pluralist account, which is similar to the
extramural pluralism of Hall. Cartwright argues that there are multiple theoretical
frameworks that each account for certain paradigmatic features of causal reasoning
but that each framework also has its limitations. She argues that the structural
model framework, for example, faces problems where its central assumption of
modularity does not apply (Cartwright, 2007, p. 13). Her example is a carburettor.
She argues that the entanglement of several causal relations in this kind of system
is even an explicit aim of efficient engineering.8
There are two ways the intramural pluralist can respond to this kind of worry.
The intramural pluralist can attempt to provide an account that exhausts all kinds of
causal concepts such that extramural pluralism would not be needed. Alternatively,
the internal pluralist can develop an intramural theory that tries to get as far as
possible, but also acknowledge that there may remain instances of causation that
8However, consider the criticism by Steel (2010): Cartwright’s carburettor example only shows that
there are some interventions that are non-modular, namely those on the carburettor’s geometry.
This shouldn’t pose a problem for the interventionist account because with respect to almost any
system it is easy to find some non-modular intervention. What Cartwright needed to show is that
there are no modular interventions. And this does not seem to be true since we can intervene
independently on other parts of the carburettor such as the air filter, the choke value, and the
throttle valve.
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will need other theoretical frameworks. On this view intramural and extramural
pluralism coexist.
I take intramural pluralism to be able to make genuine progress even if it coexists
with extramural pluralism. In analogy to David Chalmer’s (1996) hard and easy
problems of consciousness, Hitchcock (2007a) distinguishes between hard and easy
problems of causation. The hard problems of causation concern among other things
"the origins of the distinction between the causal and the non-causal" (2007a, 58).
Hitchcock argues that there may be philosophical progress on these problems of
causation but that we "should not expect these hard problems to go away any
time soon" (ibid.). The easy problems concern "distinctions among the different
kinds of causal relationships" (ibid.). Hitchcock argues that investigating into these
distinctions is a place where we can hope to make genuine philosophical progress.
Like Chalmer’s easy problems of consciousness the easy problems of causation are
still hard, but "they should at least be tractable" and he concludes that "[t]he real
work that [...] needs to be done is that of providing useful taxonomies for causal
relationships" (59). I consider my project to be a contribution to the project of
providing such useful taxonomies.
An advantage of my intramural account (over a purely extramural account) is
that it clarifies the relationship between the different concepts of actual causation
needed to account for cases involving redundancy. This is possible because the
concepts are all defined in the same formal framework, that ultimately relates them
to underlying relations of counterfactual dependence. The concept of CAC is the
most permissive concept while the concepts of PAC and TAC describe special cases.
More specifically, the three concepts exhibit a nested structure: TAC is a special case
of PAC, and PAC is a special case CAC. This implies that every TAC is also a PAC
and CAC, and that every PAC is a CAC—just as every square is a rectangle, and
every rectangle is a quadrilateral (a plain figure with four edges and four vertices).
136
4.2. Total, Path-changing, and Contributing Actual Causation
But doesn’t the hierarchical relation between CAC, PAC, and TAC threaten the
status of PAC and TAC as independent concepts of actual causation? That is,
couldn’t we state that the concept of CAC provides the basic analysis of what it
means for an event to be an actual cause, and doesn’t this imply that we have a
unified concept of actual causation after all? It is true that the concept of CAC is the
most general concept. However, this does not make the concepts of PAC and CAC
obsolete. I take the moral of the foregoing section to be that the concept of CAC (as
well as the concept of PAC), if taken in isolation, is too coarse-grained. In order to
capture the causal intuitions evoked by the example cases we need the concepts of
CAC, PAC, and TAC.
I argue that the framework of causal models (and counterfactual conditionals
more generally) provides us with the conceptual resources to distinguish a plurality
of concepts of actual causation. Thus, my account is closely related to the internal
pluralism that has been provided by Woodward in Making Things Happen. It is
different from Woodward’s account in that it extends pluralism to concepts of
actual causation.
Since the distinctions that I suggest here are so closely related to the distinctions
introduced by Woodward, it will be useful to look at them in some detail and
highlight the differences. Woodward sets out to make the relation between manip-
ulability and causation precise. A natural way to begin the analysis is to suppose
that manipulability is both a necessary and a sufficient criterion for causation. This
idea is captured by Woodward’s definition of total cause:
"X is a total cause of Y if and only if there is a possible intervention on X
that will change Y or the probability of Y" (Woodward, 2003, 51).
However, there are counterexamples to manipulability being a necessary condi-
tion. Suppose we have a causal model consisting of three variables X, Y, and Z
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Figure 4.4.: Violation of faithfulness: the direct influence of X on Y is cancelled out
by the indirect influence that X exerts on Y via the causal path going through Z.
whose dependence is described by the following structural equations:
Y = aX + cZ
Z = bX
where a, b, and c are fixed coefficients. Figure 4.4 displays the corresponding causal
graph. Suppose that a = −bc. Then the direct causal influence of X on Y is cancelled
out by the indirect causal influence that travels along the causal path going through
Z. This causal model represents a case where a causal relation between X and Y
exists but intervening only on X does not lead to a change in Y.
An example with this kind of causal structure is Hesslow’s (1976) birth control pill
case. Birth control pills (X) lower the probability of pregnancy (Z) and thereby lower
the probability of thrombosis (Y), which can be a consequence of pregnancy. Besides
that, birth control pills also have the side effect of increasing the probability of
thrombosis. Suppose that the probability increase exactly cancels out the probability
decrease that is mediated by the prevention of pregnancy (this is analogous to the
assumption that a = −bc). Then the probability of thrombosis cannot be changed
by an intervention that only targets birth control pills. Yet, at the same time, it is
implausible to deny that birth control pills in some sense cause thrombosis.
Note that the birth-control case has a causal structure that is very similar to the
structure of early preemption cases. In both kinds of cases there is one direct causal
relationship that mediates a positive influence and another causal path that sustains
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the effect in case the cause is inactive (e.g. birth-control pills are not taken or the
assassin in training is not pulling the trigger of his gun). In this sense one could say
that taking birth-control pills preempts pregnancy as a cause of thrombosis.
The fact that Y (the probability of thrombosis) cannot be influenced by an inter-
vention only on X (birth control pills) is reflected by the fact that X is not a total
cause of Y. However, we may also be interested in what happens if we combine
the intervention on X with an intervention that keeps Z fixed. Then the interven-
tion on X will change the value of Y. For instance, if women take birth control
pills even if they are already pregnant, then the pills will increase the probability
of contracting thrombosis. Likewise, birth control pills lead to an increase of the
probability of contracting thrombosis in women who cannot become pregnant for
other reasons. This kind of causal dependence is captured by the notions of direct
cause and contributing cause.
We address direct causes first. According to Woodward,
"[a] necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct cause of Y with
respect to some variable set V is that there be a possible intervention
on X that will change Y (or the probability distribution of Y) when all
other variables in V besides X and Y are held fixed at some value by
interventions" (55).
The thrombosis case describes a situation where just one other variable (Z, repre-
senting pregnancy) has to be kept fixed by an additional intervention such that the
causal dependence of Y on X is revealed. The definition of direct cause generalizes
this insight, stating that all other variables inV9 need to be held fixed.10 Moreover,
9There is no difference betweenV and V. Both symbols refer to the set of variables that constitute
the causal model.
10More precisely, it suffices to hold fixed at least one intermediate variable on each causal route from
X to Y that is not the (supposedly) direct causal route. This will block causal influence that is
transmitted along the corresponding causal route. Variables that do not lie on a causal route from
X to Y do not need to be intervened upon.
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the thrombosis case is a situation where the causal dependence of Y on X is revealed
if Z is held fixed at any of its possible values. That is, birth control pills have adverse
effects on women who are already pregnant and women who will not be pregnant
for other reasons. For X to be a direct cause of Y it is sufficient that intervening on
X leads to a change in Y when the other variables inV are held fixed at some value.
The notion of direct cause depends uponV. For example, X is a direct cause of
Y in the model given above. But suppose we interpolate a variable Z∗ between X
and Y, describing, for example, the dispersion of blood chemicals in the organism
of a person who has taken birth control pills. Then X is no longer a direct cause
of Y because the definition requires us to keep Z∗ fixed. Yet, there is an important
sense in which our considering birth control pills to be a cause of thrombosis is
independent of whether the model includes such intermediate variables. Thus, we
need a notion of cause that enables us to distinguish the influence along different
causal routes independently of whether these routes are direct links between cause
and effect or causal chains. This is captured by the notion of contributing cause
which is defined as follows.
"A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) contribut-
ing cause of Y with respect to variable setV is that (i) there be a directed
path from X to Y such that each link in this path is a direct causal re-
lationship [...]; and that (ii) there be some intervention on X that will
change Y when all other variables inV that are not on this path are fixed
at some value" (59).
The first part (i) of the definition generalizes the definition of direct cause to the
effect that it is no longer relevant whether X and Y are connected by a direct link or
by a causal chain. The second part (ii) of the definition accounts for issues associated
with failures of transitivity. Transitivity is violated, for example, in cases like "Dog
Bite" (McDermott, 1995). In this scenario a right-handed terrorist plans to detonate
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a bomb. Yet, a dog bites off the terrorist’s right forefinger. Therefore, the terrorist
uses his left forefinger instead to detonate the bomb. Thus, the dog bite causes the
terrorist’s detonating the bomb with left forefinger and the terrorist’s detonating
the bomb with the left forefinger causes the explosion. Yet, we do not consider the
dog bite to be a cause of the explosion. Woodward’s condition (ii) excludes such
cases.
According to Woodward, actual causation is another causal concept that needs to
be distinguished from the concepts of total, direct, and contributing cause. How-
ever, he does not acknowledge that there are different concepts of actual causation.
In fact, Woodward gives two definitions of actual causation (Woodward, 2003, 77
and 84). The first definition is along the lines of path-changing actual cause and the
second definition is along the lines of contributing actual cause. However, he flags
the first definition as a "first pass" notion (ibid., 77) and replaces it by the second
notion once it is introduced.
Instead, I suggest the taxonomy given in table 4.1. In the left column there are
Woodward’s concepts of total and contributing cause (the concept of direct cause
could be listed here as well). Woodward seems to suggest that actual causation is just
one more entry in this column. Instead, I argue that actual causation is the heading
of a whole new column of different causal concepts (and that, correspondingly, the
other causal concepts described by Woodward are concepts of potential causation).
Potential Causation Actual Causation
total cause total actual cause
contributing cause path-changing actual cause
contributing actual cause
Table 4.1.: Internal causal pluralism with regard to potential and actual causation.
What is the relation between the concepts in the left column of table 4.1 and
the corresponding notions in the right column? First, there is a difference in the
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relata. Potential causation describes relations between variables X and Y, while
actual causation describes relations between variables that take on particular values
(X = x and Y = y).
Second, the notion of total causation is much more permissive than the notion of
total actual causation. X is a total cause of Y in model M if there is some context ~u,
that is, some value assignment to the model’s exogenous variables such that there
is an intervention on X that leads to a change in Y. In particular, this context does
not have to be the actual context or even a context that is likely to be instantiated.
By contrast, X = x is a total actual cause of Y = y only if there is an intervention
on X that leads to a change in Y in the actual context ~u (see also the discussion in
section 1.2 for an argument why the more restrictive concept of actual causation is
so important).
Finally, the pluralisms of potential and actual causation are not exactly parallel.
What explains the fact that there is no equivalent to the distinction between path-
changing and contributing actual causes on the side of potential causation? Path-
changing actual causation entails holding fixed certain variables at actual values.
Contributing actual causation entails holding fixed certain variables at non-actual
values. But this distinction does not apply to definitions of potential cause because
here all possible values (the actual and the non-actual) are treated on a par.
4.3. A Functional Justification
So far I have argued that distinguishing total, path-changing, and contributing
actual causation accounts for the causal intuitions evoked by the three examples
given in section 4.1. In this section I will provide an argument for the pluralist
account that is based on the function that the concepts of actual causation have.
The difference between total, path-changing, and contributing actual causes matters
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from the perspective of an intervening agent. In others words: conflating these
different kinds of actual causation can impose a serious limitation on the practical
value of the notion of actual causation. The pluralist account that I suggest here
is thus not merely a reaction to the problems that extant unified accounts of actual
causation face. Instead it is positively justified by considerations concerning why
we should have concepts of actual causation in the first place.
Maybe intervening agents do not need to employ a philosophical theory of actual
causation at all. In fact the police officers, electricians and policy makers whose
perspectives we will consider in this section most likely have no explicit theory of
actual causation. My point is: were these agents to employ a unified account of
actual causation similar to the ones discussed in the previous chapter, then they
would encounter problems. They are better off if they employ my pluralist theory.
Suppose I know that the assassin in training went on her mission alone, without
his supervisor. If nothing interferes with his mission, then the trainee will pull the
trigger of his gun and the victim will die. Suppose also that I am a police officer
and wish to save the victim. In order to save the victim I have to intervene on the
trainee’s actions such that his mission fails. That is, a simple intervention on the
total actual cause is sufficient in order to accomplish my goal.
Compare this with the situation where the assassin in training is a contributing
actual cause, for example, because he is accompanied by another assassin who
shoots at the victim at the same time and hits at the same time (symmetrical overde-
termination). A simple intervention on the assassin in training will not save the
victim. In order to save the victim, we have to intervene on all contributing causes.
Thus, the overdetermination case describes a situation where the intervening agent
fails to achieve her goal if she mistakenly identifies a contributing actual cause for
a total actual cause. This is problematic. If we take concepts of actual causation
to inform us about strategies to achieve our goals by means of intervention, they
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should at least be able to reflect this important difference.
In the assassin example there are only two contributing actual causes and both
are straightforwardly identified as such. But of course the notion of contributing
cause is much more general. It also applies to situations where the effect is multiply
overdetermined such that an intervention on a contributing actual cause becomes
effective only if it is combined with a large number of additional interventions.
Voting scenarios are an example for this kind of situation (Chockler and Halpern,
2004; Livengood, 2013). Suppose you are supporting a policy that is submitted for
vote to a board constituted of 11 members. Suppose also that the policy will be put
in place if there is a simple majority for it. You also know that currently there is a
majority of 8 members against your policy while it is supported by the remaining
three board members. Each of the 8 opposing board members would turn out as
contributing actual causes of your policy not being put in place. Convincing any
one of the board member will not make a difference to the prospects of your policy.
You will have to convince at least three members.
Now, aren’t such a functional argument and pluralism about actual causation
separate issues? If one takes causal pluralism to mean extramural pluralism, then
this may well be the case. After all, I spell out total, path-changing, and contributing
actual causation in one single theoretical framework: interventionist causal models.
However, intramural pluralism is supported by the functional argument. The func-
tional approach evaluates whether and to which degree causal concepts facilitate
intervention. I agree with extant accounts that intervention is facilitated by consid-
erations about actual causes. But I argue that intervention is facilitated even better
if we distinguish total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. Conse-
quently, I argue, we should reject the assumption that there is a unified concept of
actual causation and think in terms of total, path-changing, and contributing actual
causation instead.
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Earlier I have stated that we tend to identify both the major and the sergeant as
actual causes of the corporal’s advancing. Pace Lewis’s and Schaffer’s intuition,
this judgement is justified from the interventionist perspective. Both the major and
the sergeant are potential targets for intervention if we want to prevent the corporal
from advancing. It will not be sufficient to stop either one of the major and the
sergeant to give their orders and to make them do nothing instead. We need to
intervene on both to prevent the outcome. In this sense the trumping case is just
like a situation of symmetrical overdetermination, where two contributing actual
causes bring about an effect.
Unlike cases of symmetrical overdetermination, trumping also involves an asym-
metry between the major and the sergeant, which is related to the fact that only the
major is also a total actual cause. Again, this can be explained from the interven-
tionist perspective. There is a straightforward sense in which the total actual cause
is a better target for intervention: whereas an intervention on a mere contributing
actual cause needs to be combined with other interventions, intervening on a total
actual cause allows direct control over the outcome.
I conclude that from an interventionist perspective the ability to draw a concep-
tual difference between total actual causes and contributing actual causes is essential
for accomplishing goals. We shall now turn to path-changing actual causes.
Path-changing actual causes are a subclass of contributing actual causes. Again,
we need (at least) two interventions in order to avoid the outcome. The important
difference between path-changing actual causes (PACs) and contributing actual
causes that are not path-changing actual causes (CAC\PACs) is the relation between
the interventions that have to be applied. In the case of CAC\PACs we need to apply
two interventions that target independently active causal processes. In the case of
PACs we need to combine a primary intervention that targets the path-changing
actual cause with a secondary intervention that eliminates a threat to the goal that
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did not exist (or at least was not as acute) before the primary intervention was
applied. That is, the secondary intervention needs to be performed in order to
counteract the adverse consequences of the primary intervention.
For example, in "Backup," where the assassin in training is a path-changing
actual cause of the victim’s death, we need to apply two interventions. We need
to apply a primary intervention on the assassin in training. But we also need
to apply a secondary intervention on the supervising assassin because otherwise
the supervisor would attack the victim. The difference to the overdetermination
case is that the supervisor would attack the victim only as a result of the primary
intervention.
This is an important difference for epistemic reasons. Elements of a set of
CAC\PACs are more straightforwardly identified as threats to the desired out-
come because each of them corresponds to an active causal process. Situations
involving path-changing actual causes can be much more difficult to handle be-
cause sometimes we find out about the backup threats only through applying the
primary intervention. And this is because the backups are only activated as a result
of the primary intervention.
This is even more problematic considering the fact that there are cases where
intervening only on the path-changing cause without applying a secondary inter-
vention that counteracts the adverse consequences can make the situation even
worse. Suppose, for example, that the assassin in training is known to hurt his
victims severely but does not kill them. His supervisor, however, always hits her
victims lethally. Suppose also that, given there is no interference, the trainee’s attack
preempts the supervisor’s attack such that the victim is only hurt but not hit lethally.
Intervening on the assassin in training’s mission (but not on the supervisor) would
have detrimental consequences to our goal of saving the victim. As a result of our
intervention the supervisor will kill the victim.
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There are other examples with this kind of structure. First, consider safety mech-
anisms. Suppose, for example, you want to eat toast. However, as you put the
bread into the toaster the fuse is blown. You stick the fuse back in but it keeps
being blown whenever you start the toaster. You think you should intervene on the
faulty fuse because you identify it as the actual cause of your not being able to enjoy
your toast. However, the fuse is only a path-changing actual cause. It preempts
a short-circuit and fire which would be an actual cause of your not enjoying the
toast—and other consequences that may be much worse—if you disabled the fuse.
Second, consider complex policy decisions. Suppose the members of a city council
want to make cycling safer and consider issuing a law that requires cyclists to wear
a helmet.11 Helmets are generally considered to increase cycling safety. However,
wearing a helmet can also negatively affect safety because motorists are encouraged
to leave less space when overtaking cyclists wearing a helmet (Walker (2007)).
Suppose that Suzy is a cyclist. Before the bicycle law was issued Suzy used to
cycle without a helmet. But now that the law is in place she wears a helmet
while riding. A car overtakes while leaving little space, Suzy falls and due to her
wearing a helmet she does not suffer head injuries. We are tempted to say that Suzy
benefited from the helmet law because her wearing the helmet prevented severe
head injuries. However, whether this is true depends on whether not wearing a
helmet is a total actual cause or only a path-changing actual cause of an increased
risk during cycling. If not wearing a bicycle helmet is a total actual cause, then
Suzy seems to have benefited from the law. But if not wearing a helmet is only
a path-changing actual cause then this is not necessarily so. It could be the case
that without the helmet the motorist would have left more space and Suzy had not
fallen in the first place.
I conclude that total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation are three
11This example is taken from Hitchcock (2017).
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Figure 4.5.: The revised causal model of the Suzy-Billy case.
concepts of actual causation that should be distinguished for reasons associated
with the implications of these concepts in particular contexts of intervention.
Before we turn to the next section note the following. So far I have discussed
instances of early preemption. Do the same arguments apply to late preemption?
Figure 4.5 shows a simplified version of Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) time-indexed
model of the Suzy-Billy case that we have discussed in Chapter 3. According to
this model, Suzy’s hitting the bottle SH = 1 is a cause of the bottle’s shattering
BS1 = 1. The bottle’s being shattered then causes Billy’s missing the bottle BH = 0.
The bottle’s being shattered at the final stage is governed by the structural equation
BS2 = BS1 ∨ BH. In the actual situation the bottle is shattered at the final stage
(BS2 = 1) because it was already shattered at the earlier stage BS1 = 1 .
Suppose it is our goal that the bottle be intact at the final stage (BS2 = 0). Then
we need to combine a primary intervention on Suzy’s throwing the stone with
a secondary intervention on BH. As in cases of early preemption this secondary
intervention can be described as an intervention that needs to be applied in order to
prevent Billy’s hitting the bottle which would otherwise be an adverse consequence
of our primary intervention.
However, there is also a sense in which it seems to be wrong to describe Billy’s
hitting the bottle as an adverse consequence of the primary intervention. After all,
the only reason for Billy’s failure to hit the bottle in the first place is the fact that the
bottle is already broken at the time Billy’s stone arrives. In fact, Billy’s throwing his
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stone is an alternative causal process that represents an independent threat to the
bottle (as long as the bottle is not destroyed). One consequence of this is that the
epistemic difficulties that are characteristic of situations involving early preemption
do not seem to apply to cases of late preemption.
This means that the functional theory that I am proposing here seems to char-
acterize the Suzy-Billy case as a case that is much more similar to instances of
symmetrical overdetermination, which also require applying two independent in-
terventions. But if this is so how do we explain the fact that in the Suzy-Billy case
we identify only Suzy as actual cause whereas in cases of symmetrical overdeter-
mination we identify both factors as actual causes? I will discuss this problem in
more detail in Chapter 5. The point is that cases of late preemption indicate a lim-
itation of my interventionist account of the function of actual causation. But they
also indicate a limitation of interventionist accounts more generally. Instead, I will
argue, we need to refer to responsibility in order to explain our causal intuitions in
such cases.
4.4. Two Kinds of Context-Sensitivity
What is the place of norm-dependence within the pluralist account of actual causa-
tion presented here? In Chapter 3 I have discussed Halpern and Hitchcock’s (2015)
approach according to which norm-dependent considerations enter through an ad-
ditional requirement on the witness world of the actual cause. More specifically,
this approach requires that the witness s~X=~x′, ~W=~w′,~u of
~X being an actual cause be at
least as normal as the actual world s~u. In principle, this requirement could be added
to each of the definitions of total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation
such that we arrive at norm-dependent versions of these definitions.
However, in this section I will have a closer look at how exactly these different
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concepts of actual causation interact with Halpern and Hitchcock’s requirement.
Halpern and Hitchcock’s idea of employing a normality ranking over possible
worlds treats all variables of the model on a par. In particular, it does not distinguish
between the specific normality considerations that concern the purported actual
cause X = x, on the one hand, and variables ~W = ~w, on the other hand. But this
should be surprising because the kind of information that we have about default
behaviour can be quite different. The typicality considerations with regard to X = x
are concerned with whether X typically takes on value x and whether there are
other values x′ that are more typical. The typicality considerations with regard to
~W = ~w depend on similar considerations. But in addition to that our expectations
regarding the values of those variables in ~W that depend on X should be influenced
by the information provided by the structural equations and the values of their
parent variables.
In order to illustrate the point let us consider "Backup," where we take the as-
sassin in training to be a path-changing actual cause of the victim’s death. The
corresponding witness is the world where the trainee does not shoot, where we
keep fixed that the supervisor does not shoot, and where the victim does not die
(T = 0,S = 0,VD = 0). We need to show that the witness is at least as normal as
the actual world (T = 1,S = 0,VD = 1). There are two kinds of context-sensitive
considerations that feed into this evaluation.
First, there is the context-sensitivity of considerations about the default values
of individual variables (context-sensitivity1). These considerations depend upon
the context to the degree that it depends on the context what value we expect a
variable to take on or what value a variable should take on. Typically, we think that
assassinating a person is morally wrong, against the law, and unusual. But there
may be contexts where this is different, for example, if the victim is a criminal that
threatens to kill a group of innocent hostages and there is no other way to rescue
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them.
Second, there is a kind of context-sensitivity that concerns potential violations of
structural equations (context-sensitivity2). According to the structural equations,
the supervising assassin kills the victim if the assassin in training fails to do so
(S = ¬T). In that sense, it seems that the witness describes a situation that is highly
abnormal. Again, the degree to which this is to be taken as an abnormal situation
depends on the context. For example, there may be reasons to believe that the
supervising assassin will dismiss her orders or loose her nerves when pulling the
trigger of her gun.
How are these two kinds of context-sensitive considerations to be related to each
other? This is particularly interesting in cases where the corresponding typicality
considerations pull in different directions. "Backup" is such a situation. In most
contexts we think that suitable defaults are T = 0, S = 0, and VD = 0. This
indicates that the witness is more normal than the actual world. At the same time,
however, the witness represents a situation where the structural equation S = ¬T
is violated, suggesting that the witness is less normal than the actual world (where
no structural equation is violated). In "Backup" the considerations regarding the
individual values seem to dominate because there is a clear intuition according to
which the trainee is an actual cause of the victim’s death (and at least according
to Halpern and Hitchcock’s account this would not be the case if the witness were
not at least as normal as the actual world). In analogy to Halpern and Hitchcock’s
(2015) treatment of the "Careful Poisoning" case discussed in section 3.8 it seems to
be the case that a plausible ranking for possible values of S is the following (with
decreasing order of normality):
(1) S = 0, regardless of T
(2) S = ¬T
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(3) S = 1, regardless of T
That is, the most normal case is the case where the supervisor does not intend to
kill the victim independently of the trainee’s actions. Second on the ranking is the
case where the supervisor sticks to her orders and kills the victim if the trainee fails
to do so. The least normal case is where the supervisor intends to attack the victim
regardless of the trainee’s actions.
Yet, going back to the discussions of early preemption and transitivity in sec-
tion 3.3, there are also instances where considerations regarding the violation of
structural equations seem to dominate. Consider the boulder case: a boulder is
dislodged, the hiker sees it, ducks, and survives (figure 4.6). The boulder is an
actual cause of the hiker’s ducking, the hiker’s ducking is an actual cause of the
hiker’s survival, but clearly the boulder’s being dislodged is not an actual cause of
the hiker’s survival. According to our definition of total actual cause, this is the case
because there is no counterfactual dependence of the hiker’s survival on the boul-
der’s being dislodged. Neither is the boulder’s being dislodged a path-changing or
contributing actual cause because there is no other variable that could be held fixed
at an actual or non-actual value such that the counterfactual dependence would be
restored.
In section 3.3 we have seen that this is a result of a particular model choice. If
we include a variable B representing the boulder’s presence close to the hiker’s
head such that the hiker has no opportunity to save herself, then we could restore
a counterfactual dependence, given that we hold fixed the value of B. As a result,
we would get the undesirable outcome that the boulder’s being dislodged is a
path-changing actual cause of the hiker’s survival.
Hitchcock (2001), whose active route account faces exactly this problem, argues
that the causal model that includes variable B is not an apt model. This is because it
represents the far-fetched scenario where a boulder appears close to the hiker’s head
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A B
Figure 4.6.: Boulder. According to model A, the boulder’s being dislodged is not
an actual cause of the hiker’s survival, which is the intuitive judgement. According
to model B, however, the boulder’s being dislodged is an actual cause of the hiker’s
survival. But this result can be rejected either by showing that model B is a non-apt
model or by incorporating considerations of normality. The structural equations of
model B are F = 1, D = F, B = F, and S = ¬B ∨ D. See section 3.3 for a detailed
discussion.
even though it was never dislodged. I agree that this is a legitimate treatment of the
case. But let us consider what happens if we include the variable nevertheless and
apply the normality criterion.12 In the actual world the boulder falls and approaches
the hiker’s head, the hiker ducks, and survives (F = 1, B = 1, D = 1, S = 1). The
witness of the boulder’s falling being an actual cause of the hiker’s survival is the
world where the boulder is not dislodged but appears close to the hiker’s head,
nevertheless, the hiker does not duck, and the hiker dies (F = 0, B = 1, D = 0, S = 0).
How do these worlds compare in terms of normality? Looking at the individual
variables, the result is not clear. The fact that in the witness world the hiker dies
seems to indicate that this is a world that is more abnormal than the actual world
(yet, sometimes hikers die). The fact that no boulder is falling in the witness world
could speak for this world being more normal (most of the time boulders do not
fall). But looking at the combination of variables clearly decides the comparison: the
boulder that appears close to the hiker’s head without ever having fallen clearly
makes this a highly abnormal scenario. Thus, I conclude that restrictions that
structural equations impose on considerations of normality sometimes dominate
12In Chapter 7 I will provide a more detailed analysis of the relation between constraints of apt
modelling and the relevance of the default/deviant distinction.
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those considerations related to the typicality of individual variables.
4.5. Conclusion
In this chapter I have advanced a pluralist account with regard to the notion of
actual causation. In support of the account I have provided two lines of argument.
First, I have presented three cases that raise difficulties for unified accounts of ac-
tual causation and I have argued that distinguishing between total, path-changing,
and contributing actual causation helps account for these cases. Second, I have
provided a functional argument for distinguishing between total, path-changing,
and contributing actual causation. The distinction between total and contribut-
ing actual causation is important because in cases involving total actual causation
only one intervention is required in order to prevent the effect whereas in cases
involving contributing actual causation (but not total actual causation) more than
one intervention is required. Cases involving path-changing actual causation also
require more than one intervention. Moreover, these cases are different from cases
involving contributing actual causation (but not path-changing actual causation)
because we need to distinguish between primary interventions that target the path-
changing actual cause and secondary interventions that counteract the adverse
consequences of the primary intervention. Finally, I have distinguished two kinds
of context-sensitivity. Context-sensitivity1 concerns considerations regarding the
default values of individual variables. Context-sensitivity2 concerns considera-
tions regarding combinations of variables and values that reflect a violation of the
structural equations. These different kinds of context-sensitivity will be addressed
in more detail in Chapter 6, where I will discuss the concept of actual causation in
the law. But before that we shall address a key assumption of the functional ar-
gument provided in this chapter: the assumption that concepts of actual causation
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facilitate the purpose of intervention. This will be done in the following chapter.
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5. Responsibility and the Limits of
Interventionism
A key assumption of the foregoing chapter has been that concepts of actual cau-
sation have an important role to play where agents are interested in manipulating
the outcome of a particular situation. With this assumption I have taken up the
interventionist tradition which is dominant in the literature on causal models and
actual causation. Prima facie the focus on intervention should come as a surprise
because the concept of actual causation has been imported from the law, where its
function is to facilitate the post hoc assessment of responsibility. Most contributors
to the interventionist literature on actual causation seem to be aware of this.1 Thus,
if they attempt a clarification of the concept with reference to intervention, they
seem to assume that responsibility and intervention are closely related.
In this chapter I shall have a closer look at the relation between intervention and
responsibility with particular regard to the debate on actual causation. In the recent
literature there has been a debate about how selective causal attributions as evoked
by norm-violating behaviour are to be interpreted. Interventionists (Hitchcock
and Knobe, 2009) argue that causal reasoners legitimately select norm-violating
behaviour because such behaviour is particularly suited as a target for corrective
intervention. By contrast, proponents of the responsibility view (Sytsma et al., 2012)
1For example, Pearl (2000), Halpern and Pearl (2005), and Hitchcock (2017) explicitly identify ’actual
causation’ as a notion that is relevant for ascribing responsibility.
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argue that causal reasoners legitimately select norm-violating behaviour because
such behaviour indicates responsibility for the outcome.2 In this chapter I will
examine whether and in which way these accounts are distinct accounts in the first
place. According to Hitchcock and Knobe, ascribing responsibility to an agent can
be understood as one specific kind of intervention. Blaming an agent for their
undesirable behaviour then amounts to an intervention on the agent’s motives such
that the undesirable behaviour is discouraged. Thus, it seems intervention and
responsibility do not provide explanations that compete with each other. Instead
the interventionist account seems to be simply the more encompassing theory.
However, the idea that practices of ascribing responsibility can be understood as
a particular form of corrective intervention presupposes a consequentialist view of
responsibility that is not uncontroversial. I will contrast this view with a retribu-
tivist account, according to which our practices of ascribing responsibility are not
justified through their consequences but trough a backward-looking assessment
of desert. Employing the distinctions drawn in the foregoing chapter I will then
discuss two instances of reasoning with concepts of actual causation where the
interventionist account faces limitations and reference to a retributivist notion of
responsibility gives a better explanation of our causal intuitions. First, total ac-
tual causes are typically norm-violating factors and they are distinguished from
background conditions that are typically norm-conforming. According to the in-
terventionist account, these norm-violating factors are particularly suited as targets
for intervention. However, there are instances where such norm-violating factors
should not be intervened upon. Second, there are cases of late preemption where it
is not clear what practical inferences an intervening agent should draw from claims
of path-changing actual causation. In these cases it is not clear in what sense the
path-changing actual cause is more suited as a target than other factors that are not
2There is a third view, based on the Culpable Control Model (Alicke et al., 2011), according to which
the selective judgement is a bias that results from a desire to blame.
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In both kinds of cases the relevant causal claims are better explained by our inter-
est in the assignment of retributive responsibility. Practices of blaming and praising
that follow a retributive ideal derive their justification from the past wrongs and
goods that they respond to. Retributive responsibility makes sense of selective
claims of total actual causation that concern the past, even if those factors are not
suitable targets for intervention. Retributive responsibility also explains why it
matters to point out path-changing actual causes in cases of late preemption. The
reason why these causal claims are better explained from the perspective of retribu-
tive responsibility is related to a difference in perspective. Retributive responsibility
evaluates causes in a retrospective way whereas the interventionist account evalu-
ates causes in terms of their usefulness for future action.
What can we learn from this? Functional accounts of causation seem to depend
on two questions. First, given that a concept has a particular function, what can
we infer about the concept? Second, given a certain concept, what is its function?
In the foregoing chapter I focused on the first question, arguing that from an in-
terventionist perspective we should be pluralists with regard to actual causation.
In the Introduction I also argued that a functional account along these lines can be
understood as an instance of conceptual engineering that aims at revising our causal
concepts. A concept like the concept of actual causation (or a set of concepts) can
be seen as a tool for achieving certain goals. And if there are ways to improve the
tool such that the goal is achieved in a more effective way, then there may be good
reasons to do so. In this chapter I address the second question: what is the function
of concepts of actual causation? In particular, I will suggest that the concepts fulfil
more than one function. The lesson is that a functional account has to be cautious
if it aims at revision: a concept may serve more than one purpose and revising
the concept such that it facilitates this one purpose best may come at the cost of
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neglecting other purposes.
Let me briefly clarify what this chapter is not trying to achieve. First, I do not aim to
give a reductive account of causation, that is, an account that tells us what causation
is in terms of an underlying notion of responsibility. I do not think that such an
account would be illuminating because I take the notion of responsibility itself to be
dependent upon an underlying notion of causation. And, thus, a reductive theory
would turn out to be circular.3
Second, in this chapter I ask: given certain causal intuitions what function do
they serve? That is, I will assume that we have certain causal intuitions and give a
functional account that explains these intuitions. In particular, this chapter does not
attempt to justify these intuitions. A justification of the relevant causal intuitions
would require a defence of the corresponding retributivist theory of responsibility.
I do not aim to give such a defence. Instead I will argue that if retributivists give an
adequate description of our actual practices of assigning responsibility, then they
also account for certain causal intuitions.
Third, by saying that incorporating considerations of responsibility can provide a
better explanation of certain causal intuitions I do not mean to provide a functional
account that is complete. Claims of actual causation may facilitate functions beyond
intervention and responsibility, such as explanation and prediction.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.1 I will briefly review the
main competitors in the current debate about the function of actual causation. In
3In fact, the prospectives of a reductive theory in terms of responsibility may be even worse than the
prospectives of an interventionist theory that would attempt to be reductive. Woodward (2003),
for example, interdefines causation and intervention which raises an issue of circularity. However,
according to Woodward, this is not to be seen as problematic because defining the causal relation
between two variables X and Y in terms of interventions requires us to assume causal relations
other than the one holding between X and Y. In particular, we need to assume that the intervention
variable I is a cause of X, that it acts as a switch on X (interrupting all other influences on X), that
there is no influence of I on Y that is not mediated by X. And we need to make sure that I is not
correlated with Y in a way that is not mediated by X. This response, however, is not available to
the proponent of an analogous responsibilist theory of causation. If we were to define causation
in terms of responsibility, then agent A’s causing effect E would be defined through A’s being
responsible for E.
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section 5.2 I will introduce the idea that interventionism is not opposed to the
responsibility view but simply a more encompassing theory. In section 5.3 I will
turn to responsibility and introduce two kinds of competing accounts. First, I
will discuss consequentialist accounts of responsibility according to which our
practices of assigning responsibility essentially derive their justification from their
positive effects on future behaviour. Second, I will discuss retributivist accounts of
responsibility according to which responsibility is assigned to those who deserve it.
I will then discuss two kinds of reasoning with concepts of actual causation where
the interventionist account faces limitations and reference to a retributivist notion
of responsibility gives a better explanation of our causal intuitions. In section 5.4
I will address issues related to selective claims of total actual causation. In section
5.5 I will turn to cases involving late preemption.
5.1. Intervention, Responsibility, and Blame
Much of the recent debate about the function of actual causation arises from studies
like the one involving the pen vignette (see Chapter 2). The pen vignette describes a
situation where the department’s receptionist has no pens because Professor Smith
and an administrative assistant both took one of the last two remaining pens. The
receptionist’s having no pens depends symmetrically on both the professor’s and
the administrator’s taking a pen. But test subjects typically identify Professor Smith
as the actual cause of the receptionist’s problem. And this is thought to be related
to the fact that only the administrative assistants are allowed to take pens while
members of faculty have to buy their own.
Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of explanations that have been provided
for this result. First, according to the interventionist position defended by Hitchcock
and Knobe (2009), the test subjects consider two kinds of counterfactual scenarios:
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one where the receptionist’s problem does not occur because the administrator acts
differently and one where the problem does not occur because Professor Smith acts
differently. Moreover, test subjects tend to identify the counterfactual involving a
change in Professor Smith’s behaviour as the more relevant scenario because it is
one that is more normal. Besides the descriptive claim that we typically tend to
identify norm-violating factors as relevant causes, Hitchcock and Knobe also make
an evaluative claim. They argue that a focus on norm-violating events is justified
because these events correspond to factors that are particularly suited as targets
for intervention. The underlying reasoning depends on the kind of norm that is
being violated. First, it is reasonable to intervene on factors that violate statistical
norms because such interventions amount to generalizable strategies. Second, it is
reasonable to intervene on factors that violate moral norms because such interven-
tions increase the overall number of morally good aspects of a situation. Third, it
is reasonable to intervene on factors that violate functional norms because such in-
terventions increase the overall functionality of the system that is being intervened
upon. In the following sections we will discuss these justifications in more detail,
but here is an initial example of how this kind of reasoning applies to a particular
case: Professor Smith seems to be a suitable target for intervention, presumably,
because intervening on Professor Smith reinforces a policy that is already in place.
By contrast, intervening on the assistant would undermine the current policy, by
way of encouraging other faculty members not to comply with it or discouraging
other assistants to make use of their privilege.
What kind of norm does Professor Smith violate? Hitchcock and Knobe (2009,
608f) suggest this as an instance where a moral norm is violated. However, there
does not seem to be anything morally bad about Professor Smith’s taking the pen,
other than that it undermines an agreed upon rule. Instead, it seems that the norm
can be described as a functional norm, that is, a norm that ensure that administrative
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processes in the department run smoothly.
Second, Sytsma, Livengood, and Rose have suggested an interpretation of the re-
sults in terms of responsibility. According to the "responsibility view," as defended
by these authors, the pen vignette tracks an "ordinary concept of causation" that is
an "inherently normative concept: Causal attributions are typically used to indicate
something more akin to who is responsible for a given outcome than who caused the
outcome in the descriptive sense of the term [...]" (2012, 815). The difference to the
interventionist explanation that will be most relevant in the following is that the
causal attributions are explained with regard to the role that they play in assign-
ing responsibility. Interestingly, the authors do not specify what responsibility is.
However, the discussion in section 5.3 will show that distinguishing, for example,
consequentialist from retrubitivist views has important ramifications.
Sytsma et al. support the responsibility view with a more detailed analysis of
the role that statistical norms (or typicality) play in selective causal judgement. As
we have seen in Chapter 2, they argue that we need to distinguish two types of
typicality in order to characterize the role of statistical norms in causal judgement.
First, there is typicality that relates to "how people generally behave in a given type
of situation" (2012, 816). This is called population-level typicality. Second, there
is typicality that relates to how a particular agent "herself generally behaves in
[a given type of] situation" (ibid.). This is called agent-level typicality. Sytsma
et al. provide evidence to the effect that, first, information about population-level
typicality does not influence the test subjects’ judgement with regard to the pen
vignette. Second, they show that information about agent-level typicality does
influence the test subjects’ judgements. But it does so in the reverse way than
commonly acknowledged. That is, an agent’s causal role is emphasized if she acts
agent-level typically rather than agent level atypically.
Sytsma et al. take these results to be predicted by their responsibility view. First,
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with regard to population-level typicality, they argue "that how other people typi-
cally act in a given type of situation will largely be treated as irrelevant to whether
or not a specific person is taken to be normatively responsible for an outcome" (2012,
816). That is, the degree to which we take Professor Smith to be responsible for the
problem is independent of whether other members of faculty take pens. Sytsma
et al. concede that "excuses of the form "everybody was doing it" might help to
explain an agent’s action" but they suggest that "people generally do not take such
excuses to actually mitigate normative responsibility" (ibid.). Second, with regard
to agent-level typicality, Sytsma et al. argue that agents who habitually act in a way
that has potentially bad consequences are rated to be more responsible than agents
who do so only occasionally. The reason is that such habitual acts increase "the
chance that the bad outcome would eventually occur" (ibid.). That is, specifying
that Professor Smith regularly takes pens should increase her perceived responsi-
bility for the receptionist’s problem because the more often Professor Smith takes
a pen, the more likely it is that the receptionist’s problem occurs as a result of her
actions.
Finally, according to the Culpable Control Model (henceforth CCM, Alicke (1992);
Alicke et al. (2011)), an observer of some negative state of affairs first forms an
initial blame hypothesis regarding the involved agent. The blame hypothesis is
associated with an "active desire to blame" the agent and "[t]his desire, in turn, leads
observers to interpret the available evidence in a way that supports their blame
hypothesis" (Alicke et al., 2011, 675). For example, the initial blame hypothesis
can lead to overrating the control that the agent has over her own behaviour or the
outcome of her acts. The CCM predicts that the outcome of norm-violating behaviour
has an influence on our blame judgements and our causal judgements. Here it
differs from the interventionist account and the responsibility view which predict a
dependence on whether the behaviour itself is a norm violation or not (independent
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of the outcome). Another important difference is that the CCM characterizes the
difference in causal attributions in situations like the pen case as a bias. According
to the interventionist and the responsibility account, selective causal judgement is
justified.
5.2. Intervention vs Responsibility?
In the following I am primarily interested in the relation between the interventionist
account and the responsibility view. In particular, I am interested in a claim put
forward by Hitchcock and Knobe that concerns the function of claims of actual
causation. Considering norm violation as a criterion for causal selection, they
admit that "it is natural to assume that the purpose of this mechanism must have
something to do with picking out the agents who are truly to blame for an outcome"
(2009, 606, emphasis original). But they argue that this natural assumption can
be identified as one special instance where the broader interventionist theory is at
work: "One can regard the act of blaming a person as one way of intervening on that
person’s behavior and trying to get him or her to change" (ibid). That is, according
to Hitchcock and Knobe, the interventionist view and the responsibility view are
not theories that stand in opposition. Instead the responsibility view is to be seen as
being incorporated into the interventionist theory. It represents the special case that
involves intervention on human behaviour by means of ascribing responsibility.4
If this is true, then the broader interventionist account should be able to explain
the evidence that Sytsma et al. provide in support of the responsibility view. At first
sight, this does not seem to be the case. Hitchcock and Knobe argue that from the
interventionist perspective it is reasonable to highlight those aspects of a situation
4Hitchcock and Knobe put this claim forward in order to address the CCM as a competitor. But
the point, presumably, extends to Sytsma et al. ’s responsibility view. Blaming corresponds to a
form of intervention that discourages undesirable behaviour. Praising corresponds to a form of
intervention that encourages desirable behaviour.
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that violate statistical norms. But we have seen that statistical typicality is either
irrelevant (if it concerns the population level) or that we highlight the statistically
typical rather than the statistically atypical (if it concerns the agent level).
But let us have a closer look at Hitchcock and Knobe’s explanation for why statis-
tically atypical behaviour should be relevant from the perspective of intervention.
Hitchcock and Knobe consider a situation where a scientific article is not accepted
because one of the involved referees has the idiosyncratic view that an article should
not use the word ’and’ more than three times per page. Hitchcock and Knobe dis-
cuss two kinds of strategies for dealing with this situation. One strategy is to make
sure that the paper is sent to a reviewer who does not employ this rule. This would
amount to intervening on the aspect of the situation that is currently abnormal.
Alternatively, one could allow the paper to be sent to the same reviewer and try to
compensate the reviewer’s abnormal criteria by introducing another abnormality:
by using the word ’and’ only three times per page. Hitchcock and Knobe argue
that the first strategy is better because it is generalizable. There are many more
situations where a paper will be accepted if it is sent to a reviewer without this
idiosyncratic view than there are situations where a paper will be accepted because
it uses the word ’and’ only three times per page. Thus, the idea is that we should
focus on the statistically abnormal because intervening on the statistically abnormal
amounts to strategies that are generalizable.
Going back to Sytsma et al.’s results, it seems like the interventionist can explain
the results after all. First, consider the result that an agent who acts agent-level
typically in taking a pen is rated higher than an agent who acts agent-level atypically.
From the interventionist perspective this makes sense because intervening on the
agent who acts agent-level typically is a strategy that is more generalizable. There
are many more situations where a lack of pens will be avoided if we intervene
on those who systematically take the pens rather than on those who do so only
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occasionally. Interestingly, Sytsma et al. found that the information about agent-
level typicality even overrides information about permissibility. An agent who acts
against the policy but only occasionally is rated lower than an agent who conforms
with the policy but acts agent-level typically in taking the pens. This indicates that
the generalizability of the strategy seems to be even more important than whether
a certain prescriptive norm is violated or not—a conclusion that seems to speak in
favour of the interventionist perspective, rather than the responsibility view.
Second, consider the result that causal attribution is indifferent to population-
level atypicality. This can be explained by the interventionist perspective as well.
Whether an intervention on an agent is a generalizable strategy for solving the pen
problem is independent of whether the agent belongs to a population that typically
acts in this way or not (given that population-level typicality does not imply agent-
level typicality). That is, whether Professor Smith is an individual that belongs to a
group that typically does not take pens should have no consequences for interven-
tions on Professor Smith. Population-level atypicality may have ramifications for
interventions if interventions are performed on the population level, though. An
example of such an intervention would be a reminder about the pen policy that is
sent to all members of faculty rather than merely to Professor Smith. But this seems
to be irrelevant in this particular case because the test subjects evaluate the causal
relevance of particular individuals, not of whole populations.
Thus, it seems like Hitchcock and Knobe are right and interventionism is the more
encompassing account. However, note that the consequentialist view of responsi-
bility presumed by Hitchcock and Knobe is at least not uncontroversial, which they
acknowledge (see Hitchcock and Knobe (2009), 606). Unfortunately, the proponents
of the responsibility view do not specify what theory of responsibility they rely on.
Thus, it should be useful to have a closer look at concepts of responsibility, which I
will do in the following section.
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5.3. Disambiguating Responsibility
Much of the philosophical literature on responsibility is concerned with the ques-
tion whether responsible agency is compatible with causal determinism. Incom-
patibilists argue that responsible agency requires free will and that there is no free
will if our actions are causally determined. Compatibilists, by contrast, argue that
responsible agency and free will is possible in a causally determined world. How-
ever, our practices of assigning responsibility can be described independent of this
problem, a point famously made by Strawson (1962). These practices of assign-
ing responsibility shall matter in the following. A natural place to examine these
practices is the law and, in particular, theories of punishment.
The first thing to note is that the word "responsibility" has a range of different
senses. This is illustrated by Hart’s (1968, 211) story about a captain, X:
"As captain of the ship, X was responsible (1) for the safety of his passen-
gers and crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every night and was
responsible (2) for the loss of the ship with all aboard. It was rumoured
that he was insane, but the doctors considered that he was responsible
(3) for his actions. Throughout the voyage he behaved quite irrespon-
sibly (4a), and various incidents in his career showed that he was not
a responsible (4b) person. He always maintained that the exceptional
winter storms were responsible (5) for the loss of the ship, but in the legal
proceedings brought against him he was found criminally responsible
(6) for his negligent conduct, and in separate civil proceedings he was
held legally responsible (7) for the loss of life and property. He is still
alive and he is morally responsible (8) for the deaths of many women
and children" (numbers added).
There are eight different appearances of the word ’responsible’ and its cognates
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in the story. Here is an overview:5
(1) Role responsibility describes certain duties that a person has by occupying a
particular place in social organization.
(2) Outcome responsibility describes a form of responsibility which arises from
the effects of a person’s actions and for which the person deserves praise or
blame.
(3) Capacity responsibility describes whether a person is capable to be the author
of their own actions.
(4) Virtue responsibility describes a person’s character, reputation, intentions, or
actions as dependable.
(5) Causal responsibility as in "the exceptional winter storms were responsible
for the loss of the ship" describes instances where the expression ’responsible
for’ is synonymous to ’caused’ or ’produced.’
(6) Criminal responsibility is a kind of liability that is determined by legal pro-
ceedings.
(7) Legal responsibility describes a kind of liability that is determined by civil
proceedings.
(8) Moral responsibility describes responsibility that arises from the violation of
moral norms.
These eight different senses of responsibility are highly interdependent and much
could be said about the relations between them. However, these details shall not
5Hart distinguishes four main kinds of responsibility: role responsibility, causal responsibility, legal
liability-responsibility and moral liability-responsibility. He focuses on these because he makes
a point about the difference between legal and moral liability-responsibility. In this overview I
draw from more recent taxonomies that have been provided by Cane (2002) and Vincent (2011).
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matter in the following, where I will focus on a loose understanding of outcome
responsibility. I take the term from Vincent (2011), who takes it from Perry (2000).
According to Vincent, the advantage of this term is that it captures among other
ideas the "idea of a form of responsibility which looks backwards in time to states
of affairs (outcomes or actions) that occurred in the past" (2011, 17). I agree that
considerations of outcome responsibility arise most naturally from outcomes that
occurred in the past. Yet, it seems to be reasonable to extend the concept such
that it also applies to outcomes that may occur in the future, given that an agent
acts in a certain way. In fact, outcome responsibility seems to be better described
as involving effect backward-reasoning which is also a feature of actual causation
(see the discussion in Chapter 1). Moreover, I take outcome responsibility to be
an important factor in assessing moral responsibility and at least in certain kinds
of criminal and legal responsibility. Outcome responsibility is different from mere
causal responsibility in that it is only assigned to agents and their actions, but not
to objects. Finally, the assumption that outcome responsibility is backward-looking
seems to distinguish it from role, virtue, and capacity responsibility, which are
forward-looking concepts.
What are our practices of assigning outcome responsibility and how are they
justified? In the following I shall look at two opposing strands in the literature.
First, there are moral influence theories that justify practices of assigning responsi-
bility by emphasizing the beneficial consequences of these practices. Second, there
are retributivist theories according to which assigning responsibility is justified
intrinsically.
Moral influence theories have roots in the empiricist ethics of Hobbes and Hume
and have found their first prominent defence in Moritz Schlick’s Problems of Ethics
(1939). According to Schlick, the aim of imputing responsibility to a person is pun-
ishment (or reward). Punishment, in turn, "is an educative measure, and as such is
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Figure 5.1.: Ascription of responsibility as intervention on the agent’s motives.
a means to the formation of motives, which are in part to prevent the wrongdoer
from repeating the act (reformation) and in part to prevent others from committing
a similar act (intimidation)" (152). Schlick emphasizes that the question of respon-
sibility, thus, literally is "the question concerning the correct point of application of the
motive" and that "in this its meaning is completely exhausted" (153).6
Moral influence theorists, thus, construe the question of responsibility essentially
as a question of efficient corrective intervention. One plausible way to spell out
the analogy is to presume a causal model (figure 5.1) where an agent’s action X
depends causally on certain motives M. Blaming the agent for performing X then
amounts to introducing measures I that change M and thus lead to a change in the
agent’s actions X. Interestingly, it does not seem to be the case that these measures
typically fulfil the requirement of the technical notion of intervention that is being
employed in the causal modelling literature (e.g. Woodward (2003)). This technical
notion requires, among other things, that if I is an intervention on X with regard
to Y, then there should not be an influence of I on Y that is not mediated by X.
However, putting a criminal into prison, for example, is not only a measure that
is supposed to change the criminal’s motivation (reformation). It also affects the
agent’s actions X directly because during the time that he is in prison he is (to a
certain degree) unable to act criminally (independently of his motivations to do so).
But what exactly do the variables M and X represent? We blame the criminal for
performing a particular token act that is presumed to be caused by a particular token
6Further moral influence accounts or forward-looking accounts of moral responsibility have been
provided by J. J. C. Smart (1961) and Daniel Dennett (1984). A recent defence has been provided
by Vargas (2008).
171
5. Responsibility and the Limits of Interventionism
motivation. And importantly we do so after the intentions have formed and the
criminal act is performed.7 However, Schlick describes punishment as a measure
to prevent the wrongdoer (and others) from performing future crimes. Thus, M
and X need to represent suitable generalizations of the token motivation and the
token act that evokes the punishment. We will get back to the issue of suitable
generalizations in the following section.
Retributivists, by contrast, ascribe an intrinsic value to assigning responsibility.
They think that wrongdoers should be punished even if the punishment has no
other positive effects. Here is a thought experiment that illustrates this intuition.
Suppose there is a defendant who is convicted for rape (see Moore (1997), 100f).
Suppose also that after the rape but before sentencing the defendant has lost his
sexual and aggressive desires through an accident such that no danger of rape
or similar crime is to be expected. Moreover, suppose that we could pretend to
punish the defendant such that everyone else thinks that the defendant is in prison,
but in fact he is not. Thus, the defendant is incapacitated (through the accident).
Moreover, the defendant is denounced and rehabilitated through the appearance
of being imprisoned, which has also the effect of general deterrence. Yet, there
is an important sense in which it is not right to deal with the defendant in this
way because the defendant deserves to be in prison. This is an illustration of the
retributivist’s positive desert claim.
According to the negative desert claim, only those may be punished who deserve
it. This excludes, for example, preventive detention. Here is an example (see Moore
(1997), 95). Suppose a psychiatrist finds out that one of his patients is highly likely
to be very dangerous. Suppose also that the patient is being accused of crime.
Suppose further that the judge is the only one who knows that the accused patient
is innocent. From a consequentialist perspective the judge would have to convict
7Except in cases where the intention to commit a dangerous crime is known such that the harm can
be prevented.
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the accused in order to incapacitate him, yet, this clearly goes against retributivist
intuitions because the innocent do not deserve to be punished.
There are a number of challenges that the retributivist faces. First, a retributivist,
of course, needs to specify what desert consists in. Second, the retributivist needs
to specify a rule for the proportionality of punishment. One prominent form of re-
tributivism is the Biblical Lex talionis—"an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" (Exodus
21: 23-25; Leviticus 24:17-20). This idea of payback as response in kind is of course
highly controversial. However, it should be clear that this is not representative
of retributivism in general. While retributivists argue hat punishment should be
proportional to the wrong, they are not committed to this particular measure of pro-
portionality (Moore, 1997, 88). Finally, another crucial question for the retributivist
is how desert is to be justified. The positive and the negative desert claim surely
relate to important intuitions. But the mere fact that we have these intuitions may
not be sufficient to justify a moral principle. I will not try to resolve these issues
here.
The important point is that while the consequentialist is concerned with the
future, the retributivist is concerned with the past. In the following we will see that
this has ramifications for the kinds of causal reasoning that are relevant for these
theories.
5.4. Token Causal Claims and Retrospective Evaluation
One of the competitors of the interventionist account is Alicke et al.’s Culpable
Control Model (CCM). According to this account, the causal judgements with regard
to the pen vignette are explained with a desire to blame Professor Smith. A central
difference between the CCM and the interventionist account is the following. The
CCM predicts a dependence of the judgement on whether the outcome is negative
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(otherwise there is nothing the involved agents can be blamed for). By contrast, the
interventionist account predicts a dependence on whether the behaviour itself is a
norm violation or not (independent of the outcome).
Hitchcock and Knobe discuss a variation of the pen vignette in order to show
the short-comings of the CCM. The new scenario is called the ’drug vignette.’ It is
structurally equivalent to the pen vignette but features a situation with a positive
outcome:
"An intern is taking care of a patient in a hospital. The intern notices that
the patient is having some kidney problems. Recently, the intern read a
series of studies about a new drug that can alleviate problems like this
one, and he decides to administer the drug in this case.
Before the intern can administer the drug, he needs to get the signature of
the pharmacist (to confirm that the hospital has enough in stock) and the
signature of the attending doctor (to confirm that the drug is appropriate
for this patient). So he sends off requests to both the pharmacist and the
attending doctor.
The pharmacist receives the request, checks to see that they have enough
in stock, and immediately signs off.
The attending doctor receives the request at the same time and imme-
diately realizes that there are strong reasons to refuse. Although some
studies show that the drug can help people with kidney problems, there
are also a number of studies showing that the drug can have very dan-
gerous side effects. For this reason, the hospital has a policy forbidding
the use of this drug for kidney problems. Despite this policy, the doctor
decides to sign off.
Since both signatures were received, the patient is administered the
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drug. As it happens, the patient immediately recovers, and the drug
has no adverse effects" (Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009, 603f).
Test subjects expressed higher agreement with the claim that the doctor’s signing
off caused the patient’s recovery than with the claim that the pharmacist’s signing
off caused it. Hitchcock and Knobe infer that we identify norm-violating behaviour
as actual cause even if the norm violation leads to a positive outcome and, thus, no
judgements of blameworthiness are involved. This effect cannot be explained by
the CCM and, thus, is taken to support the interventionist account.8
But let us have a closer look at how exactly the drug case is explained by the
interventionist. In analogy to the pen case, the drug case involves two factors that
are both necessary for the outcome (with the difference that the outcome is positive).
As in the pen case there is one norm-violating factor (the doctor’s signing off) and
one norm-conforming factor (the pharmacist’s signing off).9 In analogy to the pen
case we should expect that the most suitable corrective intervention is one that
targets the norm-violating factor, that is, an intervention that reminds the doctor of
the hospital’s drug policy.
With regard to future kidney patients such a corrective intervention on the doc-
tor’s behaviour seems reasonable. After all, the hospital’s policy is backed by
scientific evidence about the drug’s potentially dangerous side effects. And the fact
that one patient was lucky enough not to be affected by these side effects should
not be a sufficient reason to change the policy. However, with regard to the retro-
spective evaluation of the token situation this recommendation does not seem to
apply. In fact, in retrospective one should not have intervened at all because an
8In reply to the study by Hitchcock and Knobe, Alicke et al. 2011 give evidence to the effect that the
evaluation of the outcome does play a role in the evaluation of an agent’s causal role. However,
the effect of the outcome being good or bad is relatively small as compared to the effect of norm-
violating behaviour (only about half of the effect size). Moreover, it was not replicated in the XPhi
Replicability Project (Hannikainen and Cona, 2017). By contrast, Hitchcock and Knobe’s results
were replicated (Phillips, 2017).
9One could construe the actions of the intern as another norm-conforming factor, but for the sake of
the analysis we can ignore these.
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intervention on either one of the involved agents would have prevented the positive
outcome. I conclude that the fact that we identify the norm-violating factor is not to
be explained by the fact that the factor is an appropriate target for intervention—at
least in the token situation.
Interestingly, Hitchcock and Knobe suggest that the "hospital administrators en-
courage the attending physicians to sign off on requests to use the drug" (608, em-
phasis added). But this seems to be an implausible suggestion for several reasons.
If it is to be understood as an hypothetical intervention on the past token situation,
then it does not seem to be necessary, because in this situation the doctor signed off
the request anyway. If this is to be understood as an intervention on the doctor’s
future behaviour, then it is problematic because it puts future patients at risk of
suffering dangerous side effects. Hitchcock and Knobe’s suggestion is also in con-
flict with their theory which says that norm-violating factors are suitable targets for
corrective interventions. Encouraging the doctor’s behaviour instead would amount
to stabilizing norm-violating behaviour.10
Thus, there is a mismatch between what is to be done in future instances of this
kind of situation and the evaluation of the token situation. And this mismatch
seems to raise difficulties for the interventionist view. By contrast, such problems
do not need to arise for interpretations of the case in terms of responsibility. There
is not necessarily a conflict between stating that the doctor is responsible for the
positive outcome and stating that, in future instances, the doctor should not violate
the hospital’s policy.
Why is the responsibility view able to account for this case while the intervention-
ist account faces problems? The key difference between the two approaches is that
(retributive) responsibility involves the retrospective evaluation of the outcome of a
10Alternatively, one could understand Hitchcock and Knobe’s idea of encouraging the doctor’s
behaviour as a suggestion to change the underlying norm. But then, again, it does not seem to be
recommendable to change the policy because of a single instance where the side effects did not
occur.
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situation. The interventionist account, by contrast, is concerned with the prospective
evaluation of suitable strategies. The interventionist justification for emphasizing
norm-violating factors is derived from the fact that these factors are suitable targets
for future intervention. In the pen case, for example, Hitchcock and Knobe do not
seem to suggest that we literally intervene on Professor Smith’s past behaviour in
order to make the problem of pen shortage undone. Instead, the token situation is
interpreted in the light of possible interventions that would prevent future instances
of pen shortage.
This seems to be related to the fact that we cannot literally change the past.
But couldn’t we interpret the interventionist position as suggesting hypothetical
interventions? Hypothetical interventions are interventions that one should have
applied or interventions that one should apply if one could travel back in time and
literally make the problem undone. But even then the interventionist evaluation
seems to have prospective character. Given the knowledge of the drug’s dangerous
side effects (but not the post hoc knowledge of the lucky recovery) one should have
intervened on the doctor such that she would not have signed off the request for
the drug.
By contrast, the retrospective evaluation is sensitive not only to the action of the
doctor but also the actual result of the action. Normally, the doctor’s violating
the norm is blameworthy because it puts the patient at risk. However, in this
specific case the doctor’s blameworthiness is mitigated because the adverse side
effects did not occur. In fact, the patient may even have an inclination to praise
the doctor because she cured her. Thus, the evaluation of the doctor’s behaviour
depends on aspects of the situation that were neither foreseen by the doctor nor
under the doctor’s control. This phenomenon has been described as moral luck (see
e.g. Nagel (1979, Williams (1981). Moral luck is widely believed to have an impact
on our retrospective evaluation of an agent’s responsibility. This is reflected, for
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example, by the fact that murder is commonly assessed differently than attempted
murder that failed due to external reasons.11 This kind of consideration does not
seem to have an analogue in the prospective evaluation of possible ways to bring
about a certain effect.
5.5. Late Preemption
In this section we shall turn to claims of actual causation in the context of redun-
dancy. What is the use of these claims from the interventionist perspective? Clearly
they do not entail simple recommendations for the best target for intervention as
in the pen vignette and structurally similar cases. The reason is that intervening on
the actual cause in cases with redundancy will not prevent an undesired outcome.
The outcome will be sustained by the alternative process(es).
However, in Chapter 4 we have seen that in such cases claims of actual causation
provide information that is useful if the intervening agent can apply multiple inter-
ventions. If a factor is a path-changing actual cause, for example, its effect can be
prevented if we intervene on the path-changing actual cause and combine that in-
tervention with a secondary intervention that counteracts the adverse consequences
of the primary intervention.
In this context a particular challenge has arisen from cases of late preemption (see
the discussion in Chapter 4). On the one hand, there is an intuitive difference be-
tween the actual cause (the preempting factor) and the alternative causal processes
(that correspond to the preempted factor(s)). On the other hand, it is not clear what
the practical value of this intuition is from the interventionist perspective. Consider
the Suzy-Billy case. Suzy throws a stone at a bottle and destroys it. Just after Suzy’s
throw (and before the bottle is destroyed) Billy throws his stone. If Suzy had not
11It is a different question whether we are justified to assume that there is moral luck. Maybe we
shouldn’t assess murder differently than attempted murder that failed due to external reasons.
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hit the bottle, then the bottle would still have been intact upon the arrival of Billy’s
stone and Billy’s stone would have destroyed it. There is a clear intuition that
Suzy’s stone is the actual cause of the bottle’s shattering but not Billy’s stone. But
what does this imply for an agent who wants to save the bottle?
In order to save the bottle, the agent has to intervene, first, on Suzy’s stone such
that it does not destroy the bottle. One consequence of this intervention is that the
bottle is still intact upon the arrival of Billy’s stone. So the agent needs to apply a
second intervention such that Billy does not hit the bottle. However, it is not clear
why the agent would need to know that in the original situation Suzy’s rather than
Billy’s stone would destroy the bottle in order to come up with this strategy. The
agent has to intervene on both Suzy and Billy in the same way, and this seems to
be independent of whether Suzy or Billy would be the actual cause of the bottle’s
shattering.
Do the minor differences in timing play a role? Presumably we have |tSH − tBT| <
|tBH − tST|. This would leave more time between the two interventions if we were to
intervene first on Suzy and then on Billy. But why should such minor differences
in timing be relevant? Moreover, the differences in timing are contingent upon the
stones’ velocities. If Suzy’s stone has a higher velocity it can hit the bottle even
if Suzy throws later than Billy. Thus, the differences in timing do not support an
interventionist interpretation.
Does the same problem arise in cases of early preemption? That is, could one
reverse one’s strategy in the case of early preemption as well? Surely one could
save the victim by first intervening on the supervisor and then intervening on the
trainee just before he pulls the trigger. But this requires the intervening agent to
know in advance that the supervisor would step in as a result of an intervention on
the trainee. In the foregoing chapter I have argued that cases of early preemption
are often so difficult to handle because this kind of counterfactual information may
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not be available. In cases of late preemption this kind of counterfactual knowledge
tends to be more accessible since there are two processes that represent independent
threats to the goal.
I conclude that from the interventionist perspective it is difficult to explain the
practical value of drawing a distinction between preempted and preempting factors
in examples of late preemption. Of course, the claim of actual causation provides
some information. In the Suzy-Billy case it tells us whose stone destroyed the
bottle. The value of this additional information, however, may be explained from a
perspective other than that of the interventionist. In particular, it seems plausible to
say that the value of this information is to be explained by its relevance for assigning
responsibility. The claim that Suzy’s throwing her stone is an actual cause of the
bottle’s shattering justifies ascribing responsibility for destroying the bottle to Suzy.
By contrast, Billy can only be held responsible for intending to hit the bottle.
Is the difference between Suzy’s hitting the bottle and Billy’s attempt to hit the
bottle relevant for our actual practices of blaming and praising? Sometimes it is
relevant. Suppose, for example, that Suzy and Billy participate in a bottle shattering
competition (as described by Hall (2004, 235)). In this context we do care about
Suzy’s being the actual cause of the bottle’s shattering because we want to give her
credit for her achievement. Sometimes it is not relevant. Suppose, for example,
Suzy and Billy are members of a firing squad. Suzy shoots a little earlier and kills
the victim immediately. Billy shoots a little later but before Suzy’s bullet reaches
the victim. Suzy and Billy are most likely seen to be equally blameworthy for
the victim’s death. In fact, one of the purposes of execution by firing squad is to
create a sense of diffusion of responsibility among its members. But in this kind
of case the corresponding actual causal claim is not only irrelevant for matters of
responsibility—it is irrelevant tout court. So, I claim that if we care about actual
causation in late preemption scenarios, then there are cases where the interest is
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better explained in terms of responsibility than in terms of intervention.
Moreover, whether actual causation in late preemption is related to questions of
responsibility depends again on one’s take on moral luck. Consider the following
case. Suppose Suzy and Billy are assassins that both attack an innocent victim.
They have been sent on their missions by different clients and they attack without
knowing of each other. Suzy and Billy pull the triggers of their guns almost at the
same time but Suzy shoots a little earlier. Billy pulls the trigger while Suzy’s bullet
is propagating towards the victim such that Billy’s bullet does not arrive before the
victim is killed through Suzy’s bullet.
Does it matter that Suzy murdered the victim while Billy only attempted to
murder the victim? If one rejects the idea of moral luck, then our evaluation of Billy’s
actions should not depend upon whether he is an actual cause or not. The only
reason for Billy’s not being an actual cause is that Suzy killed the victim a split second
earlier. And this is an aspect of the situation that was neither under the control nor
foreseen by Billy. Correspondingly, from the prospective perspective of possible
interventions the difference should not matter. In order to save future victims
that are being attacked by Billy and Suzy we need to discourage the behaviour
of both Billy and Suzy. However, for the retrospective evaluation of the assassins’
actions moral luck does seem to play a role. And this corresponds to the fact that the
difference between preempting and preempted factor is considered to be important.
5.6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the scope of interventionist accounts of the function
of actual causation. It is a commonly accepted assumption among interventionists
that a key role of actual causation is the post hoc evaluation of responsibility. Thus,
the prospects of interventionist approaches to provide an exhaustive account of
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the function of actual causation depend on whether intervention and responsibility
align or not. In order to assess the relation between intervention and responsibility
I have introduced a distinction between moral influence and retributivist accounts
of responsibility. There is a close analogy between moral influence accounts and
interventionist accounts. In both cases the evaluation of causes has prospective
character, even if the causes occurred in the past. Retributivist responsibility, by
contrast, involves a retrospective evaluation of past causes.
This has ramifications for the scope of interventionist accounts of the function
of actual causation. I have discussed two instances where interventionist accounts
face limitations and where a better explanation is provided from the perspective of
responsibility. First, in the situation described by the drug vignette we identify the
doctor’s norm-violating behaviour as actual cause. This is problematic because a
corrective intervention on the doctor’s behaviour would have had adverse conse-
quences for the outcome of the situation. Second, in cases involving late preemption
it is difficult to motivate the distinction between preempting factors and preempted
factors from an interventionist perspective. In order to prevent the outcome an






6. Actual Causation in the Law
In the law the notion of actual causation goes back to the American Legal Realists
of the early 20th century. The Legal Realists were concerned with delineating
the factual and principled elements of legal inquiry from those that depend upon
context-sensitive considerations involving norms and policy. They introduced the
notion of "actual causation" and contrasted it with the notion of "proximate cause"
which refers to the context-sensitive and norm-related elements of legal inquiry.
In his first treatment of the concept Judea Pearl refers to this tradition in the law,
arguing that in the law actual causation is taken to be "the ultimate criterion" (2000,
309) for responsibility. However, in the preceding chapters we have seen that,
ironically, contributors to the causal models literature (including Pearl) have used
the term actual causation in order to describe context-sensitive and norm-dependent
modes of causal reasoning.
In this chapter my aim is to situate the results of the foregoing chapters within the
legal debate on actual causation. More specifically, I will disentangle the apparently
conflicting takes on actual causation by employing a disambiguation between two
kinds of context-sensitivity introduced in Chapter 4. Context-sensitivity1 concerns
our willingness to consider individual variables’ values as default states or deviant
states. Context-sensitivity1 features in selecting causes as salient factors from a set
of jointly sufficient background factors. This kind of selection can be described
as depending on considerations of normality: we typically identify those factors
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as salient that are in some sense abnormal. An example for this kind of context-
sensitivity is the following. In most cases the short-circuit is identified as the cause
of the fire while the presence of oxygen is a mere background condition. However,
there are also contexts where the presence of oxygen is identified as actual cause
and the short-circuit is a background condition, for example, if the fire occurs in a
chamber that is supposed to be evacuated.
Context-sensitivity2 concerns our willingness to consider complex counterfactu-
als that can be described as involving combinations of interventions. An example
has been given in Chapters 3 and 4. In most circumstances we are willing to take
seriously the possibility that (in violation of the structural equations) the supervis-
ing assassin does not kill the victim even though the assassin in training failed to
pull the trigger of his gun. Therefore, we consider the assassin in training to be
an actual cause of the victim’s death. However, there may also be circumstances
where a failure of the supervising assassin is only a far-fetched possibility. In such
circumstances the assassin in training would not be identified as actual cause.
After a brief review of the historical debate on actual causation in the law I will
address Richard Wright’s version of the NESS account as a contemporary instance
of the realist camp. The NESS account states that a cause is a necessary element
of a sufficient set of conditions for the effect. It was first developed by Hart and
Honoré (1959) and John L. Mackie’s (1965) INUS condition is a development of it
that is better known among philosophers.1 Wright embeds the NESS account as a
criterion of actual causation in a three-phase scheme of legal inquiry. I will argue
that while Wright may thereby have succeeded in eliminating context-sensitivity1,
he encounters problems with context-sensitivity2. In my argument I will focus on
cases of preemptive prevention. These are cases that concern factors that prevent a
1According to Mackie, a cause is an INUS condition, that is, an insufficient but necessary element of
a set that of factors that is unnnecessary but sufficient for the effect. Honoré declares that Mackie
"applied our idea" (Honoré, 1997, 365).
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particular outcome that otherwise would have been prevented by a second factor.
Wright has employed cases of preemptive prevention in order to clarify cases that
involve, for example, the nonuse or misuse of defective or missing safety devices. If
a safety device is defective, then it is prevented from operation. But if the defective
device is not even put to use, this means that it is prevented from operation anyway.
We say that the prevention through nonuse preempts the prevention through the
device’s being defective.2 Causal inquiry has been considered particularly difficult
in these kinds of cases because standard tests such as the but-for criterion fail.
Wright offers a principled (context-independent) account for such cases. I will
argue that the account achieves such a treatment of preemptive preemption only
at the price of committing to a class of highly implausible causal claims. This
suggests that context-sensitivity2 cannot be eliminated from causal inquiry in the
legal context.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.1 I will provide a brief review of
the debate on actual causation in the law in the beginning of the 20th century. This
section will motivate the Legal Realist’s distinction between actual and proximate
causation. In section 6.2 I will present first doubts against a principled account
of actual causation. These doubts have been put forward by Wex Malone and by
Hart and Honoré. The discussion of these two accounts will motivate a closer look
at Wright’s account, a contemporary realist account that opposes the arguments
put forward by Malone and Hart and Honoré. In section 6.3 we will see that
Wright distinguishes three phases of legal inquiry: (1) tortious-conduct inquiry, (2)
application of the actual-cause requirement, and (3) application of the proximate-
cause criterion. According to Wright, the first and the third phase are affected by
context-sensitive and norm-dependent considerations. The second stage which,
2We will see that this kind of case also involves double prevention: the defective device is prevented
from preventing some harm. In this sense these legal cases differ from cases of preemptive
prevention that have been discussed by McDermott (1995) and Collins (2004).
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according to Wright, concerns causal inquiry in the proper sense is not so affected.
I will highlight how this account manages to sideline issues related to context-
sensitivity1. In section 6.4 we will have a closer look at Wright’s NESS criterion for
actual causation which promises to provide a principled account of actual causation.
In section 6.5 I will introduce cases of preemptive prevention. Finally, in section
6.6, I will show that these cases raise difficulties for Wright’s account because
they involve context-sensitivity2. The difficulties indicate that context-sensitivity2
remains an essential feature of actual causation in the legal context, even in Wright’s
three-phase framework.
6.1. Actual and Proximate Cause
Theories of causation in the law have mainly focused on the law of tort, a branch
of private law.3 Tort law regulates cases that are prosecuted by the victim of some
wrong in order to seek (often financial) compensation from the person who hurt the
victim. Thus, tort law differs from criminal law that regulates cases prosecuted by
the state and that may result in a sentence of punishment. The reason for the focus
on tort law is that "a large part of tort law consists of but one injunction: do not
unreasonably act so as to cause harm to another" (Moore, 2009, 83). The meaning
of this injunction, of course, depends heavily on the meaning of "to cause." In this
regard tort law differs from criminal law that specifies in much more detail which
actions are prohibited or required.
A common test for causation in the law is the but-for test, also referred to as a test
that determines the conditio sine qua non. This test essentially construes causation
along the lines of counterfactual dependence: would the victim’s injury have been
avoided if the defendant’s actions had been different? But of course the but-for
3I focus here on a debate that is mostly concerned with causation in the American legal system. In
the German legal system the relevant branch is called "Deliktsrecht."
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test is an incomplete method for determining the defendant’s liability. For we are
typically held liable not for all adverse consequences that depend counterfactually
upon our actions. Here is an example:
"Suppose a parent, D, fails to control their two-year-old infant who runs
out into the path of a moving vehicle which swerves and breaks the leg
of a pedestrian, P. On the way to hospital, the ambulance carrying P is
struck by lightning and P is seriously burnt" (Stapleton, 2008, 448).
The pedestrian’s broken leg and burns both depend counterfactually on the par-
ent’s negligent behaviour. Yet the parent will be held liable for the broken leg but
not for the burns since the burns are too remote from the parent’s conduct. The
example illustrates that liability requires that the defendant’s actions stand in a re-
lation to the victim’s injury that is more demanding than the relation probed by the
but-for test. This requirement is commonly thought to be captured by the notion of
proximate cause.
Discussions of the meaning of proximate cause go back as far as Francis Bacon’s
Maxims of the Law and saw a first climax in the early 20th century (see e.g. Smith
(1912); Beale (1920); Carpenter (1932)). Contributors to this debate aimed to find
"definite principles of law by which the determination of proximity is to be reg-
ulated" (Beale, 1920, 636). An example for such a criterion is Smith’s substantial
factor criterion. According to this criterion, the "effect of defendant’s tort must have
appreciably continued; either down to the very moment of damage; or, at least,
down to the setting in motion of the final injurous force which immediately pro-
duced (or preceded) the damage" (1912, 310f). For example, one may think that the
effect of the parent’s negligence is the child’s running into the path of the moving
vehicle and thus affects the motion of the vehicle which is the final injurous force in
producing the pedestrian’s broken leg. By contrast, there is no such continuation
of the defendant’s tort to the burns.
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However, there were doubts that a principled account of proximate cause could
be given. These doubts were voiced prominently by the American Legal Realists
(e.g. Edgarton (1924); Green (1929)). Green, for example, argues with regard to
Smith’s substantial factor criterion that "the answer [to whether the defendant’s
conduct was a substantial factor] is only to be had in the judgment of the particular
tribunal [...] to which the problem is allocated [...]" (1929, 604). Another instance of
this criticism concerned the foreseeability criterion (according to which, for example,
the broken leg is a proximate cause because it is foreseeable, but not the burns).
According to Green, what exactly is foreseeable is not to be determined on the
basis of principles. Instead it depends upon stipulations about what an "ordinary
prudent person" can foresee and this, in turn, "must be defined and oriented by the
"circumstances of the particular case [...]." Green concludes that both the criterion’s
"vice and virtue lie in the fact that it may count for anything or for nothing. Its
function is similar to that of a joker in the game of poker" (1929, 612).
The Legal Realists suggest a clear separation of two elements of a legal inquiry.
First, there is the factual part of the inquiry that is considered to be truly causal.
This element of the inquiry is thought to establish whether the defendant’s conduct
stands at all in a causal relation with the victim’s injury. If such a relation exists, then
the defendant’s conduct is considered to be an actual cause (also: "material cause",
"cause-in-fact", or "but-for cause") of the injury. Second, there is the proximate cause
inquiry. The Legal Realists are sceptic with regard to any principled approach to
this relation and argue that it is a matter of policy.
The Legal Realists also argue that the distinction between actual cause and prox-
imate cause has a profound influence on the actual procedure in court. According
to Green, "[t]here is extremely little work [...] to do" in the first part of the inquiry
"for normally causal relation is so clear that a judge would not be warranted for
submitting it to a jury" (1929, 607). However, Green further argues that since "judges
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do not recognize what a narrow problem causal relation is [...] in almost every case
submit some other problem which should not be submitted to the jury at all" (ibid.).
So the distinction, according to Green, is so important because it affects which issues
are given to the jury to decide.
6.2. Challenging Principled Accounts of Actual Causation
An interesting twist to the Legal Realist’s account is introduced by Wex Malone.
In an influential article from 1956 Malone argues that policy-related issues do not
only affect proximate causation but also judgements of actual cause (which is called
"simple cause" or "cause-in-fact" in Malone’s terminology):
"I find that even within reference to this issue of simple cause the mys-
terious relationship between policy and fact is likely to be in the fore-
ground. [...] [I]t will be demonstrated that policy may often be a factor
when the issue of cause-in-fact is presented sharply for decision, much
as it is when questions of proximate cause are before the court" (61).
Malone’s main argument for the effect of policy on matters of actual causation con-
cerns cases like the following. Suppose an elderly worker with a heart ailment
happens to die from a heart attack while performing some trivial task for his em-
ployer. A doctor, Malone argues, will not view the trivial task as a cause of the
worker’s death. The doctor "cannot escape forming associations between events
that will comport with the purposes of his profession" (63). These purposes con-
cern diagnosing, curing, or otherwise preventing the adverse effects of diseases.
Therefore, the doctor "will likely envision as causes only those factors with which
he can deal in diagnosing, in curing or in seeking to forestall future occurrences
of this kind for other persons" (ibid.). By contrast, a judge who is concerned with
the workers’ compensation statute may well think of the trivial task as a cause of
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the worker’s death. For "[h]e likely will be impressed by the law’s desire to throw
its protection around the susceptible and aged worker as well as the one who is in
sound health" (64).
Malone takes this example to show that
"[m]uch misunderstanding between lawyers and physicians could be
obviated if members of both professions would realize that "simple"
causation is not merely an abstract issue of fact and that the resolution
of the cause problem depends largely upon the purpose for which cause
is to be used. What is a cause for the judge need not be a cause for the
physician. It is through the process of selecting what is to be regarded as
a cause for the purpose of resolving a legal dispute that considerations
of policy exert their influence in deciding an issue of cause-in-fact" (64).
Here Malone describes an instance of what I have earlier labelled as context-
sensitivity1: selecting a salient cause from a range of background conditions. The
problem of causal selection in legal inquiry and beyond was treated in a more
systematic way by Hart and Honoré (1959). In Chapter 2 we have seen that,
according to Hart and Honoré, the two main criteria for whether a but-for condition
is identified as a cause or merely as a background condition are, first, that the
condition be abnormal or, second, be a voluntary action. What is normal, according
to Hart and Honoré, depends upon the specific effect that is being considered and
it also depends on the pragmatic interests of the causal reasoner. We have also
seen that a weaker version of Hart and Honoré’s normality criterion has had major
influence on discussions on actual causation in the causal modelling literature.
Thus, it seems like the distinction between actual causation as a purely factual
relation and proximate causation as a norm-dependent relation cannot be drawn:
both concepts involve context-sensitive considerations about normality. But is it
legitimate to consider normality as part of the notion of actual causation in the law?
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Wright advocates a strict separation between the causal and the non-causal elements
of a legal inquiry and, thus, stands in the tradition of the Legal Realists. He
acknowledges the insights by Malone and Hart and Honoré as highlighting relevant
elements of the legal inquiry. However, he argues, the norm-related elements are
not part of the causal part of the legal inquiry. More specifically, Wright distinguishes
three stages of the legal inquiry as follows.
(1) The first stage is the tortious-conduct inquiry. The aim of this part of the
inquiry is to identify tortious aspects of the defendant’s conduct that potentially
caused the injury. Such tortious aspects and not the defendant’s overall conduct or
other factors will be analysed in the subsequent stages of the inquiry. This stage
of the analysis is norm- and policy-dependent because whether a potential cause is
tortious or not is a matter of norm and policy.
(2) The second stage is the application of the actual-causation requirement. The
aim of this stage is to determine which of the tortious aspects actually caused the
injury. According to Wright, this is the only part of the inquiry that deserves to be
called ’causal.’ Wright’s criterion for actual causation is the NESS test, which will
be discussed shortly.
(3) The third stage is the proximate-cause inquiry. This stage determines whether
liability is reduced or eliminated because of contributing factors other than the
defendant’s tortious conduct (as in the case of the burns as a result of the lightning
that hit the ambulance). This third step, again, is a matter of policy and, according
to Wright, should not be understood as being concerned with causation at all but
merely with liability.
How does this scheme help to separate the context-sensitive and norm-dependent
aspects of legal inquiry from the causal aspects that supposedly can be treated in a
principled way? First, the distinction between the actual-cause requirement and the
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proximate-cause inquiry reflects the distinction made by the earlier legal realists.
Second, there is a tortious-conduct inquiry that precedes the application of the
actual-cause requirement. What counts in a legal inquiry, according to Wright, is
not whether the overall conduct of the defendant (operating a hotel, driving a car)
stands in a causal relation to the harm. What counts is that the tortious aspects
of it (failure to provide a fire escape, excess speed) stand in a causal relation to
the harm. Thus, what is submitted to the NESS test is behaviour that violates
certain norms (such as the duty to provide a fire escape when operating a hotel or
conforming to the posted speed limit while driving). The distinction between the
tortious-conduct inquiry and application of the actual-causation requirement can
thus be understood as a response to the objections put forward by Malone and Hart
and Honoré. The context-sensitive1 questions of selection that Malone and Hart
and Honoré are concerned with are taken into account by Wright, but he describes
them as not being part of the causal part of the legal inquiry.
One might worry that selecting tortious conduct is itself a procedure that rests
upon certain causal assumptions. The legal inquiry is not concerned with all kinds
of tortious conduct but with tortious conduct that is plausibly related to the harm.
A clean separation may thus not be as straightforward as suggested by the three-
phase scheme. Yet, in the following we shall grant that Wright’s account achieves
a separation of considerations associated with context-sensitivity1. We shall now
turn to issues related with context-sensitivity2.
6.4. The NESS Criterion
In order to assess the role of context-sensitivity2 let us first have a closer look at the
NESS criterion, which Wright takes to be the basis of the second stage of the inquiry.
Wright argues that
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"[t]he essence of the concept of causation [...] is that a particular condition
was a cause of (condition contributing to) a specific consequence if and only
if it was a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was
sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence" (1790, emphasis original).
The acronym NESS summarizes what is considered to be the core of the account,
namely, that a cause is a "necessary element of a sufficient set" (1790) of conditions
for the effect. The NESS account goes back to Hart and Honoré (1959) and in the
philosophical literature its most prominent development was provided by Mackie
in the form of the INUS condition.
I shall illustrate the NESS criterion by showing how it deals with the well-known
cases of redundant causation. We shall begin with symmetrical overdetermination.
Here two events c1 and c2 both cause the effect e. The NESS criterion straightfor-
wardly accounts for this kind of case. The causes c1 and c2 are simply taken to
be necessary elements of two separate sets that are individually sufficient for the
effect. For example, if two lightning bolts cause a forest fire, each of the lightning
bolts is a necessary element of a set that is sufficient for the occurrence of the fire—a
set comprising, e.g., the presence of inflammable material, oxygen . . . at the place
where the lightning bolt strikes).
Next we turn to preemption. In preemption cases a cause event c1 preempts
an alternative event c2 that could have caused effect e in the absence of c1. The
problem with this kind of case is that both c1 and c2 are necessary elements of a
sufficient set for e. For example, in Backup (see Chapter 2) the trainee’s pulling the
trigger of the gun is a necessary element of a set that is sufficient for the victim’s
death (including the fact that the victim is standing at the right spot to be hit by
the bullet,...). Analogously, the supervisor’s shooting is a necessary element of a
sufficient set for the victim’s death. According to Wright, however, the supervisor’s
shooting does not count as a cause in the NESS account because it is not "a part of
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any set of actual antecedent conditions that was sufficient for [the victim’s death]"
(Wright, 1985, 1795). That is, the supervisor’s pulling the trigger is not a cause
because in the actual situation the supervisor simply did not pull the trigger.
But note a potential complication: while the supervisor does not shoot, earlier
events in the causal chain do occur. Consider, for example, the supervisor’s deter-
mination to shoot if the trainee doesn’t. This will turn out to be a NESS condition
for the victim’s death (in a set that leaves out the trainee’s shot).
Wright proposes a similar treatment of late preemption. In late preemption both
c1 and c2 do occur, but only c1 causes e because c2 occurs too late. Suppose both
the supervisor and the trainee shoot but only the trainee hits and kills the victim
because he pulled the trigger a little earlier. Thus, the supervisor did pull the trigger
in the actual situation. Yet, according to Wright, the supervisor’s action is still not
part of a set of actual antecedent conditions because other necessary elements of
the set are not present in the actual situation. One requirement is that the victim is
alive at the time when she is hit by the supervisor’s bullet. But the victim is already
dead because the trainee’s shot killed her immediately (by stipulation).
But note that this analysis trades on an ambiguity. The victim’s being alive
when the supervisor’s bullet hits is necessary for the supervisor’s bullet to cause the
victim’s death. But the NESS account cannot appeal to this, on pain of circularity.
The question is whether the supervisor’s shot is a NESS condition for the victim’s
death. And this appears to be true. The victim being alive when the supervisor’s
bullet hits is not necessary for the victim’s death.
Thus, Wright’s NESS account appears to face problems if applied to the standard
test cases. But these problems shall not concerns us in the following. Instead





Consider the following case of preemptive prevention (McDermott, 1995). Suppose
a fielder catches a cricket ball that was flying in the direction of a window. Between
the first fielder and the window there is a second fielder. The second fielder would
have caught the ball if the first fielder had not caught it. Did the first fielder’s
catching the ball prevent the window’s shattering? Intuitions are ambiguous. In
a way it did not: the ball would not have hit the window irrespective of the first
fielder’s action. In another way it did: if neither fielder had been present the
window would have been shattered. But which one of the two fielders did the
preventing? Clearly the first fielder because the second fielder did not contribute.
Consider the following causal model (figure 6.1). The first fielder catches the
ball (FC = 1) if it is thrown (TB = 1). As a result the ball cannot be caught by the
second fielder (represented by Z = TB ∧ ¬FC = 0) and the window does not break
(BW = TB ∧ ¬FC ∧ ¬Z = 0).
Figure 6.1.: Preemptive prevention.
Causal model accounts of actual causation such as the one proposed by Hitchcock
(2001) nicely reflect the ambiguity of this case. The existence of an active causal
route between FC and BW depends on whether we are willing to take seriously
scenarios where the intermediate variable Z is held fixed at its actual value given
that FC is intervened upon—which is why this is an instance of context-sensitivity2.
Given that the fielder does not catch the ball how likely is it that the second fielder
does not catch the ball either? Presumably, the second fielder is fallible. Thus, we
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should not disallow the combination FC = 0 ∧ Z = 0. Consequently, 〈FC,BW〉 is an
active route and the first fielder’s action is an actual cause of the window’s being
saved. In the following we shall refer to this scenario as the fielder-fielder scenario.
The ambiguity is even clearer if we consider a variation of the case suggested by
Collins (2004). Here the second fielder is replaced by a solid brick wall (henceforth
we shall refer to this scenario as the fielder-wall scenario). In this version of the
story variable Z represents whether the wall blocks the ball or not. Again we ask
the question: given that the first fielder does not catch the ball, how likely is it that
the wall does not block the ball? This is much less likely than a failure of the second
fielder. Again we should allow the combination of FC = 0 ∧ Z = 0 only to the
degree that we think the wall could fail to block the ball given that the fielder does
not catch it. And since this scenario is extremely unlikely, we should disallow it.
Correspondingly, it is much less plausible to say that there is an active route linking
the first fielder’s actions and the window’s being saved. This explains why we are
much more reluctant to consider the fielder to be an actual cause in this scenario.
How would we model the fielder-wall scenario such that the fielder is not iden-
tified as an actual cause? Note that in our first model of the case Z represents
the fact whether the wall blocks the ball or not. There are two possible ways in
which the non-blocking would occur. Either (1) it occurs as a result of the fielder’s
catching the ball, which is a reasonable scenario or (2) it occurs even though the
fielder fails to catch the ball. This is the implausible scenario. Let us adjust the
set of variablesV such that this implausible scenario is excluded. The easiest way
to do this is to introduce a variable W that represents the fact that there is a wall
if it takes on value 1 (if there is no wall it has value 0). Whether there is a wall
is independent of whether the fielder catches the ball.4 Moreover, the window’s
breaking depends on the fielder’s catching the ball and the presence of the wall as
4This is the essential difference to variable Z which represents whether the wall blocks the ball, that
is, has physical contact with the ball, which does depend on the fielder’s actions.
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Figure 6.2.: An alternative representation of the fielder-wall scenario.
follows: BW = TB∧¬FC∧¬W. The case states that there is a wall and it seems like
an extremely far-fetched scenario that this wall could suddenly disappear. So, it
seems like the possibility that W = 0 should not be part of the causal model, which
means that we should set W = 1 and background the variable.5 But this means
that BW = 0 no matter whether the ball is thrown and no matter what the fielder
does. This is reflected by the model in figure 6.2 that simply represents BW as an
independent variable.
According to this model, the fielder is not an actual cause. Neither is the wall
an actual cause. In fact, according to this model, there is no actual cause of the
window’s remaining intact. This appears to be plausible because the ball’s being
thrown and then being caught by the fielder is a causal process that is independent
of the window’s remaining intact. This independence is explained by the causal
structure of the situation. More specifically, the independence is explained by the
presence of the wall which imposes a constraint on the ball’s possible trajectories.
This is a causal explanation because the constraints imposed by the wall are causal
constraints.
For those who consider it plausible that in the fielder-wall scenario the fielder is
an actual cause Collins has a third scenario that involves an even more far-fetched
scenario (2004, 112f). Suppose someone throws the ball, aiming at Halley’s comet.
The fielder catches the ball. If the fielder had not caught the ball it would not
have collided with Halley’s comet because of Earth’s attractive gravitational force
and Earth’s atmosphere (henceforth we shall refer to this as the fielder-gravitation
scenario). Our taking the fielder’s catching the ball to be an actual cause depends on
the degree to which we are willing to entertain the scenario that Earth’s atmosphere
5Alternatively, we could include the variable but set W = 1 as the default.
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and gravitational field are not present. This, of course, is pretty far fetched. Thus,
it would be appropriate to describe this case with a model analogous to the one in
figure 6.2, replacing BW with a variable that specifies whether Halley’s comet is hit
(and a backgrounded variable representing the presence of Earth’s atmosphere and
gravitational field).
6.6. NESS and Preemptive Prevention
Preemptive prevention cases have been employed in the literature on actual cau-
sation in the law in order to clarify cases that involve an injury that is caused by
the theft, nonuse, or misuse of defective or missing safety devices. An example is
Saunders System Birmingham Co v Adams:6
"C negligently failed to discover and repair defective brakes in a car
that he rented to D, and D negligently failed to try to use brakes to
avoid running into P. It is assumed that the injury to P would have been
avoided if and only if C had repaired the brakes and D had tried to use
them" (Wright, 1985, 1801).7
In the following we shall have a closer look at Wright’s treatment of the brak-
ing case. Wright has repeatedly (1985; 2001; 2011) argued that the NESS criterion
identifies D’s failed attempt to use the brakes as the actual cause in a clear and non-
ambiguous way. According to Wright, the case is to be described as an example of
overdetermined negative causation. Negative causation means that there is a causal
process that is interrupted by some actual cause. Overdetermination reflects the
6117 So 72 (Alabama, 1928).
7Further instances concern cases where some harm occurs as a result of a failure to warn. Suppose a
"product manufacturer fails to put a required warning on a conspicuous product label containing
other warnings. The product user fails to read the label, and harms a bystander by using the
product in a way that would have been prevented had the omitted warning been provided, read,
and heeded" (Fischer, 2005-2006, 300).
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fact that there are several factors that could have interrupted the process. Accord-
ing to Wright, "when analysing overdetermined negative causation, it is critically
important to focus on the sequencing of the steps in the positive causal process
that failed, in order to determine at which step it failed" (2011, 317). The relevant
causal process, according to Wright, is the braking process.8 Wright describes this
process has having several stages, the first stage being the driver’s applying force
to depress the brake pedal. As a consequence, a lever is being operated which leads
to hydraulic brake fluid being transmitted into the system. Ultimately this leads
to braking pads being pushed against parts of the wheel such that the wheels are
slowed down through friction. Because of D’s failure to brake, the causal process
does not reach the later stages. This is why, according to Wright, the failure of the
brake system (which had occurred at one of the later stages) is not part of a set of
actualized sufficient conditions and, thus, not an actual cause.
This treatment of the braking case was criticised by Fischer (1992; 2005-2006)
and Stapleton (2008) who argue that it is arbitrary to choose the force applied to
the brake pedal as the start of the process that lead to plaintiff’s injury. Instead
one could just as well stipulate that the relevant process begins with the failure to
repair the brakes. Since the brakes are not functional at the time where D should
have operated them, D’s failure to brake is not a necessary element of the set of
conditions that lead to the accident. This, according to the critics, would mean that
the defective brakes are the actual cause.
In order to counter this objection Wright draws an analogy to McDermott’s and
Collins’s thought experiments regarding preemptive prevention. Before we address
the feasibility of Wright’s reply, let me make the analogy as precise as possible by
providing a causal model (see figure 6.3). This will reveal that between McDermott’s
and Collins’s cases, on the one hand, and the braking case on the other hand, there
8I disagree: the positive causal process is the car approaching P. The braking process would have
prevented this. See the discussion below.
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Figure 6.3.: The braking case represented in partial analogy to preemptive preven-
tion.
is a decisive difference. CP = 1 shall represent the fact that the car approaches P
(CP = 0 otherwise). DF = 1 shall represent the fact that D fails to depress the brake
pedal (DF = 0 if D does not fail to depress the brake pedal). BF = 0 shall represent
the fact that the brakes do not fail (BF = 1 if they do fail).9 Finally, P = 0 shall
represent the fact that P is injured (P = 1 otherwise). In order to implement the
analogy invoked by Wright, we would need to provide structural equations that
are isomorphic to the fielder cases.
P will be injured if the car approaches and either D fails to operate the brake
or the brake fails: ¬P = CP ∧ (DF ∨ BF). This equation is structurally similar to
the corresponding equation in the fielder-fielder case. Moreover, we may assume
that the brake’s failure depends on D’s actions as follows: BF = ¬DF, meaning that
the brakes fail if D operates them. This would be in analogy to the fielder-fielder
case as the second fielder’s actions depend on the first fielder’s actions.10 However,
note also that the first differences to the fielder-fielder case arise from the fact that
D’s failure to operate the brake and the brake’s failure are independent of the car’s
approaching P.
Then the analogy, presumably, is supposed to work as follows. In the fielder-
fielder scenario (as well as the fielder-wall scenario) there is a positive causal pro-
9In the actual scenario the brakes do not fail because they are not even put to work. This is analogous
to the second fielder not catching the ball because the ball did not even arrive at her position.
10For now, let us assume that this is an appropriate representation. Shortly, I will argue to the contrary.
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cess: the ball’s approaching the window. In analysing the case of overdetermined
negative causation we have to follow the sequence of this positive causal process
and identify the first instance where it is interrupted. The ball’s approaching the
window is interrupted by the first fielder (or the only fielder, in the fielder-wall
scenario) and, thus, the fielder’s catching the ball is the actual cause. Likewise,
according to Wright, in the braking case there is a positive causal process (presum-
ably, the braking) which is interrupted by the failure to operate the brakes, which
makes D the actual cause of P’s being injured.
The analogy seems to work only if we assume that the relevant positive causal
process is the braking process. But this seems to be an implausible choice. First, with
regard to the effect in question (P’s being harmed) braking seems to be described
more appropriately as a negative causal process (taking away the kinetic energy of
the car that threatens P). Second, there does not even seem to be a braking process
because D did not initiate one. The more relevant positive causal process seems to
be the car’s approaching P. But this process is not even interrupted. In fact, the case
seems to involve overdetermined double prevention: the braking process would
have prevented the accident if it had not been prevented by D’s failure to brake
and the brakes’ not being functional. The crucial disanalogy, thus, is the following:
in the fielder cases there are two factors that compete in preventing an outcome
(the broken window). In the braking case the outcome is not even prevented (P
is injured) because there are two factors that compete in preventing the effect that
would have prevented the outcome. The most natural choice of an actual cause in
the braking case, thus, seems to be the fact that the car approaches P (or was steered
in the direction of P).
The legal case is concerned with the braking process. So let us see whether the
analogy to preemptive prevention can still be used in order to shed light on this.
The appropriateness of the causal model given above depends, among other things,
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Figure 6.4.: A more appropriate representation of the braking case.
upon our willingness to allow the combination DF = 0∧BF = 0. This is the scenario
where D does not fail to operate the brakes and the brakes do not fail and, as a
result, P is not injured. But this scenario seems to be highly unlikely because the
case description specifies that the brakes are not functional. In fact, the braking
case seems to be more similar to the fielder-wall scenario than the fielder-fielder
scenario. Wright acknowledges the similarity with the fielder-wall scenario and
argues that the "defects in the braking system [...] are like the wall in the thrown
ball example" (320).
Following the argument that I have developed in the foregoing section, it would
then be appropriate to represent the case with a model that does not allow the
combination DF = 0 ∧ BF = 0. Here is such a model (see figure 6.4). CP = 1 shall
again represent the fact that the car approaches P. In the given case D fails to operate
the brakes while approaching P. But the brakes’ not being functional is a structural
reason for P being independent of DF. The fact that the brakes are not functional is
represented by the fact that there is no directed edge between DF and P. However,
there is a directed edge between CP and P, reflecting the fact that P’s being harmed
depends on whether the car approaches P.
According to this model, DF is not an actual cause of P = 0. Neither is the brake’s
not being functional an actual cause. In fact, the only actual cause is the fact that
the car approaches P as argued above. However, Wright argues that D’s failure to
brake is an actual cause of P’s being injured and he aims to support this by claiming
that the fielder is an actual cause in the fielder-wall scenario (see Wright (2011),
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316). That is, Wright bites the bullet and accepts these counter-intuitive claims that
causal models avoid if the model is adjusted in an appropriate way.
This seems to be an undesirable result that raises doubts regarding the NESS
criterion as a suited criterion for actual causation. But the problem is even worse
because Wright needs to commit to the claim that the fielder is an actual cause even
in the fielder-gravitation case, or so I shall argue in the following.
Wright argues that his approach does not entail that the fielder is an actual cause
in the fielder-gravitation case:
"Unlike the first two versions, Collins is assuming that the ball lacked
sufficient speed when it was released to reach the stated end point. The
lack of sufficient speed when it was released caused the failure of the
positive causal process of the ball’s reaching that very distant point the
instant the ball was released and thus pre-empted the potential negative
causal effect on that process of [the fielder’s] subsequent catching of the
ball" (2011, 317).
According to Wright, the actual cause of the ball’s not hitting the distant comet
supposedly is associated with Earth’s gravitational field. The reason is that the ball
does not have sufficient kinetic energy to evade Earth’s attractive force. And this
is the case at the very beginning of the process, that is, before the fielder catches
the ball. In other words, with regard to the fielder-gravitation case Wright seems
to accept that the gravitational field is a relevant constraint of the ball’s possible
trajectories.
This reply seems to be exactly right. But from the perspective of Wright’s prin-
cipled account there is a problem: why doesn’t this work as a response to the
fielder-wall scenario as well? From the very beginning of the process the ball does
not have the kinetic energy to get through the wall and destroy the window (the ball
is not a cannonball with sufficient momentum to destroy the wall and the window
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behind it). But this does not make the wall the actual cause of the window’s being
saved, at least according to Wright.
Here is one way Wright might want to respond: what really matters is when the
respective forces act on the ball. Take the ball to be travelling in the direction of
the distant comet. If no forces were acting on the ball, the ball would approach the
distant comet with uniform velocity, as described by Newton’s first law of motion.
Yet, there are forces acting on the ball and they do so in temporal order: first Earth’s
gravitational attraction together with atmospheric friction and then the force of the
fielder’s hand. Thus, gravitation does come first and, thus, preempts the fielder.
The problem with this anticipated response is the last "thus." If temporal order
of forces on the ball is so important, then we should be precise. It is true that the
gravitational force acts on the ball first, but only up to the point where the ball is
caught by the fielder. Suppose the Earth’s gravitational attraction would end just
behind the fielder’s hand (and other forces, like friction would also be eliminated).
If the fielder had not caught the ball under these circumstances, then the ball would
have continued on its trajectory until its impact on the distant comet. Thus, under
these circumstances it is quite plausible to view the fielder’s action as the (but-for)
cause of the ball’s not hitting the comet. Conversely, the reason why we do not
think of the fielder under normal circumstances as the cause is that behind the
fielder Earth’s gravitational field does not end.
Thus—presuming that the analogy works—Wright’s account seems to face a
dilemma. One option for Wright is to claim that the failure to operate the brakes
is an actual cause and the same holds for the first fielder in the fielder-fielder case
and for the fielder in the fielder-wall case. But then Wright is also committed to
identifying the fielder in the fielder-gravitation case as an actual cause. The other
option is to reject that the fielder is an actual cause in the fielder-gravitation case.
But then Wright must accept that the fielder is not an actual cause in the other
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scenarios either and that the failure to operate the brakes is not an actual cause.
Either position is implausible. Thus, there must be other considerations that le-
gitimately influence our judgements of actual causation in these cases. The analysis
given here suggests that these considerations concern the question which scenarios
we should be taking seriously. It is a reasonable scenario that upon failure of the
first fielder the second fielder also fails to catch the ball. Therefore, in the actual
scenario we identify the fielder as a cause of the window’s not being hit. This is
different in the fielder-wall and the fielder-gravitation case. These do not involve
reasonable scenarios where the ball hits the window or the distant comet. Thus, in
these cases the fielder is not an actual cause. Neither is the wall or the gravitational
field an actual cause in these scenarios. Instead, they feature in (causal) explana-
tions of why the ball-catching process is independent of the window’s or comet’s
not being hit.
Analogously, the braking case does not involve a reasonable scenario in which the
car is stopped. Thus, D’s failure to brake is not an actual cause of P’s being injured.
Neither is the defective brake an actual cause, even though it features as a part of
the (causal) explanation why the car could not have been stopped. Does this mean
that P’s being harmed (like the window’s remaining intact) has no actual cause at
all? No. This is where the analogy between the fielder cases and the braking case
breaks down. P’s being injured is caused by the car that approaches P.
6.7. Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored consequences of the foregoing discussions for the
notion of actual causation in the law. I have argued that my distinction between
two kinds of context-sensitivity sheds new light on the feasibility of a principled
(context-independent) approach to actual causation. Wright’s framework suggests
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a way to separate context-sensitivity1 (which is related to issues of causal selection)
from the causal part of the legal inquiry. Context-sensitivity2 (which is related to
taking seriously certain combinations of variables and values that violate a model’s
structural equations), however, is not so easily separated from the causal inquiry.
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In Chapter 3 we have seen that the original motivation for incorporating the de-
fault/deviant distinction is derived from the Problem of Isomorphism.1 The idea
was that defaults help explain why different causal judgements apply to pairs of
target systems even if the systems supposedly have isomorphic causal models.2
However, we have also seen that the explanation of causal judgements based on the
default/deviant distinction is not entirely satisfactory. The explanation involves ad
hoc assumptions about what is taken to be normal or abnormal. Moreover, in the
discussed instances the default/deviant distinction is not even necessary for solving
the Problem of Isomorphism. By choosing the causal models more carefully we
could show that the pairs of cases do not have isomorphic structure. Moreovoer,
the more carefully chosen models help account for the different causal judgements
that apply to the different target systems.
In a recent article Thomas Blanchard and Jonathan Schaffer (2017) suggest a
generalization of this strategy, which I shall call the adjust-the-model argument. They
argue that causal reasoners should take the following to be a useful heuristic with
1Chapter 7 is an extended version of my article "Causation and the Problem of Disagreement"
(Fischer (forthcoming b)) accepted for publication by Philosophy of Science on 03/30/2021 (https:
//doi.org/10.1086/714852).
2In the following the term ’causal model’ will refer to standard causal models, that is, models without
the distinction between default and deviant values. Models with defaults will be called extended
causal models.
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regard to the Problem of Isomorphism: "When confronted with structurally isomorphic
but causally distinct cases, suspect that at least one of the models is impoverished or otherwise
non-apt" (205). They also argue that defaults "come close to a free parameter in an
otherwise so precise and objectively constrained formalism, which basically gives
the theorist leeway to hand-write the result she wants" (192). Thus, according to
Blanchard and Schaffer, the default/deviant distinction does more damage than
good to the formalism of causal models.
In this chapter I shall provide a more nuanced account of the benefits of the
default/deviant distinction. The account will be based on an analysis of the adjust-
the-model argument. In particular, I shall argue pace Blanchard and Schaffer, that
there are situations where the default/deviant distinction is a useful supplement to
causal models. I shall grant that Blanchard and Schaffer’s criticism of defaults as a
solution to the Problem of Isomorphism is right. However, there is another far less
prominent problem: the Problem of Disagreement. And I will show that this prob-
lem gives rise to a genuinely new argument for incorporating the default/deviant
distinction.
The Problem of Disagreement has first been introduced by Halpern and Hitchcock
(2015). It arises from cases where agents disagree in their causal judgement even
though they base their judgement on the same assumptions about the underlying
causal model. The Problem of Disagreement is related to well-known examples of
disagreement over what is ’the cause’ of a given effect, discussed, for example by
Collingwood (1938), Malone (1956), Hanson (1958), and van Fraassen (1980). The
main difference is that the Problem of Disagreement involves the explicit assump-
tion that the disagreeing agents base their causal claims on the same underlying
causal model. As in the Problem of Isomorphism, Halpern and Hitchcock take
this to indicate that the agents’ causal judgements depend not only on assump-
tions about causal structure but also on a distinction between default and deviant
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I will show that this argument allows two possible readings. First, it can be read
as involving descriptive claims about how agents do reason about causal models
in contexts where they disagree. This reading seems to be vulnerable to a version
of Blanchard and Schaffer’s adjust-the-model argument. If two agents disagree
about judgements of actual causation with regard to a particular situation, we
should expect that these agents also disagree about the underlying causal model.
Second, the argument can be read as involving prescriptive claims about how
agents should reason about causes when they disagree. Here the adjust-the-model
argument does not apply. I will argue that it would be wrong to require that the
agents support their conflicting causal judgements with different models. Instead,
I will argue, causal models should be understood as a representative tool that
helps express causal claims that go beyond causal judgements that are based on
potentially idiosyncratic normative presumptions. If understood in this way, they
can help resolve disagreement over causes by giving a framework for disentangling
normative and epistemic dimensions of disagreement. And this function can only
be fulfilled if models incorporate the default/deviant distinction. I will illustrate this
claim with an example that concerns the causal role of Search and Rescue missions
in the Central Mediterranean with regard to increasing numbers of deaths through
shipwreck in 2015 and 2016.
In section 7.1 I will have a closer look at Blanchard and Schaffer’s case against
the Problem of Isomorphism. In particular, I shall introduce in more detail the
adjust-the-model argument as one of three challenges that Blanchard and Schaffer
raise against proponents of the default/deviant distinction. In section 7.2 I will
introduce the Problem of Disagreement. I shall briefly introduce Halpern and
Hitchcock’s main example which concerns disagreement about the causal status of
omissions. In section 7.3 I will argue why Halpern and Hitchcock’s example is not
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a convincing case for defaults. More specifically, I will point out that this version of
the Problem of Disagreement is vulnerable to a version of Blanchard and Schaffer’s
adjust-the-model argument: those who disagree about causal judgements tend to
disagree about the causal model as well. In section 7.4 I shall take a step back
and examine the function of extended causal models. In sections 7.5 and 7.6 I
will argue that extended causal models can help us disentangle disagreement that
arises for normative reasons from disagreement that arises for epistemic reasons.
I will illustrate this point by drawing from a case of actual disagreement over
causes. This example concerns the causal role of Search and Rescue missions in the
Central Mediterranen performed by non-governmental organisations in the context
of increasing numbers of deaths in 2015 and 2016.
7.1. The Adjust-the-Model Argument
Blanchard and Schaffer put forward three main lines of criticism against incorporat-
ing the default/deviant distinction. The first line of criticism, the adjust-the-model
argument, will be the focus of the following discussion but it will be useful to have
all three objections on the table before we start.
First, according to Blanchard and Schaffer, the default/deviant distinction is un-
necessary. The underlying argument is a generalization of the observations dis-
cussed in Chapter 3. There we have seen that two prominent instances of the
Problem of Isomorphism arise only because one of the involved models did not
provide an appropriate representation of the underlying target system. Blanchard
and Schaffer argue that incorporating the default/deviant distinction is not a con-
clusion supported by the Problem of Isomorphism. Instead,
"[t]he right moral is to dump at least one of the two models invoked on
the grounds that it fails to be apt. Indeed it seems to us that the follow-
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ing is a good heuristic: When confronted with structurally isomorphic but
causally distinct cases, suspect that at least one of the models is impoverished or
otherwise non-apt. [...] [T]his heuristic functions as a useful ’warning sig-
nal’ for the theorist that some non-apt model may be in use, which may
trigger her to check both models more closely with her independently
developed aptness constraints" (205f, emphasis original).
The relevant aptness constraints are rules for selecting a set of variables V that
constitutes the causal model (see section 3.2). Blanchard and Schaffer focus on
three such rules. First, the "variables should represent enough events to capture the
essential structure of the situation being modelled", second, "[a]dding additional
variables should not overturn the causal verdicts" (183) and, third, "variables should
not be allotted values that we are not willing to take seriously" (182).
The first two rules are the rules that they take the simple model of bogus preven-
tion to violate. The simple model is impoverished because it does not reflect the
structurally essential fact that no neutralization took place. Adding a corresponding
variable overturns the verdict that the actions of the bodyguard are an actual cause
(see section 3.8). Blanchard and Schaffer take the third rule to help us with cases
like the gardener/queen example: some flowers would not have died if either the
gardener or the Queen of England had watered them and it needs to be explained
why we tend to identify only the gardener as an actual cause.3
"It is because we are willing to indulge in the fantasy of the gardener
watering the flowers [...], but just can’t imagine the queen stooping to
the job, that we feel an asymmetry. If so then [the constraint to represent
only serious possibilities]—which does independent work—was all we
needed to explain the gardener/queen asymmetry. There is no apt causal
3In the gardener/queen case the problem arises from a symmetry that is internal to the model, not
from two causal models that have isomorphic structure.
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model in which wiggling whether the queen waters the flowers wiggles
the fate of the flowers, because there is no apt causal model that considers
so ridiculous a scenario as the queen of England popping by, watering
can in hand, to engage in random acts of gardening" (197).
Figure 7.1A gives a representation of the gardener/queen case that Blanchard and
Schaffer consider to be problematic. Blanchard and Schaffer think that this is not
an apt model because Q = 1 represents a scenario that we are not willing to take
seriously. Thus, they suggest eliminating variable Q which leads to the simpler
model in figure 7.1B. This model reproduces the plausible verdict that only the
gardener is an actual cause of the flowers’ death.
A B
Figure 7.1.: Employing the adjust-the-model strategy for solving the garden-
er/queen case. A: The flowers survive (F = 1) if either the gardener (G = 1) or the
queen (Q = 1) waters the flowers. B: The flowers survive if and only if the gardener
waters them.
Blanchard and Schaffer argue that there are two ways to understand this argu-
ment. First, the aptness constraint can be understood as reflecting a metaphysical
asymmetry between the gardener and the queen. An alternative view is that the
underlying asymmetry is merely psychological. According to this understanding,
both the gardener and the queen are causes of the flowers’ death but there are
psychological reasons for our focussing on the gardener. According to this view,
the constraint to represent only serious possibilities "may be interpreted not as
an aptness constraint on models, but as a descriptive psychological claim about
which causal models are most readily available to us when we form our causal
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judgements" (198).
Blanchard and Schaffer’s second line of criticism is that the default/deviant dis-
tinction involves unclarities. Most proponents of the default/deviant distinction
relate it to an underlying theory of typicality and normality that involves a range
of possibly conflicting standards. This can lead to problems as, for example, in
"[m]ost people speed. If the posted speed limit is 55 miles per hour, is driving at
55mph normal for conforming to the law, or abnormal for violating the statistical
expectation?" (193). The worry underlying this point is that the unclarity associated
with the default/deviant distinction stands in contrast with the precise theoretical
framework of standard causal models. The authors reject the idea that we should
supplement the "precise and objectively constrained formalism" with "a free pa-
rameter [...] which basically gives the theorist leeway to hand-write the result she
wants" (192).
The third line of criticism is that incorporating the default/deviant distinction
is psychologically implausible. Proponents of defaults assume that the results
from empirical studies on causal reasoning such as those based on the the pen
vignette (Knobe and Fraser (2008), see Chapter 2) reflect judgements that arise from
the competent use of a norm-laden notion of actual causation. But, according to
Blanchard and Schaffer, such causal judgements are rather to be explained by biases
that are associated with certain heuristics that support our use of a norm-free causal
notion. In the case of the pen vignette, for example, test subjects supposedly should
have identified both Professor Smith and the administrative assistant as actual
causes. The fact that test subjects ascribe a higher relevance to Professor Smith is
to be explained by norm-related presuppositions that interfere with the correct use
of a norm-free notion of actual cause. Blanchard and Schaffer support this claim
with an analogy to probability judgements. Test subjects tend to overestimate the
probability of a car accident after being presented with dramatic images of such
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accidents (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman and Miller, 1986). Blanchard
and Schaffer argue that, in analogy to the pro-default argument, we would have
to presume that the test subjects make competent use of a norm-laden notion of
probability. This is of course implausible. Instead the result is to be explained by
a norm-free notion of probability the use of which is guided by a heuristic. The
heuristic is affected by a bias that results from the test subjects’ being presented
with the dramatic pictures.
In the following I will focus on Blanchard and Schaffer’s first line of criticism,
which I shall refer to as the adjust-the-model argument. While I grant that this is
a strong argument against the Problem of Isomorphism, I will show that in the
context of the Problem of Disagreement we need a more nuanced account.
There is an important tension between Blanchard and Schaffer’s three arguments.
Suppose I am a proponent of the idiosyncratic (and potentially biased) view that
the queen is in charge of watering the flowers in the municipal gardens and that the
gardener for some reason is not supposed to water them.4 According to the adjust-
the-model strategy, I am supposed to represent only those scenarios that I take to
be serious possibilities. Thus, I will end up with a model in which variable Q is the
only cause of variable F. But this is a problem. Because now my idiosyncratic view
does not only spoil my judgements of actual causation, but also the corresponding
causal model!
The underlying point is the following. Blanchard and Schaffer argue that the
default/deviant distinction is unclear and reflects biases. Then they suggest to
solve cases like the gardener/queen example by adjusting the models on the basis
of considerations about what scenarios are to be taken seriously. But what is a
scenario that is to be taken seriously? Presumably this depends on ideas related to
normality—otherwise it would be easy to generate counterexamples to the strategy.
4Blanchard and Schaffer construct a similar case, where the gardener is a member of a secret society
that does not allow her to water inedible plants.
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But this means that the constraint on models is no less unclear than the criteria
for the default/deviant distinction. It seems like we haven’t gained anything by
shifting the problem of unclarity from the default/deviant distinction to the criteria
for selecting a suitable set of variablesV. In fact, exploiting the serious possibility
rule as a constraint on V makes the problem even worse. For now the unclarities
are not confined to the defaults but they infect the whole model.
My argument in this chapter is that there are situations where normality consider-
ations should not affect the choice of variables inV. If there is unclarity associated
with norms, then defaults are a better place for it.
7.2. The Problem of Disagreement
Consider the following case of causation by omission, which is a variant of the
gardener/queen case and which is provided by Halpern and Hitchcock:
"[W]hile a homeowner is on a vacation, the weather is hot and dry, her
next-door neighbour does not water her flowers, and the flowers die.
Had the weather been different, or had her next-door neighbour watered
the flowers, they would not have died" (414f).
Halpern and Hitchcock argue that since the flowers’ death depends counterfactu-
ally on both the weather and the neighbour’s omission it seems like a counterfactual
theory of causation cannot distinguish between these factors. However, according
to some authors (e.g. Beebee (2004); Moore (2009)), the weather is a cause of the
flowers’ death but not the neighbour’s omission to water them. Halpern and Hitch-
cock flag this as the "problem of isomorphism." Note that (as in the gardener/queen
case) this is a somewhat non-standard use of the term "problem of isomorphism." In
Chapter 3 we have seen that the Problem of Isomorphism typically is taken to arise
from pairs of cases that are represented by isomorphic causal models. Here there
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is only one case and one model at stake and the problem arises from a symmetry
that is internal to the model: there are two factors that stand in the same kind of
structural relation to the effect, but only one is identified as actual cause.
According to Halpern and Hitchcock, there is "an even deeper problem. There
is actually a range of different opinions in the literature about whether to count
the neighbour’s negligence as an actual cause of the flowers’ death [...]. Prima
facie, it does not seem that any theory of actual causation can respect all of these
judgments without lapsing into inconsistency" (415). This, according to Halpern
and Hitchcock, is the Problem of Disagreement.
The Problem of Disagreement arises where the following two conditions hold.
First, there are two (or more) agents Ai that have conflicting judgements of actual
causation with regard to the same target system. For example, theorists like Beebee
and Moore argue that only the weather is an actual cause because they think that
omissions cannot be actual causes. They disagree with theorists like Lewis (2000;
2004) and Schaffer (2000b; 2004) who think that the neighbour’s negligence is also
an actual cause because they think that omissions are genuine causes. Second, it
has to be the case that these opposing agents agree on the underlying causal model
M. In the flower case Halpern and Hitchcock take this to be a model consisting of
the following three variables (Halpern and Hitchcock, 2015, 437). First, H = 1 if
the weather is hot and dry and H = 0 otherwise. Second, W = 1 if the neighbour
waters the flowers, and W = 0 otherwise. Third, D = 1 if the flowers die, and D = 0
otherwise. The flowers die if the weather is hot and the neighbour fails to water
them: D = H ∧ ¬W.
The Problem of Disagreement is related to well known examples of disagreement
over what is ’the cause’ of a given effect, discussed, for example by Collingwood
(1938), Malone (1956), Hanson (1958), and van Fraassen (1980). For example, Han-
son describes a case where "the cause of death might have been set out by a physician
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as ’multiple haemorrage’, by the barrister as ’negligence on the part of the driver’,
by a carriage-builder as ’a defect in the brakeblock construction’, by a civic planner
as ’the presence of tall shrubbery at that turning’" (Hanson, 1958, 54). These authors
emphasize that what counts as ’the cause’ depends on criteria that are contextual.
One way context-dependence plays out is when different agents make causal claims
about the same situation but with different background assumptions or pragmatic
aims in mind. The main difference between these earlier discussions and Halpern
and Hitchcock’s more recent treatment is that the Problem of Disagreement involves
the explicit assumption that the disagreeing agents base their causal claims on the
same underlying causal model.
When there is an instance of the Problem of Disagreement, what exactly do the
agents disagree about? According to Halpern and Hitchcock, the disagreement is
about the actual cause of the outcome. That is, what is an actual cause according
to one agent is not an actual cause according to another agent. But wouldn’t this
imply an implausible metaphysical view according to which causation is subjec-
tive? Halpern and Hitchcock argue to the contrary. Actual causation is taken to
be a subjective and context-dependent notion that is to be distinguished from an
underlying and objective notion of causal structure.
Going back to Blanchard and Schaffer’s third line of criticism one might think
that the disagreement appears to affect only idiosyncratic biases and, thus, should
not be part of a theory of the notion of causation. One might think that the term
’causation’ should be reserved for the underlying structure and explain the rest by
biases that are associated with certain heuristics. But there seems to be a disanalogy
to Blanchard and Schaffer’s case about the notion of probability and probabilistic
reasoning. For an illustration take the conjunction fallacy, also known as the Linda
problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). The Linda problem arises from a situation
where test subjects are presented with a description of Linda as an outspoken, bright,
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and politically engaged person who has majored in philosophy. These test subjects
tend to say that it is more likely that Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist
movement than that she is bank teller. This is clearly false since the set of feminist
bank tellers is a subset of all bank tellers. The crucial point here is that if you are
not familiar with the problem, it is easy to give the wrong estimation. But once
you know that with the estimation you committed the conjunction fallacy, you see
immediately that you have been led astray. In particular, there is no reason to stick
to your initial judgement.
But this is different in the case of judgements of actual causation. In Chapters
4 and 5 I have argued that judgements of actual causation and in particular the
norm-dependent judgements that are relevant in the Problem of Disagreement do
not express a mere bias but fulfil certain functions. In particular they identify
suitable targets of intervention or indicate who is responsible for some outcome.
Disagreement about these issues will not be resolved by merely pointing out that on
the level of causal structure everyone agrees. Does this mean that the disagreement
concerns suitable targets of intervention and responsibility rather than causation?
If ’causation’ means causal structure, then this seems exactly right. But this is not
what the norm-dependent notion of actual causation is taken to refer to.
Next, let us see how Halpern and Hitchcock aim to resolve this instance of the
Problem of Disagreement by employing the default/deviant distinction. As we have
seen in Chapter 3, Halpern and Hitchcock take the default/deviant distinction to be
one that concerns the values of particular variables. If all variables in a causal model
take on particular values, then the model represents a possible world. Moreover,
worlds can (often but not always) be compared on a normality scale, where the
normality of a world is a function of the number of variables that take on their
default values.
Halpern and Hitchcock argue that "[t]hose who maintain that omissions are
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never causes can be understood as having a normality ranking where absences
or omissions are more typical than positive events" and Halpern and Hitchcock
take this to reflect "a certain metaphysical view: there is a fundamental distinction
between positive events and mere absences, and in the context of causal attribution,
absences are always considered typical for candidate causes" (437f). This, according
to Halpern and Hitchcock gives rise to the following normality ordering:
(H = 0,W = 0,D = 0)  (H = 1,W = 0,D = 1)  (H = 1,W = 1,D = 0)
Here the most normal world is the world where the weather is not hot and dry and
the neighbour does not have to water the flowers in order to save them. The actual
world is less normal because the weather variable takes on a non-default variable
(and the flowers die). This is taken to be more normal than the world where the
flowers are being watered and survive as a result. With this normality ordering
the norm-sensitive definition of actual causation identifies the weather as an actual
cause but not the neighbour’s negligence. This is because the normality criterion of
actual causation discussed in Chapter 3 allows as a witness only the world where
(H = 0,W = 0,D = 0).
By contrast, an advocate of the view that omissions are always causes can be
understood as subscribing to the following normality ordering:
(H = 0,W = 0,D = 0) ≡ (H = 1,W = 1,D = 0)  (H = 1,W = 0,D = 1)
Here the two worlds where the flowers do not die are equally normal and they are
taken to be at least as normal as the world where the flowers die. Consequently,
both the weather and the neighbour’s negligence fulfil the normality criterion and
qualify as actual causes of the flowers’ death.
In conclusion, the Problem of Disagreement is supposed to show that causal
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judgements track considerations that go beyond the content of causal models. As
in the Problem of Isomorphism the idea is that the problem can be solved by
incorporating a default/deviant distinction.
7.3. Problems with the Problem of Disagreement
There are two problems with Halpern and Hitchcock’s account of the Problem of
Disagreement. First, it seems quite unlikely that Beebee and Moore would agree
with the claim that absences or omissions are generally more normal than positive
events. In fact, according to each of the many dimensions of normality, there seem
to be clear counterexamples. Living humans more frequently breathe than not,
functional alarm clocks go off, we are legally and morally required to help those
whose lives are threatened through an accident. The kind of metaphysical point
that Beebee and Moore make with regard to the causal status of omissions seems
to be independent of claims regarding the normality of omissions. Thus, it seems
Halpern and Hitchcock have chosen an example where defaults do not do the
explanatory work that they expect them to do.
Second, suppose for the sake of the argument that there is an agent who subscribes
to the view that absences are always considered typical. These assumptions about
typicality will most likely also influence what an agent takes to be a far-fetched
or a serious possibility—considerations that we should expect to affect the agent’s
preferred causal model. But if this is the case, then this agent disagrees with the
proponent of absences as causes already at the level of the standard causal model.
So, if we take the Problem of Disagreement to give rise to an argument for defaults,
then it seems like this argument faces the same kinds of difficulties as the argument
from the Problem of Isomorphism. In particular, it seems like there is not really a
problem in the first place if we choose what seem to be the most plausible models.
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The fact that we have to expect agents to agree already at the level of causal models
poses a general problem for the Problem of Disagreement. The claim that there are
agents who disagree about actual causes but agree on the underlying causal model
seems to involve implausible empirical assumptions about the involved agent’s sets
of believes.5
7.4. What is the Function of Extended Causal Models?
In the following sections I will argue that there is an alternative reading of the
Problem of Disagreement. This reading of the argument does not rely on descriptive
claims about how disagreeing agents do use extended causal models to support their
reasoning. Instead it focuses on prescriptive claims about how disagreeing agents
should use extended causal models. I will argue that the alternative reading shows
that in some cases the default/deviant distinction is a useful extension to standard
causal models.
Let us begin by considering what the function of extended causal models is,
in Halpern and Hitchcock’s framework. When Halpern and Hitchcock describe
the default/deviant distinction as a conservative extension, they "envision a kind of
conceptual division of labour where the causal model (S,F ) represents the objective
patterns of dependence that could in principle be tested by intervening on the
system, and  represents the various normative and contextual factors that also
influence judgments of actual causation" (435). So, at a first glance it looks like
causal reasoning involves considerations that are located at two distinct levels.
First, there is the level of standard causal models. These represent the objective
patterns of counterfactual dependence. Second, there is the level of judgements
5Phillips and Cushman (2017) provide evidence to the effect that moral norms constrain an agent’s
representation of what is possible. The authors show that under time pressure test subjects are less
likely to judge it possible to act immorally or irrationally. If agents do not consider such actions
possible, it seems plausible to assume that they would not include them into a causal model of
such a situation.
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of actual causation. These judgements are influenced by the normality ordering 
which reflects normative and contextual considerations.
However, at a second glance the conceptual division of labour does not seem to
work as straightforwardly. First, Halpern and Hitchcock point out that objectivity
on the level of standard causal models means that "once a suitable set of variables
has been chosen, there is an objectively correct set of structural equations among
those variables" (431f). Thus, the causal model (S,F ) itself is not objective. For the
choice of the signature S (the choice of relevant variables and their possible values)
is likely to be governed by criteria that are sensitive to normative and contextual
factors.
Second, even the judgements of actual causation need to have some objective
core. Otherwise they could hardly help us "identify appropriate targets of corrective
intervention" (432). Take, for example, the claim that Professor Smith is the actual
cause of the receptionist’s problem of pen shortage. This claim is clearly context-
sensitive in the sense that it depends, for example, on the department’s pen policy.
But it also relies on a relation of counterfactual dependence that holds independently
of this norm.
But if causal models (plus information about the variables’ actual values) and
judgements of actual causation are so similar, why do we need both? Couldn’t we
just make do with either one of them? The function of claims of actual causation
has been the topic of Chapter 5. Knowing, for example, that Professor Smith is the
actual cause of the pen shortage, indicates that Professor Smith is to be blamed and
that her behaviour is a suitable target for avoiding future problems of pen shortage.
Claims of actual causation are highly selective. And this has the advantage that
they can guide agency very straightforwardly—we do not need to consider further
dependencies such as the one concerning the administrative assistant. Presumably,
causal models are somewhat closer to the objective structure because they allow
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representing larger chunks of it. They express complex counterfactual dependencies
that are not captured by a simple claim of the form ’X = x is an actual cause of Y = y.’
These larger chunks still depend upon norms, but do so to a lesser degree because
selection does not have to be constrained so narrowly.
In the following I shall argue that the Problem of Disagreement helps to indicate
one distinctive advantage of causal models: causal models can help us provide a
representation of disagreement about causes that is more conducive to resolving the
disagreement than the bare claims of actual causation. Moreover, I shall argue that
this function is sometimes (but not always) crucially facilitated by incorporating
the default/deviant distinction.
7.5. An Example: Search and Rescue Missions
Let me introduce an example that shall serve as an illustration. The example
concerns the causal role of Non-governmental Search and Rescue missions (NGO
SARs) for fatalities of refugees in the Central Mediterranean. According to Frontex,6
the European Border Control Agency, NGO SARs are an actual cause of the increase
of the number of deaths in the Central Mediterranean in the period from 2015 to
2016. Their narrative of NGO SARs as acting like a "pull factor" has been taken up
by a number of organizations and politicians across Europe. On the other hand, it
has been argued that NGO SARs are only one factor acting within a complex causal
structure, and that it is erroneous to describe NGO SARs as the cause of the increase.
In particular, I will look at a study performed by Forensic Oceanography7 and show
that the most natural way to understand their criticism of Frontex’s claim is to see
it as an attack on Frontex’s assumptions about the causal model.
Let us begin with a closer look at the claims put forward in the Frontex report.
6The following is based on claims made in the risk analysis report for 2017 (FRONTEX (2017)).
7Forensic Oceanography is part of the Forensic Architecture agency which is specialized on investi-
gating violations of human rights and which is located at Goldsmiths, University of London.
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The report describes an increase of the number of deaths of refugees in the Central
Mediterranean and states the following.
"In this context it transpired that both border surveillance and SAR
missions close to, or within, the 12-mile territorial waters of Libya have
unintended consequences. Namely, they influence smugglers’ planning
and act as a pull factor that compounds the difficulties inherent in border
control and saving lives at sea. Dangerous crossings on unseaworthy
and overloaded vessels were organised with the main purpose of being
detected by EUNAVFOR Med/Frontex and NGO vessels. Apparently,
all parties involved in SAR operations in the Central Mediterranean
unintentionally help criminals achieve their objectives at minimum cost,
strengthen their business model by increasing the chances of success.
Migrants and refugees – encouraged by the stories of those who had
successfully made it in the past – attempt the dangerous crossing since
they are aware of and rely on humanitarian assistance to reach the EU"
(FRONTEX, 2017, 32).
According to this passage, the presence of SARs (both NGO and state-led opera-
tions) near the Libyan coastline has two effects. First, they influence the smugglers’
strategies in a way that makes the crossing more risky. The claim is that the presence
of SARs gives a sense of security that allows smugglers to offer crossings on vessels
that are unseaworthy and overloaded. Second, they lead to an overall increase in
attempted crossings. Again the claim is that the presence of SARs gives a sense of
security that encourages more migrants and refugees to risk their lives.
The report goes on, stating that "[c]losely related issues are the safety of migrants
and refugees and, most significantly, the increasing number of fatalities" (32). After
reporting estimates of the fatalities in 2016 the report states that "[t]he increasing
number of migrant deaths, despite the enhanced EUNAVFOR Med/Frontex surveil-
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lance and NGO rescue efforts, seems paradoxical at first glance" (33). But then the
report relates the increase of fatalities to a change in the smugglers’ tactics: "[t]he ris-
ing death toll mainly results from criminal activities aimed at making profit through
the provision of smuggling services at any cost" (33).
It seems fair to assume that the above quoted passages can be summarized by the
following causal model, consisting of three variables (see figure 7.2A). First, S shall
represent the presence of search and rescue missions. Second, C shall be a factor that
represents the risk level of the individual crossing and the number of attempted
crossings. Third, D shall represent the number of deaths. It is claimed that an
increase in S leads to an increase in C, that an increase in C leads to an increase in
D, and that an increase in S also leads to a direct decrease in D. The narrative does
not allow a more detailed quantification of these functional relations. But there is a
possible reading according to which the narrative states that the increase of deaths
via the route 〈S,C,D〉 is larger than the decrease via the route 〈S,D〉.8
The Forensic Oceanography report (Heller and Pezzani, 2017) identifies the pull-
factor claim as part of a toxic narrative within a "de-legitimisation and criminali-
sation campaign" directed at non-governmental search and rescue missions. The
aim of the report is an empirical assessment of the claims put forward by Frontex.
In particular, the report can be understood as challenging the structural relation
between S and C as it is stated by the Frontex report. The report appears to suggest
adding another variable X feeding into C that explains the increase in risk level and
number of attempted crossings from 2015 to 2016 (see figure 7.2B). Here is a brief
8A more precise model can be given by choosing a more fine-grained version of variable C such
that C1 refers to the risk level of the individual crossing and C2 refers to the overall number of
attempted crossings. Then S would have a mixed influence on C1, according to the Frontex report.
First, an increase in S would lead to an increase in C1, which amounts to Frontex’s claim that the
presence of SARs decreases the risk aversion. Second, an increase in S would lead to a decrease
in C1 because the SARs are there to help. Moreover, there would be causal relations among C1
and C2. Increased demand for crossings will lead to less seaworthy vessels being used but more
dangerous crossings will also suppress demand. I choose the more coarse-grained variable C in
order to keep things as simple as possible.
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A B
Figure 7.2.: A simple model of the "pull-factor" narrative. A: version of the Frontex
report. The increase in risk level associated to indivicaul crossings and number of
ttempted crossings C is explained through an increase in the presence of Search and
Rescue missions S. B: version of the Forensic Oceanography report. The increase in C
is mainly attributed to a change in background factors.
summary of factors included in X, according to the Forensic Oceanography report.
First, EUNAVFOR Med’s9 mission to counteract smuggling activities in the Cen-
tral Mediterranean included among other strategies the destruction of smuggler’s
vessels. As a consequence, smugglers started making use of cheaper and much
less seaworthy rubber dinghies. Second, following a shipwreck in 2015 corpses
where washed ashore in Zuwara, which was then the main point of departure for
migrants at the Libyan coast. As a consequence, the smugglers were pushed out of
Zuwara and moved to Sabratha. Sabratha was under the control of militia who then
entered the smuggling business helping it to grow to an industrial scale. Third, the
options for crossing vary in price. The more expensive options are less risky, for
example, because part of the price is paid only after successful landing in Europe.
While migrants from the Horn of Africa tended to seal safer deals, the increasing
number of poorer migrants from Central and Western Africa could not afford them
and chose more risky options. Fourth, the Libyan Coastguard intercepted migrants
and thereby, according to the report, complicated the situation at the Libyan coast.
In particular, it is not clear to what degree the Libyan Coast Guard collaborated
with smugglers or is corrupted. The authors also report instances where the Libyan
Coast Guard violently interrupted rescue operations leading to many deaths.
9European Union Naval Forces – Mediterranean, also called Operation Sophia.
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Moreover, the Forensic Oceanography report describes NGO SARs as a con-
tinuation or replacement of preceding state-led search and rescue missions10. In
particular, the report claims that "[a]iming to deter migrants from crossing the
Mediterranean, the EU and its member states pulled back from rescue at sea at the
end of 2014, leading to record numbers of deaths. Non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) were forced to deploy their own rescue missions in a desperate attempt
to fill this gap and reduce casualties." That is, whereas the Frontex report suggests
that there is a new kind of search and rescue missions that explains the increase, the
Forensic Oceonography report describes the presence of search and rescue activity
in the Mediterranean as a default condition.
The report clearly states that "contrary to the claim made by Frontex and oth-
ers, SAR NGOs have made the crossing safer." Yet, at the same time the Forensic
Oceanography emphasizes that
"[t]he risk that their presence would keep reinforcing the trends we have
discussed, thus resulting in effects that are the exact opposite of their
humanitarian aims, is real and should not be underestimated. SAR
NGOs are acutely aware of this difficult position. As the authors of
an internal MSF position document "Unsafe passage" noted: "We are
caught in a vicious circle because both smugglers and border guards are
exploiting our presence at sea and people continue to die, despite our
actions"" (Heller and Pezzani, 2017).
That is, even though the Forensic Oceanography report disagrees with the causal
relevance that Frontex ascribes to the negative effects of SARs, it does not deny that
there is a causal relation.
10See also their earlier report "Death by Rescue" (2016).
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7.6. The Role of Defaults
With the example of Search and Rescue Missions at hand let us return to the ar-
gument for extended causal models. The point I shall make in this section is that
there are cases where extended causal models facilitate the function of representing
disagreement over causes better than causal models that do not incorporate the
default/deviant distinction.
The disagreement between the Frontex report and the Forensic Oceanography
report concerns whether the presence of SARs led to an increase in the number of
deaths in the Central Mediterranean. The underlying causal question that is at stake
in this example is: why are refugees willing to risk their lives in an attempt to cross
the Mediterranean? The presence of SARs (and stories about how they guarantee
safety on sea) is considered to be one factor. However, the presence of SARs is
surely not a sufficient criterion for someone to risk one’s life. It seems plausible to
assume that relevant factors in the decision are among others: (i) the situation in the
home country, (ii) the hope for a better life in the EU, (iii) the absence of alternative
pathways into the EU (legal pathways, or simply pathways that are not as risky).
Suppose each of these factors corresponds to a variable in a causal model such
that a variable describing the willingness of refugees to risk their lives depends
upon these variables. The disagreement about the causal role of SARs involves
agents that have opposing views about which of these variables represent scenarios
that are to be taken seriously—for functional, legal, and moral reasons. And these
considerations are associated with considerations about who is to be blamed for
the refugees’ deaths and specific policy interventions that these agents consider to
be feasible or not. For example, there is disagreement about the moral and legal
feasibility of cutting back life-saving missions on sea. Correspondingly, these agents
will have very different views regarding the actual causes (in a norm-dependent
sense) of the willingness of refugees to risk their lives.
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How should this disagreement be represented in terms of standard or extended
causal models? One way would be to require that the involved agents agree on
a set of variables V by including all variables that are at stake in the debate and
represent their disagreement on the level of the default/deviant distinction. From
a humanitarian perspective, for example, life-saving missions would be the moral
and legal default. By contrast, certain opposing agents might want to describe the
absence of SARs as the default state. But both kinds of agents would be required to
include a variable representing SARs.
Alternatively, one could require the views to be expressed by different standard
causal models that reflect the individual views about what scenarios are to be
taken seriously. This is what is suggested by the adjust-the-model strategy. The
advantage is that such models do not incorporate the default/deviant distinction
which is considered unclear. The disadvantage, however, is that now the unclarity
occurs in a disagreement about which scenarios are to be represented by the model
in the first place.
The problem with this strategy is that it leaves unclear whether agents disagree for
normative or for epistemic reasons. Suppose agent A1 does not include a particular
variable X in her standard causal model even though agent A2 thinks that X is a
cause of Y. Does agent A1 mean to say that a change in X would merely amount to
a scenario that is not to be taken seriously? Or does agent A1 mean to imply that
even if X were part of the model, it would not stand in a causal relation with Y?
Extended causal models clearly fare better in this kind of context. They provide
the formal resources that help the involved agents to point out where disagreement
arises for normative reasons and where it arises for epistemic reasons. Agent A1
would be required to include X into the model and clarify whether she takes Y to
be independent of X or merely considers X to represent scenarios that from her
particular point of view are highly abnormal.
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This is particularly important in cases where it is likely that disagreement arises
not only about norms but also about the underlying counterfactual dependencies.
The core of Frontex’s pull factor claim is the counterfactual dependency of C on
S. But this claim is of course difficult to assess directly. It involves non-trivial
assumptions about the refugees’ dispositions to risk their lives. It is also difficult
to assess it in an interventionist fashion. For performing testing interventions on
the target system is unfeasible in practice. Instead Frontex supports the pull-factor
claim by a comparison of the risk levels in 2015 and 2016 and relates this to an
increase of the NGO SAR activity over this period. But this argument is of course
valid only if all other potential causes for an increased risk level remain constant
over this period. In Frontex’s selective causal model it looks like this is the case. A
more encompassing model that includes information about the specific situation in
Libya and the availability of alternatives, however, suggests that Frontex’s claims
are unwarranted. In order to warrant the pull-factor claim in the context of such a
more encompassing model the Frontex report would have to show that the influence
of these other factors is irrelevant.
7.7. Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that there are contexts in which the default/deviant
distinction is a useful extension of the standard formalism of causal models. In
particular, I have examined the scope of a particular argument against defaults, the
adjust-the-model argument. I have taken the adjust-the-model argument to make
a convincing case against the Problem of Isomorphism. Then I have argued that
it extends to a descriptive reading of the Problem of Disagreement. Agents who
disagree about actual causation are likely to support their claims with diverging
causal narratives. If we take such narratives to be indicators for underlying causal
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model assumptions, then it seems descriptively inadequate to assume that agents
who disagree about actual causation still agree on the underlying causal model.
However, there is a prescriptive reading of the Problem of Disagreement that pro-
vides a strong case for incorporating the default/deviant distinction into causal
models. And here the adjust-the-model argument does not apply. In cases of dis-
agreement causal models should act as a representative tool for assumptions about
the underlying causal structure that are shared by the involved agents. This helps
keeping normative disagreement apart from disagreement about the underlying
counterfactual structure. This is particularly important in cases with complex and
contested structure such as in the context of claims about the causal role of Search
and Rescue missions in the Central Mediterranean.
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8. Conclusion and Outlook
My main aims have been, first, to argue that we need to be pluralist with regard
to actual causation and, second, to provide an analysis of the context-sensitivity of
concepts of actual causation. Part has provided the background for my account.
In Chapter 2 I have introduced two central problems for theories of actual cau-
sation: the problem of redundancy and the problem of selection. In Chapter 3
I have reviewed how causal models have been employed in a range of attempts
to provide a unified approach to these two problems. Part II has developed my
pluralist account. In Chapter 4 I have argued from an interventionist perspective
that we need to distinguish three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing,
and contributing actual causation. In Chapter 5, I have argued that we also need
a pluralist account with regard to the function of these concepts: even though the
interventionist approach is largely successful there are some instances of reasoning
in terms of actual causation that are better explained from the perspective of respon-
sibility. Part III has explored consequences of the pluralist account with particular
regard to the context-sensitivity of actual causation. In Chapter 6 I have employed a
distinction between two kinds of context-sensitivity in order to show that attempts
to provide a principled approach to actual causation in the law face difficulties. In
Chapter 7 I have provided a new argument for incorporating a distinction between
context-sensitive default and deviant values into causal models. In this last chapter
I shall briefly revisit the main results of each chapter and provide an outlook.
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In Chapter 2 I have introduced two challenges for theories of actual causation:
the problem of redundancy and the problem of selection. In particular, I have intro-
duced four kinds of redundancy: early preemption, late preemption, symmetrical
overdetermination, and trumping. Moreover, I have highlighted the challenges that
these forms of redundancy pose for counterfactual accounts. Next, I have turned
to the problem of selection, which is aptly captured by what I have called Mill’s
challenge: causal selection is capricious and not justified. I have then discussed
two kinds of approaches and I have assessed whether they meet Mill’s challenge.
Contextual-variable accounts (such as contrastive accounts) provide an explanation
of the perceived capriciousness of causal selection: claims in the binary form ("A
causes B") are incomplete and as soon as we fix the contextual variables the prob-
lem disappears. However, contextual-variable accounts do not provide criteria for
reconstructing the content of contextual variables and, thus, do not explain why
stating causal claims in binary form is mostly successful and, thus, justified. I have
then argued that a promising way to approach this problem is to make use of a con-
cept of normality. Normality is clearly a contextual concept. In different contexts
different dimensions of normality apply. There are, for example, statistical, func-
tional, and moral norms. Moreover, what is normal according to each particular
kind of norm varies as well. Nevertheless, considerations of normality are often
largely stable across contexts and they can be justified.
I have also highlighted an interesting parallel between the two problems. Both
problems can be explained away if we accept extremely revisionary notions of
causation. If we apply an extremely fine-grained individuation scheme for events,
then redundancy can be explained away because, for example, the preempting and
the preempted factor no longer compete for causing the same effect event. However,
this does not seem to be acceptable because the fine-grained individuation scheme
leads to a concept of causation that is far too permissive. If we restrict the notion
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of cause to the totality of jointly sufficient conditions of an effect, then the problem
of selection can be explained away. Yet, again, this does not seem to be acceptable
because we rarely use the term cause in such a restrictive way. In either case
explaining away the problem seems to come at the price of neglecting a range of
context-sensitive but important aspects of reasoning in terms of actual causation
that are in need of philosophical elucidation.
In Chapter 3 I have reviewed approaches to a unified concept of actual causation
that make use of the formal framework of causal models. First, I have discussed
a series of accounts that define actual causation as dependence given that certain
variables are being held fixed at their actual values. These accounts provide a suc-
cessful treatment of cases involving early preemption but face problems in cases
involving symmetrical overdetermination. The discussion of these accounts pre-
pares my concept of path-changing actual causation as defined in Chapter 4. Then I
have addressed accounts that define actual causation as dependence given that cer-
tain variables are set to non-actual values. These accounts succeed also with respect
to symmetrical overdetermination and correspond to my concept of contributing
actual causation.
However, both kinds of accounts face a challenge that arises from the Problem
of Isomorphism: there are pairs of cases that appear to have isomorphic causal
models but different causal judgements apply. This suggests that our causal judge-
ments go beyond the content of standard causal models. I have then turned to
approaches to the Problem of Isomorphism that incorporate a distinction between
default and deviant values. In particular, I have looked at Halpern and Hitchcock’s
approach that implements the distinction in combination with normality orderings
over possible worlds. This approach promises to account not only for issues related
to redundancy but also for the problem of selection. Thus, it seems to provide a
unified account of actual causation.
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In Chapter 4 I have provided the first part of my pluralist account of actual
causation. According to my account, we need to distinguish total, path-changing,
and contributing actual causes. The definitions of these concepts are closely re-
lated to existing definitions discussed in Chapter 3. However, so far it has not
been acknowledged that these definitions describe different and equally legitimate
concepts of actual causation. I have provided two lines of argument for this claim.
First, I have provided three toy examples that raise problems for unified accounts.
The examples have in common that there are two factors that both seem to qualify
as actual causes. Yet, at the same time, there is an important asymmetry between
these factors. Extant theories face the problem that they either describe both factors
as actual causes but then they cannot explain the asymmetry. Alternatively, extant
theories dismiss the intuition that both factors are actual causes and account for the
asymmetry by identifying only one of the factors as actual cause. My explanation
is that each example involves two actual causes but that they are different kinds of
actual causes, which explains the perceived asymmetry.
The second line of argument for my pluralist account is a functional argument.
Given that the notion of actual causation has the purpose to help us identify suitable
targets of intervention, I argue, we need to distinguish different concepts of actual
causation. The reason is that total, path-changing, and contributing actual causes
enable different kinds of control over their effects. Total actual causation means that
the effect can be prevented by an intervention on the actual cause. Contributing
actual causation means that other and independent factors have to be targeted as
well. Finally, path-changing actual causation describes the special case where a
primary intervention on the actual cause needs to be combined with a secondary
intervention that counteracts the adverse consequences of the primary intervention.
Moreover, I have argued that we can distinguish two kinds of context-sensitivity.
Context-sensitivity1 concerns the normality or typicality of the individual variables’
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possible values. This kind of context-sensitivity concerns total, path-changing, and
contributing actual causation if the concepts are combined with a normality ordering
over possible worlds. Context-sensitivity2 concerns considerations regarding pos-
sible violations of the model’s structural equations. This kind of context-sensitivity
additionally affects path-changing actual causation.
In Chapter 5 I have scrutinized a key assumption of the foregoing chapter: that
the function of concepts of actual causation is to indicate suitable targets of in-
tervention. I have argued that there are two kinds of cases where interventionist
accounts have difficulties to explain the function of relevant causal intuitions. First,
interventionists have difficulties to explain our interest in certain selective claims
of total actual causation. Hitchcock and Knobe’s drug vignette describes a case
where we identify a norm-violating factor as actual cause even though this factor is
not a suitable target of intervention. Second, in cases of late preemption it is diffi-
cult to explain the distinction between path-changing actual causes and preempted
factors. Both path-changing actual causes and preempted factors correspond to
independent causal processes leading up to the effect and in order to prevent the
effect, both causal processes have to be intervened upon in the same sense.
In both instances a better explanation of the corresponding causal intuitions is
achieved with reference to the retrospective evaluation of responsibility. The reason
why retrospective evaluations of responsibility seem to provide a better explanation
is related to an asymmetry between the retrospective evaluation of past actions and
the prospective evaluation of future actions. Factors that lie beyond the control of
an agent and that are not foreseen by the agent affect the retrospective evaluation
but not the prospective evaluation.
In Chapter 6 I have examined the context-sensitivity of actual causation in the law.
I have argued that Wright’s attempt to employ the NESS criterion in order to provide
a principled account of actual causation in legal inquiry faces counterexamples. In
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order to show this I have employed the distinction between context-sensitivity1
and context-sensitivity2 drawn in Chapter 4. I have argued that even if Wright’s
three-stage framework of legal inquiry may succeed in avoiding issues related to
context-sensitivity1, there still remain issues related to context-sensitivity2. I have
illustrated these issues with variations of cases involving preemptive prevention
and their relation to a legally relevant case where a car accident occurs because a
car approaches a person and the driver fails to use the brakes but the brakes were
also defective. I have argued that Wright’s account runs into problems because it
implies highly implausible causal claims.
By employing causal models I have provided a better account of preemptive
prevention cases and of Wright’s braking case. In a situation where a fielder catches
a ball before it hits the window we identify that fielder as actual cause of the
window’s remaining intact. This is the case even if there was a second fielder who
would have caught the ball if the first fielder had failed. The reason is that in
this kind of situation it is not a far-fetched scenario that the ball hits the window
(both fielders could fail). In the situation where the second fielder is replaced by a
solid brick wall, however, the broken window is not a scenario that is to be taken
seriously and, thus, we need to assume a causal model that is structurally different
from the one that represents the situation with two fielders. The braking case is
similar to the situation that involves the wall. It is a far-fetched scenario that the car
suddenly stops if the brakes are not functional. Therefore, we should not identify
the driver’s failure to operate the brakes as actual cause of the accident. Instead
the cause of the car’s hitting the person is the fact that the car was steered in the
direction of that person in the first place.
In Chapter 7 I have provided a new argument for incorporating a distinction
between default and deviant values into causal models. Often the distinction is
motivated by the Problem of Isomorphism. But it has been shown that instances
240
of the Problem of Isomorphism are more straightforwardly solved by adjusting at
least one of the involved causal models. But there is another problem: the Problem
of Disagreement. Halpern and Hitchcock have argued that when two (or more)
agents agree on the relevant variables and structural equations of a causal model
but disagree with regard to causal judgements, then the default/deviant distinction
is an appropriate way to reflect the disagreement. If this argument is understood as
being based on descriptive claims about how agents actually reason about causes,
then it does not seem to work as an argument for the default/deviant distinction. The
reason is that agents who disagree about actual causes typically also disagree about
which variables are to be included into the underlying causal model. However,
I have suggested a prescriptive reading of this argument: agents who disagree
about actual causation should base their claims on the same model. This helps
disentangling normative and epistemic reasons for disagreement over causation. I
have illustrated the relevance of this claim with an example of disagreement over
causal claims regarding Search and Rescue missions in the Central Mediterranean.
Finally, let me briefly address opportunities for future work that arise from my
account. First, I do not claim that the pluralist account that I have provided here
is exhaustive. Looking at cases of redundancy I have argued that we need to
distinguish total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. But there may
as well be further concepts of actual causation that are needed to account for other
kinds of situations. Moreover, my pluralist theory has focused on actual causation
as a notion that facilitates intervention and the ascription of responsibility. Again,
I do not think that the resulting functional account is exhaustive. Future work may
examine other purposes such as explanation and prediction, which may very well
add new valuable perspectives on why we reason in terms of actual causation in
the way that we do.
Another way to build on the work provided here is to apply the pluralist account
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as a framework for taxonomizing actual causes, for example, in epidemiology.
Media coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic reports the total number of deaths that
were caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The relevant notion of causation that is being
employed here is a notion of actual causation. But often COVID-19 patients suffer
from a range of pre-existing diseases. Therefore, there arise interesting questions
regarding how the virus is being selected as the salient factor and whether there are
cases that involve redundancy (such that the virus is only a contributing actual cause
or not a cause at all because it was preempted). Moreover, the COVID-19 outbreak
can in some instances be seen as a path-changing actual cause of death. There is a
significant number of cases where death can be prevented through intensive care.
However, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has also lead to a breakdown
of the health care systems in several countries. This has adverse consequences for
patients that need intensive care for other reasons. The deaths that result from a
COVID-19 induced breakdown of health care systems may, thus, also have to be
counted as being actually caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
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